Studying eye-gaze has long been employed as a central method for understanding attentional dynamics and cognitive processes in a variety of domains. The development of affordable, mobile eye-tracking devices, such as the Pupil Neon, promises new opportunities to extend this research beyond the contexts in which traditional eye-trackers have been available. But how good are such novel devices at detecting variables relevant for the study of eye movements and pupil dilations?

 

Foucher, Krug and Sauter (2024) propose an independent evaluation of the Pupil Neon eye-tracker using the Ehinger et al. (2019) test battery, comparing its performance with a traditional EyeLink 1000 Plus device. In an empirical study, participants will be asked to perform a wide variety of tasks while eye movements and pupil dilations are tracked using both devices. Results on the strengths and weaknesses, as well as potential use cases of the Pupil Neon will be informative for subsequent eye-tracking research. 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the recommender and reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).

 

 

Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. 

 

 

1. Ehinger, B. V., Groß, K., Ibs, I., and König, P. (2019). A New Comprehensive Eye-Tracking Test Battery Concurrently Evaluating the Pupil Labs Glasses and the Eyelink 1000. PeerJ, 7, e7086. https://doi.org/10.7717/peerj.7086

2. Foucher, V., Krug, A., and Sauter, M. (2024). Independent Comparative Evaluation of the Pupil Neon - A New Mobile Eye-tracker. In principle acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/3kc5t

 

When does the perceived wastefulness of different actions affect people's choices? In an influential set of studies examining different conceptions of wastefulness (overspending, underutilization, and sunk costs), Arkes (1996) found a systematic aversion to wastefulness in decision making, even when choosing to avoid wastefulness has no economic value or works against personal interest. While these findings have been influential in basic and applied research, there have been no attempts to directly replicate the results. Moreover, the original study had several methodological limitations, including the use of relatively small samples and critical gaps in statistical reporting and analyses.

 

In the current study, Zhu and Feldman (2024) conducted a high-powered replication of Arkes (1996) using an online sample of participants (N=659). The authors incorporated several extentions to improve the methodological rigor relative to the original article, including comprehension checks, manipulation checks, a within-subjects design, and a novel quantitative analysis of participants' self-reported motivations for their choices. The authors successfully replicated the effect of perceived wastefulness on two of the three scenarios used in the original article, but participants' self-reported reasons for their choices only provided partial support for the role of perceived wastefulness in decisions, with behavioral consistency and maximizing economic value also playing a role. The original effect was not observed in a third scenario, with a failed manipulation check that may indicate changes in the perceptions of wastefulness in the domain (tax preparation). Overall, the results provide some support for the role of wastefulness aversion in decision making, while also showing that perceived wastefulness might be outweighted by other considerations depending on how people interpret or reason about a situation.

 

The Stage 2 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review by the recommender and two expert reviewers. Following revision, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 2 criteria and awarded a positive recommendation.

 

URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/r7tsw
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that was used to answer the research question was generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 

 

 

1. Arkes, H. R. (1996). The psychology of waste. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 9,
213-224. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(199609)9:3%3C213::AID-BDM230%3E3.0.CO;2-1

 

2. Zhu, Z. and Feldman, G. (2024). Revisiting the Psychology of Waste: Replication and extensions Registered Report of Arkes (1996) [Stage 2]. Acceptance of Version 5 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/2jnc8

The Spatial-Numerical Association of Response Codes (SNARC) effect refers to the fact that smaller numbers receive faster responses with the left hand, and larger numbers with the right hand (Dehaene et al., 1993). This robust finding implies that numbers are associated with space, being represented on a mental number line that progresses from left to right. The SNARC effect is held to depend on relative number magnitude, with the mental number line dynamically adjusting to the numerical range used in a given context. This characterisation is based on significant effects of relative number magnitude, with no significant influence of absolute number magnitude. However, a failure to reject the null hypothesis is not firm evidence for the absence of an effect. In this Registered Report, Roth and colleagues (2024) report two large-sample online experiments, with a Bayesian statistical approach to confirm—or refute—a role for absolute number magnitude in modulating the classic SNARC effect (smallest effect size of interest, d = 0.15).

 

Experiment 1 closely followed Dehaene’s (1993) original methods, and found strong evidence for an influence of relative magnitude, and moderate-to-strong evidence against an influence of absolute magnitude. Experiment 2 was designed to exclude some potential confounds in the original method, and this second experiment found strong evidence for both relative and absolute magnitude effects, of comparable effect sizes (in the range of d = .24 to .42). This registered study demonstrates that the SNARC effect is not ‘fully flexible’, in the sense of depending only on relative number magnitude; it is also shaped by absolute magnitude.

 

This Stage 2 manuscript was evaluated by the recommender and one external reviewer. Following appropriate minor revisions, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 2 criteria for recommendation.

 

URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/ae2c8
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that was used to answer the research question was generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 

• Advances in Cognitive Psychology
• Collabra: Psychology
• Experimental Psychology
• Journal of Cognition
• Peer Community Journal
• PeerJ
• Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice
• Royal Society Open Science
• Studia Psychologica
• Swiss Psychology Open

 
References

 

1. Dehaene, S., Bossini, S., & Giraux, P. (1993). The mental representation of parity and number magnitude. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 122, 371–396. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.122.3.371

 

2. Roth, L., Caffier, J., Reips, U.-D., Nuerk, H.-C., Overlander, A. T. & Cipora, K. (2023). One and only SNARC? Spatial-Numerical Associations are not fully flexible and depend on both relative and absolute magnitude [Stage 2]. Acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/epnd4

As children grow, their cognition develops alongside their metacognition – the awareness and understanding of their own thought processes. One important aspect of cognitive development is learning effective strategies for exploring new situations and testing surprising claims, prompting the question of how improvement in cognition and reasoning is related to metacognitive understanding of these processes. For example, as children develop more targeted and efficient exploration strategies to test a surprising claim (e.g. “of these three rocks, the smallest one is the heaviest”), metacognitive understanding of why they are uncertain or skeptical may be crucial to testing the claim effectively and, in the long run, developing more complex reasoning and logical skills.

 

In this lab-based study of 174 children, Hermansen et al. (2024) tested the role of metacognition in shaping how children search for information to test surprising claims. Using a series of measures – including an experimental task involving comparative claims (e.g. “this rubber duck sinks much faster than this metal button”) – the authors asked whether older (relative to younger) children express more uncertainty about surprising claims, propose more plausible reasons for their uncertainty, and are more likely to suggest specific empirical tests for a claim. Furthermore, they investigated whether prompting children to reflect on their uncertainty helps them devise an efficient test for the claim, and whether any such benefit of prompting is greater for younger children.

 

Results provided mixed support for the hypotheses. Contrary to expectations, older children were not more likely than younger children to express uncertainty about surprising claims -- although an exploratory analysis suggested that prior belief may moderate the relationship with age. Consistent with predictions, older children did, however, propose more plausible reasons for their uncertainty and were more likely to suggest specific empirical tests for a claim. Interestingly, prompting children to reflect on their uncertainty did not significantly increase the likelihood that they would generate an efficient test for a claim, although exploratory analysis again suggested that taking to account additional variables (in this case the type of explanation children provide when prompted) could moderate the effect. Taken together, these findings suggest that the development of children’s reasoning about their own beliefs influences their empirical evaluation of those beliefs. Overall, the study highlights the role of metacognition in the development of explicit scientific thinking and suggests a variety of promising avenues for future research.

 

The Stage 2 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 2 criteria and awarded a positive recommendation.

 

URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/uq6dw
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that was used to answer the research question was generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 

 

 

1. Hermansen T. K., Mathisen, K. F., & Ronfard, S. (2024). When children can explain why they believe a claim, they suggest better empirical tests for those claims [Stage 2]. Acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/6ket7?view_only=d86eb8b5296b4499801e052a6a22291f

Many people nowadays struggle with maintaining a healthy diet. Despite the intentions to eat healthily, they often over-consume highly palatable yet nutrient-poor foods and drinks, which in turn can lead to many health problems. There is therefore a need to develop tools that can help people resist the (over-)consumption of such foods and drinks. 

Previous work has shown that training people to execute certain motor responses toward food items can modify their liking for these items, which may also influence their subsequent consumption behavior. Based on these findings, Najberg et al. (2023) developed a mobile game that combined two food-related response training tasks, namely the go/no-go training (Veling et al., 2017) and the cue-approach training (Schonberg et al., 2014). The experimental group was trained to consistently inhibit their responses toward sugary drinks in the go/no-go training, and consistently respond to water items in the cue-approach training (i.e., 100% consistent mapping). In the control group, the mapping between an item and response requirement was 50%, such that participants executed both go and no-go responses toward sugary drinks and water. Najberg et al. (2023) found that after the training, the experimental group reported more reduction in liking for sugary drinks and more increase in liking for water items compared to the control group. However, both groups showed equivalent reduction in self-reported consumption of sugary drinks. 

Using the same design (i.e., 100% vs. 50% consistency), in the current study, Najberg et al. (2024) further examined whether the combined go/no-go and cue-approach training game could help people resist the consumption of sugary drinks. Participants were divided into the experimental and control group (N = 100 and 92, respectively), and received the respective training for a minimum of seven days (and up to 20 days). After completing the training, they were asked to avoid the trained sugary drinks. The number of days in which they reported to successfully adhere to this restrictive diet was used as the main dependent variable. Contrary to their predictions, the two groups did not differ in how long they resisted the consumption of sugary drinks after training. Both groups showed equivalent reductions in liking for sugary drinks (contrary to the finding in Najberg et al., 2023), but this reduction in liking was not correlated with the number of successful days of diet in the experimental group. Lastly, those who trained for more days in the experimental group also adhered to the diet for a longer duration, but this correlation might be explained by differences in motivation across individuals.

Together, these results suggest that consistently withholding responses toward sugary drinks and responding to water items does not help people resist the consumption of sugary drinks, compared to a control intervention in which the mapping is 50%. More research is therefore needed to test the effectiveness of food-related response training in changing consumption behavior outside of laboratory contexts.

The Stage 2 manuscript was evaluated over three rounds of review by two expert reviewers who also assessed the Stage 1 manuscript. Following detailed responses to the recommender and the reviewers’ comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 2 criteria and awarded a positive recommendation.

 

List of eligible PCI-RR-friendly journals: 

 

 

1. Najberg, H., Mouthon, M., Coppin, G., & Spierer, L. (2023). Reduction in sugar drink valuation and consumption with gamified executive control training. Scientific Reports, 13, 10659. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-36859-x

 

2. Veling, H., Lawrence, N. S., Chen, Z., van Koningsbruggen, G. M., & Holland, R. W. (2017). What Is Trained During Food Go/No-Go Training? A Review Focusing on Mechanisms and a Research Agenda. Current Addiction Reports, 4, 35–41. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40429-017-0131-5

 

3. Schonberg, T., Bakkour, A., Hover, A. M., Mumford, J. A., Nagar, L., Perez, J., & Poldrack, R. A. (2014). Changing value through cued approach: An automatic mechanism of behavior change. Nature Neuroscience, 17, 625–630. https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.3673

4. Najberg, H., Tapparel, M., & Spierer, L. (2024). The capacity of response training to help resist the consumption of sugary drinks [Stage 2]. Acceptance of Version 4 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/eu7j4?view_only=4934c0215f2943cfb42e019792a30b53