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Latest recommendations
Id | Title * ▲ | Authors * | Abstract * | Picture | Thematic fields * | Recommender | Reviewers | Submission date | |
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13 Jun 2022
STAGE 1
![]() Revisiting the link between true-self and morality: Replication and extensions of Newman, Bloom and Knobe (2014) Studies 1 and 2Shuk Ching (Janet) Lee, Gilad Feldman https://osf.io/8rp96/Replicating positive evaluations of our "true selves"Recommended by Chris ChambersThe concept of a “true self” – the deepest and most genuine part of a person’s personality – is fundamental to many aspects of psychology, with influences that extend deep into society and culture. For decades, research in psychology has consistently found that people see their true selves as positive and virtuous. But people also positively regard (and indeed overestimate) many other characteristics related to the self, such as their abilities and achievements, prompting the question of whether there is anything special about the “true self” as a psychological concept. In an influential study, Newman et al. (2014) found that people were more likely to attribute morally good than morally bad changes in the behaviour of other people to their true selves. Crucially, they also found that our tendency to view the true self positively is shaped by our own moral values – in essence, what we regard as morally or politically good, we see in the true selves of others. Newman et al’s findings suggest that the tendency for us to regard our true self in a positive light stems from the specific nature of true self as a concept.
In the current study, Lee and Feldman (2022) propose to replicate two key studies from Newman et al. (2014) in a large online sample. In particular, they will ask whether true-self attributions are higher for changes in behaviour that are morally positive compared to morally negative or neutral, and, further, how true-self attributions are aligned with personal moral/political views. The authors also propose exploring the relationship between true-self attributions and perceived social norms.
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/v2tpf Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
References
1. Newman, G. E., Bloom, P., & Knobe, J. (2014). Value judgments and the true self. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40, 203–216. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167213508791
2. Lee, S. C. & Feldman, G. (2022). Revisiting the link between true-self and morality: Replication and extension of Newman, Bloom, and Knobe (2014) Studies 1 and 2, in principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/v2tpf
| Revisiting the link between true-self and morality: Replication and extensions of Newman, Bloom and Knobe (2014) Studies 1 and 2 | Shuk Ching (Janet) Lee, Gilad Feldman | <p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Revisiting the link between true-self and morality: Replication and extensions of Newman, Bloom and Knobe (2014) Studies 1 and 2"</p> | Social sciences | Chris Chambers | 2022-02-15 08:43:21 | View | ||
03 May 2022
STAGE 1
![]() Revisiting the links between numeracy and decision making: Replication of Peters et al. (2006) with an extension examining confidenceMinrui Zhu, Gilad Feldman https://osf.io/8z6ga/Assessing the replicability of specific links between numeracy and decision-makingRecommended by Chris ChambersNumeracy – the ability to understand and work with numbers – is associated with a wide range of social and health-related outcomes, including socioeconomic status, employment, literacy, reasoning, and life satisfaction. A substantial body of evidence has also shown links between numeracy and decision-making, prompting the question of how it relates to finer-grained measures of reasoning, judgment and affect/emotion.
In the current study, Zhu and Feldman propose to replicate four influential experiments from a study by Peters et al. (2006), which demonstrated links between numeracy and performance on a variety of decision-making tasks, including attribute framing, frequency-percentage framing, susceptibility to affective influences, and various cognitive biases. The authors also propose several extended questions, including refinements of the original hypotheses and an examination of the relationship between numeracy and confidence in numeric judgments (subjective numeracy).
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/r73fb
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
References
1. Zhu, M. & Feldman, G. (2022). Revisiting the links between numeracy and decision making: Replication of Peters et al. (2006) with an extension examining confidence, in principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/r73fb
2. Peters, E., Västfjäll, D., Slovic, P., Mertz, C. K., Mazzocco, K., & Dickert, S. (2006). Numeracy and decision making. Psychological Science, 17, 407-413. https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9280.2006.01720.x
| Revisiting the links between numeracy and decision making: Replication of Peters et al. (2006) with an extension examining confidence | Minrui Zhu, Gilad Feldman | <p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Revisiting the links between numeracy and decision making: Replication of Peters et al. (2006) with an extension examining confidence"</p> | Social sciences | Chris Chambers | 2022-01-31 10:27:58 | View | ||
Revisiting the links between numeracy and decision making: Replication Registered Report of Peters et al. (2006) with an extension examining confidenceMinrui Zhu, Gilad Feldman https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/4HJCKAssessing the replicability of specific links between numeracy and decision-makingRecommended by Chris ChambersNumeracy – the ability to understand and work with numbers – is associated with a wide range of social and health-related outcomes, including socioeconomic status, employment, literacy, reasoning, and life satisfaction. A substantial body of evidence has also shown links between numeracy and decision-making, prompting the question of how it relates to finer-grained measures of reasoning, judgment and affect/emotion.
In the current study, Zhu and Feldman repeated four influential experiments from a study by Peters et al. (2006), which reported links between numeracy and performance on a variety of decision-making tasks, including attribute framing, frequency-percentage framing, susceptibility to affective influences, and various cognitive biases. The authors also explored several extended questions, including refinements of the original hypotheses and an examination of the relationship between numeracy and confidence in numeric judgments (subjective numeracy).
The results broadly constitute a successful replication, with higher numeracy associated with weaker attribute framing and susceptibility to bias. The relationship between numeracy and the frequency-percentage framing effect – that is, the change in decision-making when numbers are presented as frequencies (e.g. 5 out of 100) rather than percentages (e.g. 5%) – was inconclusive for the main analysis that treated numeracy as a categorical variable (low vs. high); however the link emerged reliably in exploratory analyses that considered numeracy as a continuous variable. The outcomes of the extended analyses were mixed, revealing evidence for a potentially weak relationship between numeracy and confidence.
The Stage 2 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewer's comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 2 criteria and awarded a positive recommendation.
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/r73fb
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that was used to answer the research question was generated until after IPA.
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
References
1. Zhu, M. & Feldman, G. (2022). Revisiting the links between numeracy and decision making: Replication Registered Report of Peters et al. (2006) with an extension examining confidence. Acceptance of Version 5 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/62wqb
2. Peters, E., Västfjäll, D., Slovic, P., Mertz, C. K., Mazzocco, K., & Dickert, S. (2006). Numeracy and decision making. Psychological Science, 17, 407-413. https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9280.2006.01720.x
| Revisiting the links between numeracy and decision making: Replication Registered Report of Peters et al. (2006) with an extension examining confidence | Minrui Zhu, Gilad Feldman | <p>Numeracy is individuals’ capacity to understand and process basic probability and numerical information required to make decisions. We conducted a Replication Registered Report of Peters et al. (2006) examining numeracy as a predictor of positi... | Social sciences | Chris Chambers | 2023-01-16 10:34:09 | View | ||
21 Nov 2022
STAGE 1
![]() Revisiting the motivated denial of mind to animals used for food: Replication and extension of Bastian et al. (2012)Tyler P. Jacobs, Meiying Wang, Stefan Leach, Siu Ho Loong, Mahika Khanna, Ka Wan Chan, Ho Ting Chau, Yuen Yan Tam, Gilad Feldman https://osf.io/gs4u3Does denial of animal minds explain the "meat paradox"?Recommended by Chris ChambersThe psychology of meat-eating offers a fascinating window into moral reasoning, cognition and emotion, as well as applications in the shift toward more sustainable and ethical alternatives to meat consumption. One key observation in this field is the so-called “meat paradox” – the tendency for people to simultaneously eat meat while also caring about animals. One way to resolve this conflict and reduce cognitive dissonance is for people to separate the concept of meat from animals, mentally disengaging from the origins of meat in order to make the act of consumption more ethically acceptable. Another potential explanation is a motivated “denial of mind”, in which people believe that animals lack the mental capacity to experience suffering; therefore, eating an animal is not a harm that the animal will experience. In support of the latter hypothesis, Bastian et al (2012) found that animals judged to have greater mental capacities were also judged to less edible, and that simply reminding meat eaters that an animal was being raised for the purposes of meat consumption led to denial of its mental capacities.
Using a large-scale online design in 1000 participants, Jacobs et al. (2022) propose a replication of two studies from Bastian et al. (2012): asking how the perceived mental capabilities of animals relates to both their perceived edibility and the degree of moral concern they elicit, and whether learning that an animal will be consumed influences perceptions of its mental capabilities. Among various exploratory analyses, the authors will also examine whether the perception of animal minds (in animals consumed for meat) varies systematically according to species.
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/cru4z Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
References
1. Bastian, B., Loughnan, S., Haslam, N., & Radke, H. R. M. (2012). Don’t mind meat? The denial of mind to animals used for human consumption. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38, 247–256. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167211424291
2. Jacobs, T. P., Wang, M., Leach, S., Loong, S. H., Khanna, M., Chan, K. W., Chau, H. T., Tam, Y. Y. & Feldman, G. (2022). Revisiting the motivated denial of mind to animals used for food: Replication and extension of Bastian et al. (2012), in principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/cru4z
| Revisiting the motivated denial of mind to animals used for food: Replication and extension of Bastian et al. (2012) | Tyler P. Jacobs, Meiying Wang, Stefan Leach, Siu Ho Loong, Mahika Khanna, Ka Wan Chan, Ho Ting Chau, Yuen Yan Tam, Gilad Feldman | <p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Revisiting the motivated denial of mind to animals used for food: Replication and extension of Bastian et al. (2012) "</p> | Social sciences | Chris Chambers | Ben De Groeve, Sebastian Berger, Florian Lange, Brock Bastian | 2022-03-04 04:21:18 | View | |
Revisiting the motivated denial of mind to animals used for food: Replication Registered Report of Bastian et al. (2012)Tyler P. Jacobs, Meiying Wang, Stefan Leach, Ho Loong Siu, Mahika Khanna, Ka Wan Chan, Ho Ting Chau, Yuen Yan Tam, Gilad Feldman https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/H2PQUConfirmatory evidence that the denial of animal minds explains the "meat paradox"Recommended by Chris ChambersThe psychology of meat-eating offers a fascinating window into moral reasoning, cognition and emotion, as well as applications in the shift toward more sustainable and ethical alternatives to meat consumption. One key observation in this field is the so-called “meat paradox” – the tendency for people to simultaneously eat meat while also caring about animals. One way to resolve this conflict and reduce cognitive dissonance is for people to separate the concept of meat from animals, mentally disengaging from the origins of meat in order to make the act of consumption more ethically acceptable. Another potential explanation is a motivated “denial of mind”, in which people believe that animals lack the mental capacity to experience suffering; therefore, eating an animal is not a harm that the animal will experience. In support of the latter hypothesis, Bastian et al (2012) found that animals judged to have greater mental capacities were also judged as less edible, and that simply reminding meat eaters that an animal was being raised for the purposes of meat consumption led to denial of its mental capacities.
Using a large-scale online design in 1000 participants, Jacobs et al. (2024) replicated two studies from Bastian et al. (2012): asking how the perceived mental capabilities of animals relates to both their perceived edibility and the degree of moral concern they elicit, and whether learning that an animal will be consumed influences perceptions of its mental capabilities. The original findings were successfully replicated. For study 1, attributions of mind were negatively related to animals’ edibility, positively related to negative affect towards eating animals, and positively related to moral concern for animals. For study 2, learning that an animal would be used for food led participants to attribute less mind to the animal. Overall, the results strengthen the conclusion that motivated denial of animal minds can be a mechanism for resolving the ‘meat paradox’.
The Stage 2 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 2 criteria and awarded a positive recommendation.
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/cru4z Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that was used to answer the research question was generated until after IPA.
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
References
1. Bastian, B., Loughnan, S., Haslam, N., & Radke, H. R. M. (2012). Don’t mind meat? The denial of mind to animals used for human consumption. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38, 247–256. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167211424291
2. Jacobs, T. P., Wang, M., Leach, S., Loong, S. H., Khanna, M., Chan, K. W., Chau, H. T., Tam, Y. Y. & Feldman, G. (2024). Revisiting the motivated denial of mind to animals used for food: Replication and extension of Bastian et al. (2012) [Stage 2]. Acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/mwyde
| Revisiting the motivated denial of mind to animals used for food: Replication Registered Report of Bastian et al. (2012) | Tyler P. Jacobs, Meiying Wang, Stefan Leach, Ho Loong Siu, Mahika Khanna, Ka Wan Chan, Ho Ting Chau, Yuen Yan Tam, Gilad Feldman | <p>Bastian et al. (2012) argued that the ‘meat paradox’–caring for animals yet eating them–exemplifies the motivated moral disengagement driven by a psychologically aversive tension between people’s moral standards (caring for animals) and their b... | Social sciences | Chris Chambers | 2023-08-10 21:19:16 | View | ||
06 Jun 2022
STAGE 1
![]() Revisiting the psychological sources of ambiguity avoidance: Replication and extensions of Curley, Yates, and Abrams (1986)Sze Ying (Dawn) Yiu, Gilad Feldman https://osf.io/xdes8/Reducing ambiguity in the psychological understanding of ambiguity avoidanceRecommended by Chris ChambersA considerable body of research in behavioural economics has established the existence of ambiguity avoidance: the tendency for people, when given a choice between two options, to choose the option for which there is greater certainty about the probabilities of certain outcomes occurring. In a seminal study, Curley, Yates, and Abrams (1986) explored potential psychological explanations of ambiguity avoidance, contrasting five hypotheses: hostile nature (the anticipation that more ambiguous options are biased against oneself), other-evaluation (the anticipation that one’s decision will be evaluated by others), self-evaluation (the anticipation that one's decision will be self-evaluated in the future), forced-choice (in which the less ambiguous option is selected only when all other considerations are equal), and a more general uncertainty avoidance associated with risk aversion. The results favoured other-evaluation as the most promising explanation, with implications in the following decades for research in social psychology, judgment and decision making, behavioural economics, consumer behaviour, and cognitive psychology.
In the current study, Yiu and Feldman (2022) plan to revisit the psychological basis of ambiguity avoidance in a large online sample through a replication of key studies from Curley et al. (1986), including extensions to increase methodological rigour and to explore the relationship between ambiguity avoidance and hostility bias, anticipated future regret, and post-choice social judgment from others, as well as trait measures of risk tolerance and ambiguity tolerance.
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/wb3hc
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
References
1. Curley, S. P., Yates, J. F. & Abrams, R. A. (1986). Psychological sources of ambiguity avoidance. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 38, 230-256. https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(86)90018-X
2. Yiu, S. Y. & Feldman, G. (2022). Revisiting the psychological sources of ambiguity avoidance:
Replication and extensions of Curley, Yates, and Abrams (1986), in principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/wb3hc | Revisiting the psychological sources of ambiguity avoidance: Replication and extensions of Curley, Yates, and Abrams (1986) | Sze Ying (Dawn) Yiu, Gilad Feldman | <p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Revisiting the psychological sources of ambiguity avoidance: Replication and extensions of Curley, Yates, and Abrams (1986) "</p> | Social sciences | Chris Chambers | 2022-02-15 09:03:37 | View | ||
07 May 2024
STAGE 1
![]() Revisiting the Psychology of Waste: Replication and extensions Registered Report of Arkes (1996)Zijin Zhu, Gilad Feldman https://osf.io/xcthsWhen do perceptions of wastefulness affect how people make choices?Recommended by Douglas MarkantHow do perceptions of wastefulness affect how people make choices? In an influential set of studies examining different conceptions of wasteful behavior (overspending, underutilization, and sunk costs), Arkes (1996) found a systematic aversion to wastefulness in decision making, even when choosing to avoid wastefulness has no economic value or works against personal interest. While these findings have been influential in basic and applied research, there have been no attempts to directly replicate the results. Moreover, the original study has several methodological limitations, including the use of relatively small samples and gaps in statistical analysis and reporting.
In this Stage 1 manuscript, Zhu and Feldman (2024) propose to conduct a high-powered replication of Arkes (1996) using an online sample of participants. The authors will incorporate several extensions to improve methodological rigor relative to the original article, including added comprehension checks, checks of the wastefulness manipulations, a within-subjects design, and a quantitative analysis of participants’ self-reported motivations for their choices. The results of the study will provide insight into the robustness of the original findings, while also better distinguishing wastefulness aversion from other potential reasons behind participants' decisions.
The Stage 1 submission was evaluated by the recommender and two expert reviewers. After two rounds of revision, the recommender determined that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/r7tsw
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
References
1. Arkes, H. R. (1996). The psychology of waste. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 9,
213-224. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(199609)9:3%3C213::AID-BDM230%3E3.0.CO;2-1 2. Zhu, Z. & Feldman, G. (2024). Revisiting the Psychology of Waste: Replication and extensions Registered Report of Arkes (1996). In principle acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/r7tsw
| Revisiting the Psychology of Waste: Replication and extensions Registered Report of Arkes (1996) | Zijin Zhu, Gilad Feldman | <p>[IMPORTANT: Abstract, method, and results were written using a randomized dataset produced by Qualtrics to simulate what these sections will look like after data collection. These will be updated following the data collection. For the purpose o... | Social sciences | Douglas Markant | 2024-01-11 06:55:16 | View | ||
Revisiting the Psychology of Waste: Replication and extensions Registered Report of Arkes (1996)Zijin Zhu, Gilad Feldman https://osf.io/2jnc8When do perceptions of wastefulness affect how people make choices?Recommended by Douglas MarkantWhen does the perceived wastefulness of different actions affect people's choices? In an influential set of studies examining different conceptions of wastefulness (overspending, underutilization, and sunk costs), Arkes (1996) found a systematic aversion to wastefulness in decision making, even when choosing to avoid wastefulness has no economic value or works against personal interest. While these findings have been influential in basic and applied research, there have been no attempts to directly replicate the results. Moreover, the original study had several methodological limitations, including the use of relatively small samples and critical gaps in statistical reporting and analyses.
In the current study, Zhu and Feldman (2024) conducted a high-powered replication of Arkes (1996) using an online sample of participants (N=659). The authors incorporated several extentions to improve the methodological rigor relative to the original article, including comprehension checks, manipulation checks, a within-subjects design, and a novel quantitative analysis of participants' self-reported motivations for their choices. The authors successfully replicated the effect of perceived wastefulness on two of the three scenarios used in the original article, but participants' self-reported reasons for their choices only provided partial support for the role of perceived wastefulness in decisions, with behavioral consistency and maximizing economic value also playing a role. The original effect was not observed in a third scenario, with a failed manipulation check that may indicate changes in the perceptions of wastefulness in the domain (tax preparation). Overall, the results provide some support for the role of wastefulness aversion in decision making, while also showing that perceived wastefulness might be outweighted by other considerations depending on how people interpret or reason about a situation.
The Stage 2 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review by the recommender and two expert reviewers. Following revision, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 2 criteria and awarded a positive recommendation.
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/r7tsw
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that was used to answer the research question was generated until after IPA. List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
References
1. Arkes, H. R. (1996). The psychology of waste. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 9,
213-224. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(199609)9:3%3C213::AID-BDM230%3E3.0.CO;2-1 2. Zhu, Z. and Feldman, G. (2024). Revisiting the Psychology of Waste: Replication and extensions Registered Report of Arkes (1996) [Stage 2]. Acceptance of Version 5 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/2jnc8
| Revisiting the Psychology of Waste: Replication and extensions Registered Report of Arkes (1996) | Zijin Zhu, Gilad Feldman | <p>Arkes (1996) demonstrated a phenomenon of wastefulness avoidance, showing that people’s decisions are impacted by wastefulness, making decisions that avoid appearing wasteful. In a Registered Report with a Prolific sample (N = 659), we conducte... | Social sciences | Douglas Markant | 2024-06-04 19:00:58 | View | ||
06 Jun 2022
STAGE 1
![]() Revisiting the role of public exposure and moral beliefs on feelings of shame and guilt: Replication of Smith et al. (2002)’s Study 1Yikang Zhang, Fung Chit (Jack) Cheung, Hei Tung (Patrina) Wong, Lok Yee (Noel) Yuen, Hui Ching (Rachel) Sin, Hiu Tang (Kristy) Chow, Gilad Feldman https://osf.io/4nqy6/How do public exposure and moral beliefs impact feelings of shame and guilt?Recommended by Chris ChambersShame and guilt are powerful negative emotions that are notable for their external vs. internal focus: while shame is generally experienced in response to public scrutiny, guilt arises from a self-directed, private evaluation. In a formative study, Smith et al. (2002) asked whether the level of public exposure influenced levels of shame and guilt arising from one's transgressions, and found that, compared to private situations, public exposure was more strongly associated with shame than with guilt. Since then, these findings have had significant implications for theories and applications of moral psychology.
In the current study, Zhang et al. propose to directly replicate Smith et al. (2002) in a large online sample. In particular, they will revisit the critical questions from Study 1, asking (a) whether public exposure affects the magnitude of shame and guilt over one’s misconduct, and (b) whether stronger moral belief increases guilt and shame over one’s misconduct.
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/j7kt2
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
References
1. Smith, R. H., Webster, J. M., Parrott, W. G., & Eyre, H. L. (2002). The role of public exposure in moral and nonmoral shame and guilt. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 138-159. https://doi.apa.org/doi/10.1037/0022-3514.83.1.138
2. Zhang, Y., Cheung, F. C., Wong, H.T., Yuen, L. Y., Sin, H. C., Chow, H. T. & Feldman, G. (2022). Revisiting the role of public exposure and moral beliefs on feelings of shame and guilt: Replication of Smith et al. (2002)’s Study 1. https://osf.io/j7kt2
| Revisiting the role of public exposure and moral beliefs on feelings of shame and guilt: Replication of Smith et al. (2002)’s Study 1 | Yikang Zhang, Fung Chit (Jack) Cheung, Hei Tung (Patrina) Wong, Lok Yee (Noel) Yuen, Hui Ching (Rachel) Sin, Hiu Tang (Kristy) Chow, Gilad Feldman | <p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Revisiting the impact of public exposure on shame and guilt: Replications of Smith et al. (2002) Study 1 with extensions examining regret, responsibility, and robustness to a within-s... | Social sciences | Chris Chambers | 2022-02-16 05:05:36 | View | ||
Revisiting the role of public exposure and moral beliefs on feelings of shame and guilt: Replication Registered Report of Smith et al. (2002)’s Study 1Yikang Zhang, Fung Chit (Jack) Cheung, Hei Tung (Patrina) Wong, Lok Yee (Noel) Yuen, Hui Ching (Rachel) Sin, Hiu Tung Kristy Chow, Gilad Feldman https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/J3UE4The effect of public exposure and moral beliefs on feelings of shame and guiltRecommended by Chris ChambersShame and guilt are powerful negative emotions that are notable for their external vs. internal focus: while shame is generally experienced in response to public scrutiny, guilt arises from a self-directed, private evaluation. In a formative study, Smith et al. (2002) asked whether the level of public exposure influenced levels of shame and guilt arising from one's transgressions, and found that, compared to private situations, public exposure was more strongly associated with shame than with guilt. Since then, these findings have had significant implications for theories and applications of moral psychology.
In the current study, Zhang et al. (2023) directly replicated Smith et al. (2002) in a large online sample, revisiting two critical questions from Study 1: (a) whether public exposure affects the magnitude of shame and guilt over one’s misconduct, and (b) whether stronger moral belief increases guilt and shame over one’s misconduct. The results fail to confirm the original conclusions: both public exposure and manipulation of moral beliefs were found to influence shame and guilt, with no reliable evidence that shame was influenced more strongly than guilt. These findings thus constitute a non-replication and offer a challenge to theoretical models that hinge on the separability of shame and guilt as separate constructs.
The Stage 2 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewer's comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 2 criteria and awarded a positive recommendation.
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/j7kt2
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that was used to answer the research question was generated until after IPA.
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
References
1. Smith, R. H., Webster, J. M., Parrott, W. G., & Eyre, H. L. (2002). The role of public exposure in moral and nonmoral shame and guilt. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 138-159. https://doi.apa.org/doi/10.1037/0022-3514.83.1.138
2. Zhang, Y., Cheung, F. C., Wong, H.T., Yuen, L. Y., Sin, H. C., Chow, H. T. & Feldman, G. (2023). Revisiting the role of public exposure and moral beliefs on feelings of shame and guilt: Replication Registered Report of Smith et al. (2002)’s Study 1. Acceptance of Version 5 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/jpx87
| Revisiting the role of public exposure and moral beliefs on feelings of shame and guilt: Replication Registered Report of Smith et al. (2002)’s Study 1 | Yikang Zhang, Fung Chit (Jack) Cheung, Hei Tung (Patrina) Wong, Lok Yee (Noel) Yuen, Hui Ching (Rachel) Sin, Hiu Tung Kristy Chow, Gilad Feldman | <p>Shame and guilt are unpleasant self-conscious emotions associated with negative evaluations of oneself or one’s behavior. Smith et al. (2002) demonstrated that shame and guilt are distinct and are impacted differently by public exposure, that i... | Social sciences | Chris Chambers | 2023-02-03 10:58:20 | View |
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