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IdTitle * Authors * Abstract * PictureThematic fields * RecommenderReviewersSubmission date
27 Mar 2024
STAGE 1

Impulsivity and online sports betting behaviour: Untangling the causal relationship (ISPO study)

Examining the causal pathways from impulsivity to disordered gambling in online sports betting

Recommended by based on reviews by 2 anonymous reviewers
Online sports betting is becoming increasingly popular worldwide, which has raised concerns about the negative consequences it has on both individual health and public health. To prevent and reduce these negative consequences, it is important to understand how gambling-related harms arise in the context of online sports betting. 

Impulsivity has long been recognized as a risk factor for disordered gambling, yet how impulsivity may lead to gambling-related harms is not entirely clear. In the current study, Jacob and colleagues (2024) aim to examine this question using a longitudinal cross-lagged panel design. Regular online sports bettors will be invited to fill out measures of impulsivity (including impulsive choice, impulsive action, and impulsivity personality) and gambling disorder symptoms three times at three-month intervals. Player tracking data on these players' online betting behavior in these three-month intervals will then be retrieved from the online gambling provider. Combining these data provides a unique opportunity to test the hypotheses that impulsivity may lead to riskier online gambling behavior, which in turn may lead to more gambling-related problems later on. The results of the current study will offer novel insights into the causal pathways from impulsivity to disordered gambling in online sports betting, and may also inform the development of early prevention strategies to reduce gambling-related harms.

The current Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated by two reviewers and the recommender. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/7wsfh
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 3. At least some data/evidence that will be used to the answer the research question has been previously accessed by the authors (e.g. downloaded or otherwise received), but the authors certify that they have not yet observed ANY part of the data/evidence.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 
References
 
1. Jacob, A., Joshanloo, M., Czernecka, R., & Kräplin, A. (2024). Impulsivity and online sports betting behavior: Untangling the causal relationship. In principle acceptance of Version 4 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/7wsfh
Impulsivity and online sports betting behaviour: Untangling the causal relationship (ISPO study)Anne Jacob, Mohsen Joshanloo, Robert Czernecka, Anja Kräplin, <p>The rapid expansion of online sports betting has raised concerns about its potential impact on individual health and public health. In order to further develop etiological models for gambling disorder (GD) in sports betting, it is essential to ...Social sciencesZhang Chen2023-10-16 13:58:01 View
21 Sep 2022
STAGE 2
(Go to stage 1)
article picture

Phenomenological Strands for Gaming Disorder and Esports Play: A Qualitative Registered Report

The lived experience of gamers: a comparative qualitative investigation of treatment-seekers and esports players

Recommended by ORCID_LOGO based on reviews by Malte Elson and Peter Branney
Since 2018, the inclusion of “gaming disorder” in the ICD-11 has been met with a mixture of interest, confusion and controversy (Van Rooij et al, 2018), mirroring broader debates about the effects of gaming on mental health. One of the major gaps in understanding the validity of gaming disorder as an identifiable mental illness is the absence of qualitative studies comparing the lived experience of gamers who seek treatment with esports players who do not report health problems.
 
Here, Karhulahti et al. (2022) tackle this question in the first of two Stage 2 Registered Reports associated with their previous programmatic Stage 1 submission. Using interpretative phenomenological analysis in gamers and medical experts, they find that treatment-seekers and esports players differ in how gaming is associated with the sense of self, either interfering with the self for treatment-seekers or successfully integrating into the self for esports players. These findings help to identify the key characteristics of problematic and non-problematic gaming and call for more intensive and wide-reaching qualitative research in this area.
 
Following one round of in-depth review and revision, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 2 criteria and awarded a positive recommendation.
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/a2rwg
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 4. At least some of the data/evidence that was used to answer the research question existed prior to in-principle acceptance(IPA) but the authors certify that they did not access any part of that data/evidence prior to IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 
 
References
 
1. van Rooij AJ, Ferguson CJ, Carras MC, Kardefelt-Winther D, Shi J, Aarseth E, Bean AM, Bergmark KH, Brus A, Coulson M, Deleuze J, Dullur P, Dunkels E, Edman J, Elson M, Etchells PJ, Fiskaali A, Granic I, Jansz J, Karlsen F, Kaye LK, Kirsh B, Lieberoth A, Markey P, Mills KL, Nielsen RKL, Orben A, Poulsen A, Prause N, Prax P, Quandt T, Schimmenti A, Starcevic V, Stutman G, Turner NE, Looy J van, Przybylski AK (2018) A weak scientific basis for gaming disorder: Let us err on the side of caution. Journal of Behavioral Addictions, 7, 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1556/2006.7.2018.19
 
2. Karhulahti V-M, Siutila M, Vahlo J, Koskimaa R (2022) Phenomenological Strands for Gaming Disorder and Esports Play: A Qualitative Registered Report. Stage 2 Registered Report, acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/q53jz
Phenomenological Strands for Gaming Disorder and Esports Play: A Qualitative Registered ReportVeli-Matti Karhulahti, Miia Siutila, Jukka Vahlo, Raine Koskimaa<p>The recent inclusion of gaming disorder in the ICD-11 as a mental disorder has further increased the importance of researching the health spectrum related to gaming. A critical area in this regard is the lack of clarity concerning the differenc...Medical Sciences, Social sciencesChris Chambers2022-06-11 23:49:03 View
07 Dec 2023
STAGE 1

Is conscious perception necessary to direct attention? A replication of Jiang et al. (2006)

Can sexually salient stimuli direct attention outside of conscious awareness?

Recommended by ORCID_LOGO based on reviews by Myron Tsikandilakis and Surya Gayet
Are attention and consciousness inherently intertwined or distinct aspects of cognition? One report (Jiang et al. 2006) presented clear results in evidence of the latter. In this earlier study, the authors used a continuous flash suppression (CFS) paradigm which presents a colorful pattern to the dominant eye and stimuli of interest to the non-dominant eye; the colorful pattern masks the relevant stimulus from awareness. On each trial, the authors presented a sexually stimulating image and a scrambled image on different sides of a computer screen during CFS. They found that, even though participants were not consciously aware of the images, intact images that matched participants' sexual orientation could still capture attention.
 
Despite these seemingly clear results, the authors of the current Stage 1 manuscript pointed out that CFS studies are often not replicated, and the paper by Jiang et al. (2006) is no exception. Therefore, Chen et al. (2023) seek to replicate this study using a Bayesian (rather than NHST) analytic approach. This method will allow the authors to determine the strength of evidence for their hypotheses.
 
In this Stage 1 manuscript, Chen et al. present an introduction that motivates the replication, and a pilot study that replicated the procedure of Jiang et al. (2006) conducted with 21 participants. This led to a well-motivated statistical sampling plan and some small design changes for the main experiment, such as adding a staircasing procedure to remove potential performance ceiling effects, and using less extreme wording for stimulus attractiveness ratings. A clear study design template is presented, detailing the different hypotheses that will be tested, and what different outcomes would indicate.
 
The Stage 1 submission was evaluated by the recommender and two expert reviewers. Following revisions, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/b2ncp
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 

References
 
1. Jiang, Y., Costello, P., Fang, F., Huang, M., & He, S. (2006). A gender-and sexual orientation-dependent spatial attentional effect of invisible images. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 103, 17048-17052. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0605678103
 
2. Chen, Y.-J., Scott, R.B., & Dienes, Z. (2023). Is conscious perception necessary to direct attention? A replication of Jiang et al. (2006). In principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/b2ncp
Is conscious perception necessary to direct attention? A replication of Jiang et al. (2006)Yung-Jung Chen, Ryan B Scott, Zoltan Dienes<p>The relationship between attention and consciousness has been debated for the past few decades. Observing attentional biases induced by visual stimuli below conscious threshold is one way of providing evidence for the independence of attention ...Social sciencesReshanne Reeder2023-10-11 22:02:33 View
14 Mar 2023
STAGE 2
(Go to stage 1)

Causal evidence for the role of the sensory visual cortex in visual short-term memory maintenance

The visual cortex can maintain information for up to a second

Recommended by ORCID_LOGO based on reviews by Evie Vergauwe and Vincent van de Ven
According to the sensory recruitment framework, the visual cortex is at least in part responsible for maintaining information about elementary visual features in visual short term memory. Could an early visual area, constantly taking in new information, really be responsible for holding information for up to a second? But conversely, could higher order regions, such as frontal regions, really hold subtle sensory distinctions? It must be done somewhere. Yet the existing evidence is conflicting. Phylactou et al. addressed this question by applying transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to disrupt early visual areas at intervals up to a second after stimulus presentation to determine the effect on visual short term memory performance. In this way, they causally influenced the sensory cortex at relevant times while tightening up on possible confounds in earlier research.
 
They found that TMS applied to the occipital hemisphere at each of 200ms and 1000ms after presentation of a brief visual stimulus disrupted stimuls detection on a visual short term memory test. These findings support sensory recruitment, which claims that both perceptual and memory processes rely on the same neural substrates in the visual cortex.

The Stage 2 manuscript was evaluated by two expert reviewers. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 2 criteria for recommendation.
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/empdt
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that was used to answer the research question was generated until after Stage 1 IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 
 
References
 
1. Phylactou, P., Shimi, A. & Konstantinou, N. (2023). Causal evidence for the role of the sensory visual cortex in visual short-term memory maintenance, acceptance of Version 13 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/64hdx
Causal evidence for the role of the sensory visual cortex in visual short-term memory maintenancePhivos Phylactou; Andria Shimi; Nikos Konstantinou<p>The role of the sensory visual cortex during visual short-term memory (VSTM) remains controversial. This controversy is possibly due to methodological issues in previous attempts to investigate the effects of transcranial magnetic stimulation (...Social sciencesZoltan Dienes2023-01-03 08:47:59 View
06 Jun 2022
STAGE 1

Causal evidence for the role of the sensory visual cortex in visual short-term memory maintenance

Can the visual cortex maintain information in the short term?

Recommended by ORCID_LOGO based on reviews by Robert McIntosh, Evie Vergauwe and Vincent van de Ven
According to the sensory recruitment framework, the visual cortex is at least in part responsible for maintaining information about elementary visual features in visual short term memory. Could an early visual area, constantly taking in new information, really be responsible for holding information for up to a second? But conversely, could higher order regions, such as frontal regions, really hold subtle sensory distinctions? It must be done somewhere. Yet the existing evidence is conflicting. Phylactou et al. seek to address this question by applying transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to disrupt early visual areas at intervals up to a second after stimulus presentation to determine the effect on visual short term memory performance. In this way they will causally influence the sensory cortex at relevant times while tightening up on possible confounds in earlier research.
 
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review by three expert reviewers. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/empdt
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 
 
References
 
1. Phylactou, P., Shimi, A. & Konstantinou, N. (2022). Causal evidence for the role of the sensory visual cortex in visual short-term memory maintenance, in principle acceptance of Version 5 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/empdt
Causal evidence for the role of the sensory visual cortex in visual short-term memory maintenance Phylactou, P., Shimi, A., & Konstantinou, N.<p>The role of the sensory visual cortex during visual short-term memory (VSTM) remains controversial. This controversy is possibly due to methodological issues in previous attempts to investigate the effects of transcranial magnetic stimulation (...Social sciencesZoltan Dienes2021-10-10 11:44:54 View
21 Apr 2024
STAGE 1

Mechanisms of secularization: Testing between three causal pathways

Understanding links between secularization, rationalisation and insecurity

Recommended by ORCID_LOGO based on reviews by Chris Chambers and 1 anonymous reviewer
What relationship can be expected between secularization, rationalisation and insecurity? While some authors argue that rationalisation reduces the willingness to belong to religious groups, others have suggested that insecurity increases this need to belong to religious groups.
 
In the current study, Lang and Chvaja (2024) will adjudicate between these two possibilities using an economics game in participants from two countries: US and Poland. The central question posed by the authors is whether cooperative insecurity increases the probability of joining a religious normative group. They will test the relationship between an environment (secure and insecure) and institution (which related to the norm context: religious and secular) on the probability of choosing the normative group in an experimental setting. Therefore, the study will be a quantitative analysis.
 
The authors included an adequate power analysis, alternatives for non-supported hypotheses, and filtering to ensure a high quality of data collection. They also undertook a pilot study to ensure the quality of the procedure and sensitivity of the analyses.
 
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review. Based on ​detailed responses to reviewers’ and the recommender’s comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance.​​​
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/yzgek
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 
 
References
 
1.Lang, M. & Chvaja, R. (2024). Mechanisms of secularization: Testing between the rationalization and existential insecurity theories. In principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/yzgek
Mechanisms of secularization: Testing between three causal pathwaysMartin Lang, Radim Chvaja<p>The study tests two competing explanations of the secularization process related to rationalizing worldviews and decreasing existential insecurity. While the former explanation argues that people are unwilling to join religious groups because o...Social sciencesAdrien Fillon2023-11-22 11:17:30 View
21 May 2023
STAGE 2
(Go to stage 1)

Sunk cost effects for time versus money: Replication and extensions Registered Report of Soman (2001)

Mixed evidence for the hypothesis that sunk cost effects are weaker for time than money

Recommended by ORCID_LOGO based on reviews by Christopher Olivola and Dilip Soman
The sunk cost fallacy is a cognitive bias in which people persist with a decision that is no longer optimal because of previous resources they have invested (now considered to be spent or “sunk”). Most of us will have heard sunk costs reflected in the saying “throwing good money after bad”, but sunk costs can, in theory, occur more broadly, whether for money, time or any other resource-limited investment. The sunk cost effect for money has been widely studied and appears robust; in contrast, the sunk cost effect for time is more uncertain, and is potentially moderated by the age of respondents (and likely resource availability), the fact that time is irreplaceable, and the tendency for people to account for time less easily than they do for money. In an impactful study, Soman (2001) found that the sunk cost effect for time was indeed weaker than for money, although this finding has not been widely replicated.
 
In the current study, Petrov et al. (2023) replicated three studies (1, 2 and 5) from Soman (2001), asking whether sunk costs are weaker for time than for money, and then testing whether the relative absence of a sunk time cost arises from the inability of participants to account for time or due to more rational beliefs in the evaluation of past time investments.
 
Results provided mixed support for the original findings. Consistent with Soman (2001), the sunk cost effect for money was reliably stronger than for time in Study 1; however, sunk costs for both money and time were comparable in Study 2 (and if anything, slightly stronger for time). The indirect replication of Study 5 from Soman (2001) found that the sunk cost effect for time was not significantly influenced by accounting for time, either using education or by highlighting opportunity costs. Robustness checks confirmed the main preregistered outcomes while also ruling out a range of potential alternative explanations. Overall, the results suggest that that sunk cost effects for time are more context-dependent and empirically volatile than sunk costs for money.
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/65htv
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that was used to answer the research question was generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 
References
 
1. Soman, D. (2001). The mental accounting of sunk time costs: Why time is not like money. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making,14, 169-185. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.370
 
2. Petrov, N. B., Chan, Y. K., Lau, C. N., Kwok, T. H., Chow, L. C., Lo, W. Y. V, Song W., & Feldman, G. (2023). Sunk cost effects for time versus money: Replication and extensions Registered Report of Soman (2001), acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/q9s6p
Sunk cost effects for time versus money: Replication and extensions Registered Report of Soman (2001)Nikolay PETROV, Yin Kan (Megan) CHAN, Cheuk Nam (Chris) LAU, Tin Ho (Donald) KWOK, Lok Ching (Estelle) CHOW, Wai Yan (Vivian) LO, Wenkai SONG, Gilad FELDMAN<p>The sunk cost effect is the tendency for an individual's decision-making to be impacted by unrecoverable previous investments of resources. Soman (2001) found that sunk cost effect is weaker for time than for money (Studies 1 and 2) and that th...Social sciencesChris Chambers2023-04-18 20:57:24 View
13 Jun 2022
STAGE 1

Associations of fear, anger, happiness, and hope with risk judgments: Revisiting appraisal-tendency framework with a replication and extensions of Lerner and Keltner (2001)

Replicating the relationship between emotions and judgments of risk

Recommended by ORCID_LOGO based on reviews by Kelly Wolfe, Max Primbs, Agata Sobków and Karolina Scigala
How do emotions interact with cognition? The last 40 years has witnessed the rise of cognitive-appraisal theories, which propose that emotions can be differentiated along an axis of cognitive dimensions such as certainty, pleasantness, attentional activity, control, anticipated effort, and responsibility (Smith and Ellsworth, 1985). Early tests of such theories focused especially on the impact of the valence – pleasantness/unpleasantness – of emotions on judgment and decision-making, finding, for instance, that negative mood induction can heighten pessimistic estimates of risk (Johnson & Tversky, 1983).
 
The Appraisal-Tendency Framework proposed by Lerner and Keltner (2000) refined cognitive-appraisal theory by proposing that specific emotions trigger a predisposition to appraise future (or hypothetical) events in line with the central appraisal dimensions that triggered the emotion, even when the emotion and the judgment are unrelated. For example, an individual who is triggered to become fearful of a heightened risk, such as nuclear war, may then exhibit heightened pessimism about risks unrelated to war. The Appraisal-Tendency Framework also predicts relationships between traits, such as between fear, anger and risk-taking/risk-seeking tendencies. In an influential paper, Lerner and Keltner (2001) reported direct empirical support for the Appraisal-Tendency Framework, which aside from its influence in cognitive/affective psychology has had considerable impact in behavioural economics, moral psychology, and studies of consumer behaviour.
 
In the current study, Lu and Feldman (2022) propose to replicate three key studies from Lerner and Keltner (2001) in a large online sample. Through a combination of replication and extension, the authors will probe the relationship between various trait emotions (including fear, anger, happiness, and hope) and trait characteristics of risk seeking and optimistic risk assessment. The authors also propose examining how the ambiguity of triggering events moderates the relationship between specific emotions and risk judgments. 
 
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/8yu2x
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 
References
 
1. Smith, C. A., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1985). Patterns of cognitive appraisal in emotion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 813-838. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.48.4.813
 
2. Johnson, E. J., & Tversky, A. (1983). Affect, generalization, and the perception of risk. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45(1), 20–31. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.45.1.20
 
3. Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2000). Beyond valence: Toward a model of emotion-specific influences on judgment and choice. Cognition & Emotion, 14, 473-493. https://doi.org/10.1080/026999300402763 
 
4. Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2001). Fear, anger, and risk. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 146–159. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.81.1.146
  
5. Lu, S. & Feldman, G. (2022). Associations of fear, anger, happiness, and hope with risk judgments: Revisiting appraisal-tendency framework with a replication and extensions of Lerner and Keltner (2001), in principle acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/8yu2x
Associations of fear, anger, happiness, and hope with risk judgments: Revisiting appraisal-tendency framework with a replication and extensions of Lerner and Keltner (2001)Sirui Lu; Gilad Feldman<p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Associations of fear, anger, happiness, and hope with risk judgments: &nbsp;Revisiting appraisal-tendency framework with a replication and extensions of Lerner and Keltner (2001)​"</p>Social sciencesChris Chambers2022-01-31 09:36:29 View
23 Jan 2023
STAGE 1

Comparing time versus money in sunk cost effects: Replication of Soman (2001)

Are sunk cost effects weaker for time than money?

Recommended by ORCID_LOGO based on reviews by Johanna Peetz, Christopher Olivola, David Ronayne, Johannes Leder and Dilip Soman
The sunk cost fallacy is a cognitive bias in which people persist with a decision that is no longer optimal because of previous resources they have invested (now considered to be spent or “sunk”). Most of us will have heard sunk costs reflected in the saying “throwing good money after bad”, but sunk costs can, in theory, occur more broadly, whether for money, time or any other resource-limited investment. The sunk cost effect for money has been widely studied and appears robust; in contrast, the sunk cost effect for time is more uncertain, and is potentially moderated by the age of respondents (and likely resource availability), the fact that time is irreplaceable, and the tendency for people to account for time less easily than they do for money. In an impactful study, Soman (2001) found that the sunk cost effect for time was indeed weaker than for money, although this finding has not been widely replicated.
 
In the current study, Petrov et al. (2023) propose a replication of three studies from Soman (2001), asking whether sunk costs are weaker for time than for money, and then testing whether the relative absence of a sunk time cost arises from the inability of participants to account for time or due to more rational beliefs in the evaluation of past time investments.
 
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/65htv
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 
References
 
1. Soman, D. (2001). The mental accounting of sunk time costs: Why time is not like money. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making,14, 169-185. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.370
 
2. Petrov, N. B., Chan, Y. K., Lau, C. N., Kwok, T. H., Chow, L. C., Lo, W. Y. V, Song W., & Feldman, G. (2023). Sunk cost effects for time versus money: Replication of Soman (2001) [Registered Report Stage 1], in principle acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/u34zb
Comparing time versus money in sunk cost effects: Replication of Soman (2001) Nikolay Petrov, Wenkai Song, Yin Kan (Megan) CHAN, Cheuk Nam (Chris) LAU, Tin Ho (Donald) KWOK, Lok Ching (Estelle) CHOW, Wai Yan (Vivian) LO, Gilad Feldman (gfeldman@hku.hk)<p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Comparing time versus money in sunk cost effects: Replication of Soman (2001) ​"</p>Social sciencesChris Chambers2022-02-23 10:39:42 View
25 Jun 2023
STAGE 1

Reference points and decision-making: Impact of status quo and defaults in a conceptual replication and extensions Registered Report of Dinner et al. (2011)

Understanding the impact of status quo bias and the default effect on decision-making

Recommended by ORCID_LOGO based on reviews by Laurens van Gestel, Julia Nolte and Sylvain Chabé-Ferret
Everyday decisions can often be biased by how different options are presented and which choices were made previously, over and above whichever option is rationally preferable. Two such major biases in judgment and decision-masking are status quo bias and the default effect. The status quo bias reflects a tendency for people to choose an option that has already been implemented or represents the current state of affairs (for instance, choosing to remain with a current energy supplier rather than switching to a different one, even when the current supplier provides less value for money), while the default effect is a bias toward taking a course of action that would occur automatically in the absence of an active choice (such as the pre-selected energy supplier in questionnaire). Status quo bias and default effects can overlap or diverge: the status quo option will often be the same as the default, while on other occasions the default option in a choice set will be determined by other factors and differ from the option that was already implemented.
 
In the current study, Yam and Feldman (2023) propose a replication and extension of an influential study by Dinner et al. (2011) that purported to examine default effects but, arguably, actually studied its nearby cousin, status quo bias. Using a large online sample, the authors will independently test for the existence of both status quo bias and the default effect, before then asking whether (and if so how) status quo bias and default effects interact and how they are related to several potential explanatory variables, including perceived effort (which may be lower for the status quo or default) and endorsements (whether through direct recommendations or indirectly through perceived norms). The authors also build in additional manipulation checks and comprehension checks, in addition to exploratory analyses examining (among other variables), the political orientation of participants.
 
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/ep3jh
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 
References
 
1. Dinner, I., Johnson, E. J., Goldstein, D. G., & Liu, K. (2011). Partitioning default effects: Why people choose not to choose. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 17, 332– 341. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0024354

2. Yam, M. L. M.  & Feldman, G. (2023). Reference points and decision-making: Impact of status quo and defaults in a conceptual replication and extensions Registered Report of Dinner et al. (2011), in principle acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/ep3jh
Reference points and decision-making: Impact of status quo and defaults in a conceptual replication and extensions Registered Report of Dinner et al. (2011)Monique Moon Ling YAM, Gilad Feldman <p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Default, status quo, and past behavior effects: Examining impact of reference points on decisions in a replication and extensions of Dinner et al. (2011)"</p>Social sciencesChris Chambers2023-02-02 06:02:29 View