

# Is subjective perceptual similarity metacognitive?

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## ABSTRACT

Perceptual similarity is a cornerstone for human learning and generalization. However, in assessing the similarity between two stimuli differing in multiple dimensions, it is not well-defined which feature(s) one should focus on. The problem has accordingly been considered ill-posed. We hypothesize that similarity judgments may be, in a sense, metacognitive: The stimuli rated as subjectively similar are those that are in fact more challenging for oneself to discern in practice, in near-threshold settings (e.g., psychophysics experiments). This self-knowledge about one's own perceptual capacities provides a quasi-objective ground truth as to whether two stimuli 'should' be judged as similar. To test this idea, we measure perceptual discrimination capacity between face pairs, and ask subjects to rank the similarity between them. Based on pilot data, we hypothesize a positive association between perceptual discrimination capacity and subjective dissimilarity, with this association being importantly specific to each individual.

**Keywords:** similarity judgment, subjective perceptual similarity, perceptual discrimination capacity, metacognition, subjective perception

## Introduction

30 Subjective perceptual similarity between stimulus pairs has long been studied in human  
31 behavior. These studies explored various factors modulating similarity judgments, such as the  
32 effects of knowledge and expertise, contextual cues, and the order of presenting the stimuli  
33 (Shepard, 1964; Tversky, 1977; Smith, 1989; Smith & Heise, 1992; Medin et al., 1993). Different  
34 theories and quantitative models of similarity have also been proposed (Nosofsky, 1984; Shepard,  
35 1987; Smith, 1989). For example, Roger Shepard famously formulated the universal law of  
36 generalization, according to which humans respond in the same way to stimuli of high similarity,  
37 and the probability of this generalization decays exponentially as the distance increases within a  
38 putative metric psychological space (Shepard, 1987). Later, Shepard's law was expanded to  
39 encompass general non-metrically structured spaces (Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001) and different  
40 accounts; notably, the rate-distortion theory was proposed to explain its nature (Sims, 2018).  
41 Intriguingly, recent research has demonstrated that the exponential similarity decay, coupled with  
42 a signal detection theory, can also effectively capture observations in visual working memory  
43 (Schurgin et al., 2020). There is also a rich history of studies utilizing similarity judgments, in  
44 combination with multidimensional scaling, to uncover the underlying perceptual dimensions of  
45 stimuli (Borg & Groenen, 2005; Hebart et al., 2020).

46 Similarity judgments are subjective, in that it is up to the subject to report how they feel about  
47 the stimuli. Accordingly, some researchers have argued that similarity judgments may reflect key  
48 aspects of conscious perception (Clark, 2000; Rosenthal, 2010; Malach, 2021; Lau et al., 2022;  
49 Tallon-Baudry, 2022; Zeleznikow-Johnston et al., 2023; Moharramipour & Lau, 2024). However, the  
50 essentially subjective nature of these judgments also led to the well-known critique that similarity  
51 is perhaps an ill-posed problem: there is, in a sense, no objective ground-truth as to how similar  
52 two things really are (Goodman, 1972; Medin et al., 1993). For example, Joe Biden may look more  
53 similar to Hillary Clinton than to Barack Obama, with respect to skin color. However, if we focus on  
54 gender-related facial features, Joe Biden may look more similar to Barack Obama. From the outset,  
55 it is unclear which visual features one should focus on. This presents a challenging obstacle to  
56 understanding the processes underlying similarity judgments, as mechanistic explanations of  
57 perception often rely on characterizing the observer as performing optimal inference, given  
58 existing constraints (Rao, 1999; Shen & Ma, 2016).

59 Following previous theoretical work (Lau et al., 2022), we hypothesize that subjective similarity  
60 judgments may be normative and rational, in the sense that they are made systematically based  
61 on the metacognitive access of our own perceptual abilities. Stimuli pairs judged to be more similar  
62 are, in fact, more challenging for oneself to discern in practice. If one judges two perceptual stimuli  
63 to be highly dissimilar, and yet fails to distinguish them in psychophysical tasks, the said similarity  
64 judgment can be regarded as 'incorrect' in a meaningful sense.

65 Revisiting the above example of how subjectively similar two faces are, the idea is that such  
66 judgment would be made on a dimension in which all relevant features are optimally combined,  
67 such that along this dimension, the two faces are maximally distinguishable. Specifically, for this  
68 combination to be optimal, the choice of this dimension should be based on how perceptible each


69 feature is to oneself. In other words, this process is not only about the physical stimulus itself, but  
70 rather, it reflects (implicit) metacognitive knowledge of one's own perceptual abilities.

71 Metacognition is commonly defined as the monitoring (and control) of one's own cognitive  
72 abilities. In the present study, we hypothesize that similarity judgments involve a type of implicit  
73 metacognition. When we make a similarity judgment, it reflects our own perceptual capacities.

74 The above is a non-trivial prediction, because an alternative hypothesis is that subjective  
75 similarity ratings may be made based on whatever visual features that happen to be more salient,  
76 depending on one's fluctuating attentional states, or arbitrary preferences that aren't necessarily  
77 related to one's own performance in near-threshold psychophysical tasks. This alternative  
78 hypothesis is not implausible given that 'error' feedbacks are generally never given to subjects, to  
79 'correct' them or train them, as they make these similarity ratings somewhat freely.

80 To test our hypothesis, we quantify the degree of subjective perceptual similarity between  
81 stimulus pairs by having participants freely rank subjective-similarity, without being given specific  
82 criteria, making it subjective, across a stimulus set (Figure 1A & 1B; subjective similarity judgment  
83 task). We also assess participants' perceptual discrimination capacity between the pairs. The  
84 stimulus pairs may be so obviously dissimilar that discriminating between them is just too easy (i.e.  
85 performance under normal conditions would be at the ceiling). To address this problem, we  
86 propose to use a psychophysical method to measure such discrimination capacity near perceptual  
87 threshold. We measure the participants' discrimination performance within the morph set that  
88 spans between the two stimuli (Figure 1C; near-threshold discrimination task). With this, we  
89 quantify the number of just-noticeable-differences (#JNDs; see legends of Figure 1C for  
90 explanation) between a pair. The #JNDs reflects the perceptual discrimination capacity, with its  
91 higher value indicating a higher capacity. We use faces as stimuli in our study due to their high-  
92 dimensional (i.e. multi-featural) nature, and the fact that these are naturalistic stimuli commonly  
93 encountered in everyday life. In subsequent sections, we use the notion "dissimilarity" instead of  
94 "similarity", so the hypothesized association with discrimination capacity is positive.

95 In summary, we hypothesize that there is a correlation between perceptual discrimination  
96 capacity (in near-threshold tasks) and subjective perceptual dissimilarity (as reflected by self-  
97 ratings of supra-threshold stimulus pairs) within each individual (Hypothesis 1, first row in Table  
98 1). Specifically, perceptual discrimination capacities are higher in face pairs that are subjectively  
99 judged to be more dissimilar. Further – and critically– we hypothesize that this association is  
100 specific to each individual (Hypothesis 2, second row in Table 1), meaning that one's subjective  
101 perceptual dissimilarity is better explained by one's own perceptual discrimination capacity than  
102 other participants' (average) discrimination capacity. This would support the notion that  
103 subjective perceptual similarity may be metacognitive in nature, meaning that it concerns one's  
104 own perceptual capacities, not just the general physical similarity between stimuli. A complete  
105 overview of the hypotheses and their corresponding tests is provided in Table 1.



**Figure 1. Experimental tasks for estimating subjective perceptual dissimilarity and perceptual discrimination capacity.**

(A) Illustration of 30 faces to be used in the present study. (B) The subjective similarity judgment task for estimating the level of subjective perceptual dissimilarity between face pairs. A target face on top and four other faces (candidates) on the bottom are shown to the participant in each trial. Participants are instructed to rank the candidate faces from the most to least similar with respect to the target face by clicking on them in order. Then, a 30x30 dissimilarity matrix is computed from the participant's responses across trials, with the value in each cell of the matrix indicating the level of subjective dissimilarity between a face pair. (C) The near-threshold perceptual discrimination task for measuring the discrimination capacity between two faces. One thousand morphs are created as intermediate transitions between two faces (based on a computational face model; see Methods for details). In each trial, three faces are shown simultaneously to the participants. Two are identical, and one is different from the other two by a certain degree (number of morph steps within the 1000-morph series). Participants are instructed to click on the face that is different from the other two. Task difficulty is maintained by titrating the number of morph steps needed for the different face to be barely detectable, using a standard 1-up-2-down staircase method. The converged (i.e., stabilized) value of the staircase indicates the number of morph steps required to maintain near-threshold performance (71% correct); thus, this value reflects the just-noticeable-difference (JND). Because these morph steps come from a series of 1000 morphs between a face pair (e.g., any two faces in 1A), if e.g. JND = 250 morph steps, we can also describe the two faces concerned as being 4 JNDs apart from each other. This general notion of the number of JNDs (#JNDs) between face pairs, which is just the total number of morph steps (1000) divided by the measured JND, allows us to describe the psychophysical discriminability between two faces, free from the non-standard physical unit of 'morph steps' (which depends on the

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132 arbitrary specifics of the morphing procedure such as total number of steps used).  
133 Essentially, #JNDs indicates the perceptual distance between a face pair, in other words, how  
134 many JNDs are in between the face pair; thus, its higher value corresponds to a higher  
135 discrimination capacity.

## 136 **Methods**

137 Please note that the method section is written in the present tense as the experiment has not  
138 been done yet. We will change the tenses to past tense in the second phase submission.

### 139 **Ethics information**

140 The study received approval from the Ethics Review Committee at RIKEN, complying with all  
141 their ethical guidelines. Informed consent is obtained from participants before the experiment, and  
142 in appreciation of their participation, they are compensated with 3000 yen (approximately 20 US  
143 dollars) for each day of participation (roughly 90 minutes each day).

### 144 **Design**

145 Twelve participants are recruited for the study. They initially perform the subjective similarity  
146 judgment task, twice over the course of two days. After all participants complete this task twice, a  
147 set of 24 face pairs are selected for examination in the near-threshold discrimination task. The  
148 criteria for selecting the face pairs are described in the subsequent sections. Then, all participants  
149 are invited back to perform the near-threshold discrimination task over two days on these 24 face  
150 pairs, randomly splitting the pairs between the days.

151 Note that there are 48 sessions in total, across 12 participants. Each participant performs four  
152 sessions on different days with each session taking more than 60 minutes. This provides us with  
153 enough data to perform our statistical analysis at the individual-level. The subjective similarity  
154 judgment task consists of 300 efficiently crafted trials to estimate the level of subjective perceptual  
155 dissimilarity between all face pairs. Participants perform this task twice, and the achieved  
156 dissimilarity values are averaged to further enhance the robustness. The near-threshold  
157 discrimination task comprises a total of 1440 trials, 60 trials per face pair, to effectively estimate  
158 the perceptual discrimination capacity between a systematically selected set of 24 face pairs.  
159 Furthermore, we recruit more participants if these initial 12 participants don't satisfy our data  
160 collection stopping rule described in the Sampling plan section.

#### 161 *Face data set*

162 The basal face model (BFM) (Paysan et al., 2009) is used to select our face dataset and generate  
163 morphs between the faces for the near-threshold discrimination task. BFM is a widely used  
164 morphable model for generating graphical faces with two embedded vectors describing the shape  
165 and texture of the faces independently. We arbitrarily selected 30 faces from the BFM space, while  
166 ensuring a diverse set that also includes faces positioned close to each other in the BFM space. The  
167 top three shape dimensions were assigned systematically from a cylindrical coordinate with a 2.5  
168 SD radius, and the subsequent top 47 shape dimensions and top 50 texture dimensions were

169 assigned randomly from a uniform distribution ranging between -1.5 and 1.5 SD. The remaining  
170 less important shape and texture dimensions were set to zero. Figure 1A shows the selected 30  
171 faces for the study.

### 172 *Subjective similarity judgment task*

173 In each trial, participants are presented with a visual arrangement consisting of one face  
174 positioned at the top (target face) and four other faces positioned at the bottom (candidate faces)  
175 (Figure 1B). Participants are instructed to rank the four bottom candidate faces based on their  
176 perceived similarity to the top target face by mouse-clicking on the faces in the order of most to  
177 least similar. Each clicked face immediately disappears from the screen, and the trial ends after all  
178 candidate faces are clicked one by one. If participants fail to complete the trial within 30 seconds,  
179 the trial is skipped, and any ranking assigned is disregarded. The aim of this task is to estimate the  
180 level of subjective dissimilarity between each face pair and to construct a dissimilarity matrix  
181 (Figure 1B) for each participant by analyzing their assigned rankings across trials.

182 The level of subjective dissimilarity (dissimilarity value) between two faces is estimated by  
183 calculating the probability of one face being ranked lower than the rest of the faces when the other  
184 face is the target, as outlined in the following. The rankings given in all trials are segmented into  
185 sets of three, consisting of the target face and the combination of two of the four candidate faces  
186 (i.e., six sets per trial). Within each set, the face that ranked lower is marked as the odd face.  
187 Subsequently, the dissimilarity value between a face pair is determined by calculating the ratio of  
188 instances where one of the faces is marked as the odd face across all sets that include the face pair  
189 with either of them as the target face. It is noteworthy that when calculating this ratio, we account  
190 for a non-tested set with an obvious outcome, where one of the faces repeats, by adding 0.5 to both  
191 the numerator and the denominator. This fundamentally prevents getting a dissimilarity value of  
192 zero, as only the diagonal value of the dissimilarity matrix should be zero.

193 The tuple of five faces displayed in each trial is strategically selected using the InfoTuple  
194 method (Canal et al., 2020). This method guarantees that each trial offers informative data, thereby  
195 enhancing the estimation of the dissimilarity matrix. This essentially enables achieving a robust  
196 estimation of the dissimilarity matrix over a smaller number of trials. The trial selection procedure  
197 is similar to the one used by Canal et al. (Canal et al., 2020) and comprises the following steps:

- 198 1. The tuple set in the first 30 trials is selected at random while ensuring that each face is  
199 selected once as the target face.
- 200 2. The dissimilarity matrix is calculated as described above, and a 5-dimensional metric  
201 multidimensional scaling (MDS) (Borg & Groenen, 2005) is applied to the dissimilarity matrix  
202 to find its embeddings.
- 203 3. A cycle of 30 trials, showcasing each face once as the target face, is selected by the InfoTuple  
204 method using the embeddings. The InfoTuple method selects the tuple that maximizes a  
205 mutual information estimate which involves two entropy terms: intuitively, one term favors  
206 tuples whose rankings are uncertain given the current embeddings, while the other  
207 discourages inherently ambiguous tuples that are expected to remain uncertain even if the  
208 embeddings are revealed. So, it aims to select an informative tuple whose rankings are

209 [unknown but yet can be answered reliably \(consistently\). Please refer to the original paper](#)  
210 [for a detailed explanation and the mathematics of the InfoTuple \(Canal et al., 2020\).](#)

- 211 4. The dissimilarity matrix is calculated given all the data collected, and the embeddings are  
212 updated by applying a 5-dimensional metric MDS to the dissimilarity matrix and using the  
213 previous embeddings as the seed in the MDS algorithm.
- 214 5. Steps 3 and 4 are repeated for 9 iterations. We stop after 9 iterations as the dissimilarity  
215 matrix and embeddings reach a relatively stable state at this point. As completing 9  
216 iterations is lengthy and can be exhausting, participants are given a short break after every  
217 3 iterations.

218 The final obtained embeddings are used to recalculate the dissimilarity matrix by computing  
219 the Euclidean distances between the faces. This process results in a more accurate version of the  
220 dissimilarity matrix by refining inaccuracies in some cells of the original dissimilarity matrix due to  
221 insufficient data attributed to them or due to noise in responses (i.e., response inconsistencies).  
222 Therefore, this dissimilarity matrix, derived from the embeddings, is utilized in all the subsequent  
223 stages instead of the original dissimilarity matrix. [Please see the supplementary Figure 1 for a](#)  
224 [schematic overview of the task design described above.](#)

225 We also plan to test a 2-dimensional metric MDS for recalculating the dissimilarity matrix. Even  
226 though there might be significant information loss in using such a low dimensional MDS, it can  
227 further refine the matrix and also make the dissimilarity relations sharper (i.e., more distinct). A  
228 sharp dissimilarity relation can potentially make its association with perceptual discrimination  
229 capacity more salient. This was true in our pilot data. Both Hypothesis 1 and 2 (Figure 2) reached a  
230  $p < 0.05$  at the individual-level in all four participants.

231 We note that in our algorithm, prior to applying a metric MDS, a nonmetric MDS is employed to  
232 fill in the missing cells of the dissimilarity matrix (i.e., pairs with no ranking data). The missing cells  
233 are filled in by the Euclidean distances computed from the embeddings derived by the nonmetric  
234 MDS. This procedure is important in initial iterations in which there are a considerable number of  
235 missing cells. Then, the metric MDS is applied to this filled-in dissimilarity matrix. We don't use the  
236 nonmetric MDS directly because the nonmetric MDS, unlike the metric MDS, doesn't preserve the  
237 magnitude of the dissimilarity between pairs.

238 Last, it is important to mention that each participant performs the above task twice, each time  
239 on a different day. The average of the dissimilarity matrices obtained from each day forms the final  
240 dissimilarity matrix. [Further, to evaluate the reliability of the obtained dissimilarity matrix from a](#)  
241 [session, we report the within-participant correlation between the dissimilarity matrices derived](#)  
242 [from each day. As a reference, we also report the distribution of between-participant correlation](#)  
243 [by randomly correlating a matrix from a session in one participant with that of another participant.](#)  
244 [We expect that the within-participant correlation to be higher than the between-participant](#)  
245 [correlation.](#)

246 [In addition to the above approach for deriving the embeddings and the dissimilarity matrix, we](#)  
247 [plan to try a machine learning approach as an exploratory analysis \(i.e., we don't use this method](#)  
248 [in our main hypotheses testing and the stopping criterion\). This approach starts with random](#)  
249 [embeddings and iteratively updates them to minimize a loss function, which penalizes wrong](#)

250 similarity rankings derived from the embeddings. The loss is constructed using a sigmoid activation  
251 function in a binary cross-entropy as follows:

$$252 \quad p = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-k(d_{dissim} - d_{sim})}}, \quad d_{sim} = \|x_{target} - x_{sim}\|_2, \quad d_{dissim} = \|x_{target} - x_{dissim}\|_2$$
$$253 \quad L = -\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \log(p_i) + \lambda_1 \sum_{m=1}^M \|x_m\|_1 + \lambda_2 \sum_{m=1}^M \|x_m\|_1^2$$

254 Where  $x_m$  represents the vector embedding of face  $m$ ;  $d_{sim}$  and  $d_{dissim}$  are the Euclidean  
255 distances between a target face and a face ranked as more similar and a face ranked as less similar  
256 to the target face by the participant, respectively;  $k$  corresponds to the ranking difference (e.g., 2  
257 for a face ranked first and a face ranked third), putting more emphasis on clearer similarity  
258 comparisons;  $N$  indicates the number of segmented trio comparisons (with six trio segments in a  
259 trial);  $\lambda_1$  and  $\lambda_2$  are the hyperparameters of L1 and L2 regularizations which help to control the  
260 sparsity and scale of the embeddings. We use the Keras library in Python, with Adam optimizer, to  
261 minimize the loss function.

262 We note that we don't use this machine learning approach during the task (i.e., in our online  
263 application) because it is slower, requiring cross-validations and careful selection of the  
264 hyperparameters. This approach is more sophisticated than our main approach, which involves  
265 estimating probabilities and running MDS, but it has the potential to yield a better estimation of  
266 the embeddings and the dissimilarity matrix. In our pilot study, using this approach, we got similar  
267 results to those shown in Figures 2 and 3.

### 268 *Near-threshold discrimination task*

269 The objective of this task is to estimate perceptual discrimination capacity in a face pair. A series  
270 of 1000 equally spaced morphs are generated along the line connecting a face pair in the BFM  
271 space. In each trial, three faces are shown to the participants: two identical faces, randomly  
272 selected from the morph set, and a third different face spaced by a certain number of morphs (step  
273 value) from the identical faces (e.g., morph 200, morph 200, and morph 300: here the step value is  
274 100). The faces are displayed simultaneously at the center of the screen next to each other, and  
275 their arrangement is randomized in each trial (Figure 1C). Participants are instructed to identify  
276 and click on the different face.

277 A staircase (Cornsweet, 1962) with a 1-up and 2-down protocol is applied to the step value (i.e.,  
278 the number of morphs between the different and identical faces), initiating from a step value of  
279 500. After each incorrect response trial, the step value is increased, and it is decreased after two  
280 consecutive correct trials. The magnitude of the change in the step value gradually decreases over  
281 trials, reaching a minimum change of 20 steps. The task is terminated after 60 trials, allowing  
282 precise convergence of the step value. The converged step value indicates the just-noticeable-  
283 difference (JND), the minimum degree of differences between the faces required to achieve near-  
284 threshold discrimination performance (71% correct response). The average of the steps achieved  
285 within the last 5 changes is defined as the converged step. Essentially, a small JND, for example,  
286 100, indicates that the two questioned faces are quite distinct, involving 10 JNDs (i.e., 1000 divided  
287 by 100) between them. We use the notion of the The number of JNDs (#JNDs) to quantify perceptual



288 discrimination capacity. The #JNDs indicates the perceptual distance between a face pair, in other  
289 words, how many JNDs are in between the face pair in a participant. Therefore, its higher value  
290 corresponds to a higher discrimination capacity. The #JNDs is simply calculated as 1000 (i.e., total  
291 number of morphs) divided by the JND, thus, reflects the perceptual discrimination capacity. A  
292 higher #JNDs indicates a higher capacity in distinguishing a face pair.

293 In a session, there are 12 face pairs to undergo the staircase procedure. The staircases for each  
294 of these face pairs are interleaved, progressing concurrently. There is a cycle of 12 trials, featuring  
295 each staircase once in a random order. The trials are time-constrained, requiring participants to  
296 respond within 8 seconds. If participants fail to respond within this time window, the trial is skipped  
297 and reintroduced at the end of the cycle. To encourage participants to perform to the best of their  
298 abilities, they are provided with feedback on their responses. A green circle is displayed on the  
299 different face (i.e., correct answer) and a red cross on the identical faces (i.e., wrong answers) after  
300 they provide their response. Since the session is lengthy, with a total of 720 trials, participants are  
301 given a short break after every 180 trials.

302 The trajectory convergence of a staircase could indicate the reliability of the estimated #JNDs.  
303 A staircase with a higher ratio of reversals in its later trials could be considered more reliable.  
304 Therefore, we report the ratio of reversals in the last 20 trials of each pair's staircase and its  
305 statistics across participants. In an absolute ideal case, given our 1-up and 2-down staircase  
306 protocol, the ratio of reversals in the last 20 trials would be 0.6.

#### 307 *Selection of the pairs for the near-threshold discrimination task*

308 Following the completion of the subjective similarity judgment task twice by all 12 participants,  
309 24 face pairs are systematically selected to be examined in the near-threshold discrimination task.  
310 Practical constraints (time limitations; it takes 4-5 minutes to complete the near-threshold  
311 discrimination task for a face pair) limit us to examine only a small subset of the pairs. A sample  
312 size of ~~Our decision to select~~ 24 pairs should be fairly adequate for detecting an effect, and it is  
313 further justified supported by our pilot study, as we achieved reasonably robust results by  
314 examining only 13 pairs, almost half of our planned 24 pairs. Participants are re-invited for two  
315 sessions to perform the near-threshold discrimination task on these specific 24 pairs, completing  
316 12 of the pairs in each session.

317 Measuring perceptual discrimination capacity, expressed as #JNDs, in a face pair, involves  
318 running a near-threshold discrimination task dedicated to that specific pair. Thus, considering  
319 practical constraints as described earlier, we have no choice but to examine only a limited subset  
320 of pairs (24 out of 435 possible pairs). However, this subset is carefully chosen to provide the most  
321 informative data for testing our hypotheses while fairly covering different ranges in the group-  
322 averaged dissimilarity matrix. The pairs with a controversial subjective dissimilarity degree across  
323 participants are particularly promising candidates. If the hypothesis holds true, these pairs should  
324 also exhibit controversial discrimination capacity across participants. Considering the inherent  
325 noise in our methods in estimating the dissimilarity values and the #JNDs, any effect should be  
326 better detectable on pairs with larger standard deviations, those that are more distinct, across

327 participants. So, we select 18 pairs with controversial dissimilarity values across participants, and  
328 for the sake of comparison, we select 6 pairs with less (non) controversial values.

329 First, the dissimilarity matrix is z-normalized within each participant to ensure that its scale is  
330 consistent across participants. Subsequently, the mean and SD of the dissimilarity matrix are  
331 computed across participants, and the quantiles of the mean values are derived. Within the first  
332 and the last quantiles, 3 pairs with the highest and 1 with the lowest SD are selected. Additionally,  
333 6 pairs with the highest and 2 pairs with the lowest SD are chosen within the second and the third  
334 quantiles. This systematic selection ensures choosing 18 controversial and 6 non-controversial  
335 pairs that cover a diverse range in the group-averaged dissimilarity matrix.

### 336 **Sampling plan**

337 Participants who meet the following criteria are excluded from the analysis: Those who don't  
338 complete all four experimental sessions and those who show a lack of attentiveness to the task in  
339 any of the sessions. The lack of attentiveness in the near-threshold discrimination task is identified  
340 by non-converging staircases, indicated by a non-fluctuating increment in the step value over  
341 trials. Specifically, a session in which there are more than 4 (out of 12) staircases with less than  
342 three downs in their last 20 trials is considered bad with lacking sufficient attentiveness. In the  
343 subjective similarity judgment task, the lack of attentiveness is judged by comparing the  
344 consistency of responses between the first and second half of the session. Specifically, if the  
345 correlation between the dissimilarity matrices estimated from each half falls below 0.2, the session  
346 is considered bad with inadequate attentiveness. This correlation was  $0.56 \pm 0.086$  (mean  $\pm$  SD) in  
347 our pilot data. The data collection continues until we have 12 participants who successfully  
348 complete the experiment without meeting any of the exclusion criteria. If a participant meets the  
349 exclusion criteria, a new participant is recruited to replace the excluded participant. Note that the  
350 second phase of the study, involving the selection of the pairs and the near-threshold  
351 discrimination task, does not start until the quality of the data from all 12 participants in the  
352 subjective similarity judgment task is confirmed as not meeting the above mentioned exclusion  
353 criteria. Following this, any subsequent exclusion and recruitment of new participants do not  
354 modify the initially selected pairs for the near-threshold discrimination task.

355 After analyzing the data from these 12 participants, if the statistics fail to meet the following  
356 stopping criterion, we recruit more participants until the criterion is satisfied. The individual-level  
357 statistic is converted to z-values, and the 95% confidence interval of the group-mean z-value is  
358 derived (See the Analysis Plan section). We stop the experiment, if, in both Hypothesis 1 and 2, the  
359 width of this 95% confidence interval is less than 1. Moreover, we consider a hypothesis to be  
360 confirmed, if the group-mean z-value is significantly above zero, specifically, if the 95% confidence  
361 interval is above zero. Note that we set our stopping criterion independent of the significance  
362 testing and solely based on the precision of the effect (i.e., the confidence interval). We do not stop  
363 our experiment until achieving a high precision, so that we are confident that the effect is not being  
364 confirmed or rejected because of some extreme observations (Cumming, 2008; Lakens, 2014) .  
365 Given our sample size scale, we expect a considerable effect to have a group-mean z-value of at  
366 least above 0.5. So, a minimally significant scenario involves a group-mean z-value of 0.5 with a

367 95% confidence interval width of less than 1. Considering this, we set our stopping criterion as the  
368 width of the 95% confidence interval being smaller than 1. Thus, this seems like enough precision  
369 to safely reject or accept a hypothesis.

370 We note that after our initial 12 participants, we recruit three more participants, each time the  
371 stopping criterion is not met. We repeat this until reaching a maximum of 24 participants. Given  
372 that our pilot data with only four participants show a 95% confidence interval with a width of  
373 around 1.5 (see Figure 2B & 2D), it is unlikely not meeting the stopping criterion before reaching  
374 our maximum sample size of 24 (see the supplementary Figure 2). It is also worth noting that the  
375 recruitment of new participants does not alter the pairs used in the near-threshold discrimination  
376 task. The newly recruited participants perform the task on the same pairs selected based on our  
377 initial 12 participants.

## 378 **Analysis plan**

### 379 *Hypothesis 1*

380 Spearman correlation coefficient and its p-value are computed between the dissimilarity  
381 values and #JNDs of the examined 24 pairs in each individual. The Spearman correlations are  
382 converted to z-values using the Fisher z-transformation (Fieller et al., 1957) to conduct group-level  
383 statistical tests. The distribution of the group-mean z-value is computed by bootstrapping, iterated  
384 100,000 times, and then its 95% confidence interval is derived by obtaining the 2.5th and 97.5th  
385 percentile of the distribution. The hypothesis is confirmed if this confidence interval is above zero.  
386 The following statistics are reported as complementary information: the p-value and the Bayes  
387 factor of a t-test applied to z-values (BayesFactor Matlab package is used:  
388 <https://zenodo.org/badge/latest/doi/162604707>), the p-value of a Fisher's combined probability  
389 test, combining individual-level p-values (Brown, 1975), and a Bayesian posterior distribution of  
390 population prevalence (Ince et al., 2021) and its 95% highest posterior density interval, considering  
391 the p-value of 0.05 as the individual-level significance threshold. The Bayesian posterior  
392 distribution quantitatively summarizes how prevalent a particular effect would be in the  
393 population, based on the number of participants tested in a study and their proportion showing  
394 the effect significantly.

### 395 *Hypothesis 2*

396 Each participant's #JNDs is z-normalized to ensure that the #JNDs range is consistent across  
397 participants. This normalization is crucial, given that some participants may exhibit generally  
398 higher #JNDs than others. Subsequently, a nonparametric permutation test is applied to each  
399 individual to assess the specificity of the relationship between their #JNDs and dissimilarity values,  
400 as follows:

- 401 1. A permutation set of #JNDs is constructed by randomly permuting the #JNDs across  
402 participants (i.e., for each pair, selecting the value in one of the participants at random),  
403 excluding the participant in question. Essentially, the permutation set simulates a new  
404 participant by mixing the existing participants.

- 405 2. The Spearman correlation coefficient is calculated between the permuted #JNDs and the  
406 dissimilarity values of the participant in question. It is noteworthy that with 12 participants  
407 and 24 pairs, there are an enormous number of possible permutations (i.e.,  $11^{24}$  unique  
408 permutations), which ensure constructing a reliable null distribution.
- 409 3. Steps 1 and 2 are repeated 100,000 times to derive the distribution of the Spearman  
410 coefficients. This distribution represents the null hypothesis distribution in which there is  
411 no individual specificity.
- 412 4. The actual Spearman coefficient between the #JNDs and dissimilarity values of the  
413 participant in question is tested against the null distribution, and the p-value, indicating  
414 the significance level, is derived. The z-value is also calculated by subtracting the actual  
415 Spearman correlation from the null distribution's mean and then dividing it by the null  
416 distribution's SD.

417 Then, similar to Hypothesis 1, the 95% confidence interval of the group-mean z-value is derived  
418 through bootstrapping, and if it is above zero, the hypothesis is confirmed. The complementary  
419 statistics, outlined in Hypothesis 1, are also reported for Hypothesis 2.

Table 1 Experimental Design Table

Question	Hypothesis	Outcome Measures	Sampling plan	Analysis Plan	Interpretation given to different outcomes
How does perceptual discrimination capacity relate to subjective perceptual dissimilarity?	There are higher perceptual discrimination capacities in pairs that are perceptually more dissimilar. In other words, we hypothesize that perceptual discrimination capacity is positively correlated with subjective perceptual dissimilarity.	Subjective perceptual dissimilarity and perceptual discrimination capacity between stimuli pairs are measured in each participant through two different psychophysical tasks called the subjective similarity judgment task (Figure 1B) and the near-threshold discrimination task (Figure 1C). The subjective similarity judgment task assesses the level of subjective dissimilarity (dissimilarity value) between stimulus pairs. The near-threshold discrimination task measures the number of just-noticeable-differences (#JNDs) between stimulus pairs, quantifying the perceptual discrimination capacity. A higher #JNDs indicates a higher capacity in distinguishing a stimulus pair.	Twelve participants are recruited, each completing four sessions over four days, spending two days on the subjective similarity judgment task and two days on the near-threshold discrimination task. Participants failing to complete all four sessions and those displaying a lack of attentiveness to the task in any of the sessions are excluded from the analysis. The criteria for a lack of attentiveness are described in the method section. After completing the data collection on 12 participants who don't meet any of the <b>execution exclusion</b> criteria, if the results don't satisfy our following experiment's stopping criterion, we recruit more participants until the criterion is satisfied. <b>However, we end the experiment once we reach a maximum of 24 participants, regardless.</b> The stopping criterion is met if the width of the 95% confidence interval of the group-mean z-value (see the method section) is less than 1, and the hypothesis is confirmed if this 95% confidence interval is above zero. * The hypothesis was confirmed in the pilot study (Figure 2A & 2B)	In each participant, the Spearman correlation between the #JNDs and dissimilarity values is computed. Then, the Spearman correlations are transformed into z-values using the Fisher z-transformation. Subsequently, the 95% confidence interval of the group-mean z-value is derived through bootstrapping with 100,000 iterations.	If the described group test doesn't reach the level of significance, yet at the individual level, the correlation reaches significance ( $p < 0.05$ ) within a certain few participants, we can interpret that the positive association between perceptual discrimination capacity and subjective perceptual dissimilarity holds true for certain individuals and doesn't generalize to the entire population. Failure of the group test may indicate that subjective perceptual dissimilarity is made rather arbitrarily, based on subjective preferences, and does not reflect underlying psychophysical capacities.
Is the association between perceptual discrimination capacity and subjective perceptual dissimilarity specific to each individual?	A participant's subjective perceptual dissimilarity is better explained by their own perceptual discrimination capacity than by a group-averaged perceptual discrimination capacity. To put it differently, we hypothesize that the positive association between perceptual discrimination capacity and subjective perceptual dissimilarity is specific to each individual. Essentially, subjective dissimilarity reflects a metacognitive assessment of one's own perceptual discrimination capacity, rather than general knowledge about the physical differences of the stimuli.	The level of individual-specificity of the relationship between perceptual discrimination capacity and subjective perceptual dissimilarity is measured by a nonparametric permutation test, which assesses whether one's own dissimilarity value is more strongly correlated with one's own #JNDs than with others' #JNDs. Essentially, the above test reflects how specific this relationship is in each individual in terms of z-values.	The participants' exclusion and the experiment's stopping strategies remain the same as above.  Similar to the above hypothesis, the hypothesis is confirmed if the 95% confidence interval of the group-mean z-value is above zero, and the experiment stopping rule is met if the width of this confidence interval is smaller than 1.  * The hypothesis was confirmed in the pilot study (Figure 2C & 2D)	First, the #JNDs is z-normalized within each individual to ensure that its scale is consistent across participants, and then a nonparametric permutation test is applied to each participant separately as follows: Briefly, a permutation #JNDs set is constructed by randomly permuting the #JNDs of all participants, excluding the participant in question. The Spearman coefficient is then computed between the permuted #JNDs set and the dissimilarity values of the participant in question. This process is iterated 100,000 times to establish the distribution of the Spearman coefficient, representing the null hypothesis distribution. Finally, the actual Spearman coefficient between the dissimilarity values and the #JNDs of the participant in question is compared against the null distribution, and its z-value is computed. Subsequently, the 95% confidence interval of the group-mean z-value is derived by bootstrapping, similar to the above hypothesis.	If the described group test fails to reach the significance level, but there are certain individuals with significant statistics ( $p < 0.05$ ), we can draw a similar interpretation as the above that the hypothesis holds true only for certain people. Failure of the group test, if the first hypothesis holds true, may suggest that subjective perceptual dissimilarity is made based on general stimulus properties that predict the psychophysical performance of human subjects and is not metacognitive in the sense of reflecting direct access to one's own perceptual capacities.

## Pilot data

423 We conducted a pilot version of the study with 4 participants. The experimental design was  
424 similar to the currently proposed experiment (Figure 1), with a few differences. Participants  
425 performed the subjective similarity judgment task only once. After all of them completed the task,  
426 13 pairs of faces were selected, and the participants were all invited back to perform, in a different  
427 session, the near-threshold discrimination task on these pairs. In this pilot study, we randomly  
428 selected the pairs while ensuring that most of them have high dissimilarity values SD across  
429 participants, indicating that the degree of subjective dissimilarity is quite ‘controversial’, i.e.,  
430 individual-specific. The subjective similarity judgment task and the near-threshold discrimination  
431 task were conducted similarly to the proposed experiment, except that there was no time  
432 constraint on both tasks, and no trial-by-trial behavioral feedback was provided during the near-  
433 threshold discrimination task. Additionally, in one participant, the near-threshold discrimination  
434 task comprised 50 instead of 60 trials. We applied the same analysis approach described in the  
435 method section on the pilot data.


436 Hypothesis 1 was confirmed in the pilot study (Figure 2A & 2B), indicating that subjective  
437 perceptual dissimilarity and perceptual discrimination capacity are highly correlated. The  
438 correlation was significant ( $p < 0.05$ ) at the individual-level in 2 out of 4 participants. At the group  
439 level, the mean z-value across participants was 2.33, with a 95% confidence interval between  
440 1.651-74 and 3.023. A t-test on the z-values yielded a p-value of 0.012, and a Bayes factor (BF) of  
441 6.11. Moreover, a Fisher’s test, combining the individual-level p-values, resulted in a p-value of  
442 0.00011.

443 More importantly, Hypothesis 2 was also confirmed in the pilot study (Figure 2C & 2D),  
444 suggesting that the association between subjective perceptual dissimilarity and perceptual  
445 discrimination capacity is specific to each individual. To put it differently, others’ perceptual  
446 discrimination capacity cannot account for one’s subjective perceptual dissimilarity as well as their  
447 own perceptual discrimination capacity. The statistic was highly significant ( $p < 0.05$ ) at the  
448 individual-level in 3 out of 4 participants. At the group-level, the mean z-value across participants  
449 was 2.26, with a 95% confidence interval between 1.451-51 and 2.942-88. A t-test on the z-values  
450 resulted in a p-value of 0.016 and a BF of 5.07, and a Fisher’s test yielded a p-value smaller than  
451 0.00001.

452 In the main study, we anticipate observing even stronger statistics not only at the group-level  
453 but also at the individual-level. We expect that testing more stimulus pairs and having more  
454 participants lead to observing stronger results at the individual-level for Hypothesis 1 and  
455 Hypothesis 2, respectively.

456 We further explored the correlation between subjective perceptual dissimilarity and perceptual  
457 discrimination capacity in each face pair across participants in our pilot study (Figure 3). Given the  
458 small sample size (i.e., four participants), no meaningful statistical conclusions can be inferred.  
459 However, it is notable that the correlations were strongly positive, particularly in the controversial  
460 pairs: those with controversial degrees of subjective dissimilarity across participants. Essentially,  
461 Figure 3 also indicates that one’s perceptual discrimination capacity can explain one’s subjective


462 perceptual dissimilarity. Similar inter-individual differences observable in the subjective  
 463 perceptual dissimilarity could also be found in the perceptual discrimination capacity. However,  
 464 this is not apparent in the less controversial pairs. Nonetheless, this may not necessarily suggest  
 465 that the association doesn't exist in the less controversial pairs. The measures obtained from our  
 466 psychophysical tasks inevitably contain some noise which may make them to be not precise  
 467 enough to capture the subtle differences across participants in the less controversial pairs. In the  
 468 main experiment, we expect to obtain a clearer picture by having more participants and  
 469 experimental sessions.



470 **Figure 2. Relationship between perceptual discrimination capacity and subjective**  
 471 **perceptual dissimilarity in the pilot study (N = 4 participants) at the individual**  
 472 **participant level.** (A) Correlation between the perceptual discrimination capacity expressed  
 473 by #JNDs and the subjective perceptual dissimilarity within each participant. Each subplot  
 474 illustrates the correlation in an individual participant, with each data point corresponding to  
 475

476 a face pair.  $r$  indicates the Spearman correlation coefficient, and  $p$  denotes its associated  $p$ -  
477 value. (B) Individuals' Spearman correlations of A were transformed to  $z$ -values for group-  
478 level hypothesis testing. The bar plot shows the mean  $z$ -value across participants, the vertical  
479 line represents the 95% confidence interval of the group-mean  $z$ -value, calculated through  
480 bootstrapping, and each dot on the plot corresponds to a participant. As displayed under the  
481 plot, analysis of the group-level effect by applying a  $t$ -test on the  $z$ -values yielded a  $p$ -value  
482 of 0.012, and a Bayes factor (BF) of 6.11. Alternatively, employing a Fisher's combined  
483 probability test, combining the individual-level  $p$ -values, resulted in a  $p$ -value of 0.00011. (C)  
484 Individual specificity of the relationship between perceptual discrimination capacity and  
485 subjective perceptual dissimilarity. Blue square, red circle, and green diamond indicate the  
486 Spearman correlation coefficient between each participant's dissimilarity values and the  
487 participant's own #JNDs, other participants' #JNDs, and the group averaged #JNDs,  
488 respectively. The dotted horizontal black line denotes the Spearman correlation value  
489 corresponding to a permutation test's  $p$ -value of 0.05, rejecting the null hypothesis and  
490 indicating that the correlation is specific to each individual. The correlation would not be  
491 specific to each individual (i.e., null hypothesis) if one participant's dissimilarity values are as  
492 equally correlated to the other participants' #JNDs as the own participant's #JNDs. The  $p$ -  
493 value rejecting the null hypothesis in each participant is shown in blue at the top of the blue  
494 squares. The result of the permutation test suggests that the relationship between  
495 perceptual discrimination capacity and subjective perceptual dissimilarity was highly  
496 specific to each individual in three out of four participants. (D) Individuals' specificity  
497 statistics of C were converted to  $z$ -values for group-level hypothesis testing. The remaining  
498 descriptions of the plot are similar to those in B.





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**Figure 3. Relationship between perceptual discrimination capacity and subjective perceptual dissimilarity across participants (pilot study N = 4 participants).** (A) Across participants' correlation between the #JNDs and the dissimilarity values in different face pairs. Each panel corresponds to a face pair, sorted based on their controversy in the level of subjective dissimilarity across participants. The top left panel shows the most controversial pair (i.e., one with the highest dissimilarity value SD across participants), and the bottom right panel showcases the least controversial pair. Both the #JNDs and the dissimilarity values were z-normalized within each participant.  $r$  indicates the Spearman correlation coefficient, and each dot on the plots corresponds to a participant. (B) Relationship between the face pairs Spearman correlation coefficient shown in A and their controversy in the level of subjective dissimilarity across participants (i.e., SD of the dissimilarity values across participants). The relationship between perceptual discrimination capacity and subjective perceptual dissimilarity across participants was more salient in highly controversial pairs.

## Discussion

513

514 In the present study, we use a near-threshold psychophysical task to quantify perceptual  
515 discrimination capacity, which indicates one's capability to distinguish two stimuli (Figure 1C). We  
516 aim to examine whether this perceptual discrimination capacity measured at near-threshold is  
517 associated with subjective perceptual similarity rankings (Figure 1B) given at suprathreshold  
518 (Hypothesis 1). More critically, we seek to explore whether this association is specific to each  
519 individual, meaning that one's perceptual discrimination capacity can best explain one's own  
520 subjective perceptual similarity compared to that of others' (Hypothesis 2).

521 We conducted a pilot version of the study and confirmed both Hypotheses on our pilot data  
522 (Figure 2). However, to further and more precisely investigate our hypotheses, we intend to  
523 conduct a larger-scale study with more participants and experimental sessions. Given the high  
524 significance level observed in our pilot data, we expect a high likelihood of confirming the  
525 hypotheses in the main experiment.

526 If our hypotheses hold true, it may suggest that subjective similarity judgment is, in a specific  
527 sense, metacognitive: The self-knowledge of one's perceptual capacity guides one's subjective  
528 similarity judgment, and this may occur automatically and implicitly. In essence, perceptual  
529 discrimination capacities serve as a ground truth basis for making similarity judgments. A more  
530 accurate perceptual similarity judgment could be defined as the one with a more precise  
531 metacognitive read-out of one's own perceptual discrimination capacities. Similarly, the instability  
532 in perceptual similarity judgments could be considered as the result of inaccurate metacognitive  
533 assessment of one's own perceptual capacities.

534 Consequently, higher cortical brain areas, particularly the prefrontal cortex, may play a critical  
535 role in perceptual similarity judgments, given that its activity has been demonstrated to be  
536 associated with perceptual metacognition (McCurdy et al., 2013; Fleming et al., 2014; Morales et al.,  
537 2018). Of course, the current study does not directly test this hypothesis about neural mechanisms.  
538 Others have suggested that perceptual similarity information resides within the sensory cortices  
539 (Malach, 2021). In light of this, we are currently investigating whether perceptual similarity  
540 representations can be found beyond the visual areas, such as the lateral prefrontal cortex, using  
541 fMRI.

542 Finally, if our hypotheses are correct, perhaps it could shed light on one conundrum regarding  
543 large language models and consciousness. Recently, it has been reported that these models built  
544 with current technology in artificial intelligence can give human-like similarity ratings (Kawakita et  
545 al., 2023; Marjeh et al., 2023). If the qualitative characters of conscious perception are determined  
546 by the relevant similarity relations, as some researchers assume (Clark, 2000; Rosenthal, 2010;  
547 Malach, 2021; Lau et al., 2022; Tallon-Baudry, 2022; Zeleznikow-Johnston et al., 2023;  
548 Moharramipour & Lau, 2024), does it mean that these artificial agents are conscious  
549 (Moharramipour & Lau, 2024)? Or, at least, does it mean that they contain the essential information  
550 that is encapsulated within human perceptual experiences? The answer is probably no, if the  
551 metacognitive perspective described above is correct. That is, for the similarity judgment to be  
552 relevant for subjective experiences, according to our hypothesis, they need to reflect one's own

553 perceptual capacities. What these models do is simply to mimic what humans say in general, and  
554 as such, their similarity judgments at best reflect common world knowledge about the physical  
555 characteristics of the stimuli, but they are not about one's own perceptual capacities (of which  
556 these models have none). There is, thus, a critical difference between humans and those models,  
557 in terms of what the similarity judgments mean for them.  
558

### 559 **Author contributions**

560 A.M. contributed to conceptualization, project planning and design, methodology application,  
561 data collection, data analysis, visualization, writing, review, and editing.

562 W.Z. contributed to methodology application, data analysis, review, and editing.

563 D.R. contributed to conceptualization, project design, review, and editing.

564 H.L. contributed to conceptualization, supervision, project planning, design, analysis, review,  
565 and editing.

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### 570 **Conflict of interest disclosure**

571 The authors declare no competing interests.

### 572 **Data, scripts, code, and supplementary information availability**

573 The pilot data, the code used in the pilot study and the code that will be used in the main  
574 experiment are publicly accessible from the GitHub repository below:

575 <https://github.com/AliMoharramipour/Subjective-Dissimilarity-and-Discrimination-Capacity->

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
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
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**Supplementary Figures**



**Supplementary Figure 1. Schematic of the subjective similarity judgment task design**



**Supplementary Figure 2. Simulations to determine a feasible sample size for our stopping criterion.**

We ran two simulations: one generated z-values from a Gaussian distribution with a mean of 2 and SD of 1 and another from a uniform distribution ranging between -0.5 and 3.5. These example distributions seem reasonable given our expectations based on our pilot data and seem conservative enough. For example, the 95% CI width in our pilot data with four participants was around 1.5, however, in the presented simulations, the 95% CI width is, on average, around 1.7 for the same sample size of four. The shaded area indicates the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile of the 95% CI width obtained over 1000 simulations. Assuming the used distributions are realistic, there is a high likelihood of hitting the stopping criterion by reaching a maximum sample size of 24.