Both research and public debates around social media use tend to involve a premise of positivity bias, which refers to presenting one’s life in an overly positive light by various different means. This premise contributes to multiple potentially important follow-up hypotheses, such as the fear of missing out and low self-image effects, due to repeated consumption of positive social media content (e.g., Bayer et al. 2020, for a review). The positivity bias of social media use, itself, has received limited research attention. 
 
In the present study, Masciantonio and colleagues (2025) tested positivity bias in the context of three social media platforms: Facebook, Instagram, and X. The experiment involved recruiting participants (n=312) into platform-specific user groups and crafting posts to be shared with friends as well as respective social media audiences. For social media positivity bias to differ from everyday positivity bias, posts in the former should introduce more positive valence in comparison to offline sharing—and if the platforms differ in their encouragement of positivity bias, they should introduce significant between-platform differences in valence.
 
Based on how the participants reported events, the study found no significant differences between everyday and social media positivity bias, but messages posted on Twitter/X had a more negative valence than posts in other social media platforms. The results would be consistent with the implication that people's positive actions in social media simply follow the natural human tendency to present oneself positively to others—a hypothesis that should be investigated in follow-up work. More research attention should also be given to specific design features, which may contribute to platform-specific differences in user habits, as suggested by the distinct valence rate found in relation to Twitter/X.

 

The Stage 2 manuscript was evaluated by three experts (areas: experimental methods, social media, statistics) via in-depth peer review across two rounds, with one reviewer returning to validate analysis code and methdological accuracy on a final round. Based on the authors’ careful responses and revisions, the revised manuscript was judged to meet the Stage 2 criteria and was awarded a positive recommendation. 

 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/9z6hm
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that was used to answer the research question was generated until after IPA.  
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:

 

 

 
1. Bayer, J. B., Triệu, P., & Ellison, N. B. (2020). Social media elements, ecologies, and effects. Annual review of psychology, 71, 471-497. https:// doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-050944

 

2. Masciantonio, A., Heiser, N., & Cherbonnier, A. (2025). Unveiling the Positivity Bias on Social Media: A Registered Experimental Study On Facebook, Instagram, And X [Stage 2]. Acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/s93yu 

Making causal judgements are part of everyday life, whether seeking to understand the action of complex humans or the relations between inanimate objects in our environments. Albert Michotte’s (1963) classic book, The perception of causality, contained an extensive report of experiments demonstrating not only that observers perceive causality of inanimate shapes, but do so in manifold ways, creating different “causal impressions.” This work has been highly influential across psychology and neuroscience. 

 

In the current study, White (2025) conducted 14 experiments aimed at replicating and extending Michotte’s work. Despite the fact that this research is foundational to current work on perception and understanding of causal relations, it has never been subject to rigorous replication. Moreover, like many research studies from that era, Michotte was sparse on details about methodology and did not rely on statistical analysis. White carried out an ambitious set of 14 experiments and 18 hypotheses that directly replicated and, in some cases, extended Michotte’s experiments. The results of the experiments were mixed, with the hypotheses evenly divided among being supported, partially supported, and not supported. The current effort by White not only brings rigorous contemporary data to classic studies of perceptual impressions of causality, but the results point to important new directions for future study on the topic. In particular, the findings suggest a need to broaden our investigations of causal explanations of movement beyond launching (i.e., contact of one object leading to motion of another) to also consider entraining (i.e., joint movement following contact) and pulling. The collected studies provide fertile ground for further testing a variety of mechanisms that explain different perceptual impressions of causality. 

 

The Stage 2 manuscript was evaluated over three rounds of in-depth review, the first two rounds consisting of detailed comments from two reviewers and the third round consisting of a close read by the recommender. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 2 criteria and awarded a positive recommendation.

 

URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/5jx8f
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that was used to answer the research question was generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI-RR-friendly journals:
 

 

 

1. Michotte, A. (1963). The perception of causality (T. R. Miles & E. Miles, trans.). London: Methuen. (English translation of Michotte, 1954). 

 

2. White, P. A. (2025). Michotte's research on perceptual impressions of causality: A registered replication study [Stage 2]. Acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/jdac7

We may not believe what our memory tells us: Memory may deliver a compelling recollection we believe did not happen (we know we were not there at the time); and we may know an event happened that we fail to remember. That is, there can be distrust in remembering and distrust in forgetting. Previous work by the authors has looked at this through a signal detection lens, reporting in separate studies that people who have distrust in remembering have either a high or low criterion for saying "old" (Zhang et al, 2023, 2024). A plausible explanation for these contrasting results is that the criterion can either be the means by which false memories are generated enabling the distrust (low criterion); or rather, in conditions where accuracy is at stake, the means for compensating for the distrust (high criterion).

 

In the current study by Zhang et al (2025), participants were incentivised to be as accurate as possible, and in a memory test given feedback about commission errors or, in another group, ommission errors. The manipulation check indicated that the feedback did not increase (by a meaningful amount) distrust in remembering or distrust in forgetting, respectively, compared to a no feedback control group. Nonetheless, the authors found that people adjusted the criterion to say "old" in a compensatory way in each group. The possible mechanisms underlying these criterion shifts are discussed by the authors, who grapple with the distinction between response criterion shifts versus genuine meta-memory belief changes, and for the latter case, whether any memory distrust change could be contextual versus global (the manipulation check measured the latter).

 

The Stage 2 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review by four reviewers. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' and recommender's comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 2 criteria for recommendation.

 

URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/x69qt
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that was used to answer the research question was generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:

 

 

 

1. Zhang, Y., Qi, F., Otgaar, H., Nash, R. A., & Jelicic, M. (2023). A Tale of Two Distrusts: Memory Distrust towards Commission and Omission Errors in the Chinese Context. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1037/mac0000134

 

2. Zhang, Y., Otgaar, H., Nash, R. A., & Rosar, L. (2024). Time and memory distrust shape the dynamics of recollection and belief-in-occurrence. Memory, 32, 484–501. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2024.2336166

 

3. Zhang, Y., Otgaar, H., Nash, R. A., & Li, C. (2025). The effects of false feedback on state memory distrust toward commission and omission, and recognition memory errors [Stage 2]. Acceptance of Version 6 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/z8mv5

Does knowing more about others necessarily lead to greater liking, or might it breed contempt, as suggested by Norton et al. (2007)? In the current study, Horsham et al. (2025) tried to replicate and extend that original question. Collecting data from a large sample of U.S. undergraduates and employing carefully revised designs reviewed at Stage 1, they replicated Norton et al.’s initial studies (1a, 1b, and 2) while also adding new measures. Their primary aim was to see if the “less is more” effect, where increased familiarity decreases liking, would hold under rigorous modern standards, including pre-registration and several open science practices.

 

Results indicated that people indeed believe they will like someone more if they know more about that person, replicating Norton et al.’s initial finding from Studies 1a and 1b. However, the association between greater knowledge and reduced liking, the core of the “less is more” claim, was not consistently observed. Instead, the data showed little evidence that accumulating information inevitably decreases liking. Moreover, an added examination of curiosity as a potential mediator revealed that although curiosity and liking are positively related, curiosity itself was not strongly contingent on the amount of knowledge participants had. These findings help clarify why previous literature has sometimes presented mixed outcomes, and they underline the distinction between what people predict will happen and what actually does happen in forming impressions of others.

 

Peer review involved thorough evaluations by experts. Following multiple revisions through Stages 1 and 2, the manuscript has been deemed a carefully executed Registered Report, providing transparent methods, open data, and full reproducibility. It adds nuance to discussions around how knowledge, familiarity, and curiosity jointly shape our interpersonal attitudes. On this basis, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 2 criteria and awarded a positive recommendation.​

 

URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/7mc4y
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that was used to answer the research question was generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 

 

 

1. Norton, M. I., Frost, J. H., & Ariely, D. (2007). Less is more: The lure of ambiguity, or why familiarity breeds contempt. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 97-105. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.92.1.97

 

2. Horsham, Z., Haydock-Symonds, A., Imada, H., Tai, H. C., Lau, W. L., Shum, T. L., Zeng, Y., Chow, K., & Feldman, G. (2025). Does learning more about others impact liking them?: Replication and extension Registered Report of Norton et al. (2007)’s Lure of Ambiguity [Stage 2]. Acceptance of Version 6 by Peer Community in Registered Reports.​ https://osf.io/ygkft

Surveys that measure self-report are a workhorse in psychology and the social sciences, providing a vital window into beliefs, attitudes, and emotions, both at the level of groups and individuals. The validity of self-report data, however, is an enduring methodological concern, with self-reports vulnerable to a range of response biases, including (among others) the risk of social desirability bias in which, rather than responding honestly, participants answer questions in a way that they believe will be viewed favorably by others. One proposed solution to socially desirable responding is the so-called Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS), which aims to incentivize truthfulness by taking into account the relationship between an individual’s response and their belief about the dominant (or most likely) response given by other people and then assigning a high truthfulness score to answers that are surprisingly common (Prelec, 2004).

Although valid in theory (under a variety of assumptions), questions remain regarding the empirical utility of the BTS. One area of concern is participants’ uncertainty regarding incentives for truth-telling – if participants don’t understand the extent to which telling the truth is in their own interests (or they don’t believe that it matters) then the validity of the BTS is undermined. 

In the current study, Neville and Williams (2025) tested the role of clarifying incentives, particularly for addressing social desirability bias when answering sensitive questions. The authors administered an experimental survey design (N=877) including sensitive questions, curated from validated scales, that are relevant to current social attitudes and sensitivities (e.g., “Men are not particularly discriminated against”, “Younger people are usually more productive than older people at their jobs”). Three groups of participants completed the survey under different incentive conditions: the BTS delivered alone in a standard format, the BTS with an interim bonus payment that is awarded to participants (based on their BTS score) halfway through the survey to increase certainty in incentives, and a Regular Incentive control group in which participants receive payment without additional incentives.

The authors analyzed the effectiveness of the BTS through two registered hypotheses. First, the authors found that the BTS did not increase agreement with socially undesirable statements (compared to the control group), as theory would suggest, and even observed an opposite effect. This result, which could be confirmed by follow-up studies, raises some concerns about the robustness of the BTS method. Second, the authors conjectured that introducing an interim payment in the BTS mechanism would help reinforce its credibility in the eyes of the participants and would thus magnify its effect. However, the authors failed to detect a statistically significant difference between the standard BTS and interim-payment BTS mechanisms. Overall, the results of Neville and Williams (2025) call for some caution in the use of the BTS and for further work to better understand the contexts in which the BTS might be a useful tool to mitigate social desirability in surveys. 

This Stage 2 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review by two expert reviewers and a second round of review by the recommender. After the revisions, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 2 criteria and awarded a positive recommendation.

 

 

Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that was used to answer the research question was generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI-RR-friendly journals:

 

 

1. Neville, C. M & Williams, M. N. (2025). Does Truth Pay? Investigating the Effectiveness of the Bayesian
Truth Serum with an Interim Payment: A Registered Report [Stage 2]. Acceptance of Version 4 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/s3znc

 

2. Prelec, D. (2004). A Bayesian truth serum for subjective data. Science, 306, 462-466. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1102081