Anthropomorphism is a widespread phenomenon in which people instil non-human entities or objects with human-like characteristics, such as motivations, intentions, and goals. Although common, the tendency to anthropomorphise varies between people, and a growing body of psychological research has examined the importance of various individual differences. One major theoretical account of anthropomorphism (Epley et al. 2007) suggests that sociality motivation – the drive to establish social relationships – is a key moderator of the phenomenon. In support of this account, some evidence suggests that people who experience greater loneliness (a proposed marker of sociality motivation) are more likely to anthropomorphise. In an influential series of studies, Epley et al. (2008) found that anthropomorphism and loneliness were positively correlated and that inducing participants experimentally to feel more lonely led to greater anthropomorphism. Later studies, however, produced more mixed results, particularly concerning the effectiveness of the experimental interventions.

 

In the current study, Elsherif et al. (2022) propose a partial replication of Epley et al. (2008), focusing on the correlational relationship between anthropomorphism and loneliness, with extensions to examine free will beliefs, anthropomorphism for supernatural beings (in addition to objects/gadgets), and the extent to which participants judged objects/gadgets to be controllable.

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/by89c

 

Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:

 

 

1. Epley, N., Waytz, A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2007). On seeing human: A three-factor theory of anthropomorphism. Psychological Review, 114, 864–886. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.114.4.864 

 

2. Epley, N., Akalis, S., Waytz, A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2008). Creating social connection through inferential reproduction: Loneliness and perceived agency in gadgets, Gods, and greyhounds. Psychological Science, 19, 114–120. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02056.x 

 

3. Elsherif, M., Pomareda, C., Xiao, Q., Chu, H. Y., Tang, M. C., Wong, T. H., Wu, Y. &  Feldman, G. (2022). Revisiting the positive association between loneliness and anthropomorphism with an extension to belief in free will: Replication and extensions of Epley et al. (2008), in principle acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/by89c

Emotion is a well-established mediator of decision-making, including prospective economic decisions, but does it affect the way we respond economically to loss? According to classic economic theories, when an object is lost and cannot be recovered, our emotional attachment to that object should be irrelevant for decisions such as choosing whether to claim insurance or compensation. Intriguingly, however, this does not appear to be the case: in a series of experiments, Hsee and Kunreuther (2000) found that when people have higher affection towards an object, they are more sensitive to its loss and are more willing to claim compensation or purchase insurance for the object. They explained these findings according to an influential “consolation hypothesis” in which people see insurance compensation as means to mitigate against the emotional distress associated with property loss.

 

Using a large online sample (N=1000), Law and Feldman (2023) propose to replicate four of six studies from Hsee and Kunreuther (2000), each asking (primarily) whether people with higher affection towards an object are more willing to claim compensation or purchase insurance for that object. In each experiment, participants are randomly assigned to either a high affection group or a low affection group and then given a scenario in which the level of affection to an object is correspondingly manipulated while the monetary value is held constant. For example, for high affection: “You liked the now-damaged painting very much and you fell in love with it at first sight. Although you paid only $100, it was worth a lot more to you”, and for low affection: “You were not particularly crazy about the now-damaged painting. You paid $100 for it, and that’s about how much you think it was worth.” A range of dependent measures are then collected, including the maximum hours participants would be willing to spend driving to claim compensation, the maximum amount participants would be willing to pay for insurance, and how likely participants would be to claim compensation or purchase insurance. As part of the replication, the authors have also built in manipulation checks to confirm that the scenarios influenced participants' (imagined) level of affection for the object, and a range of exploratory analyses.

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).

 

URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/b7y5z
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 

 

References
 

1. Hsee, C. K., & Kunreuther, H. C. (2000). The affection effect in insurance decisions. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 20, 141-159. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007876907268

2. Law, Y. Y. & Feldman, G. (2023). Revisiting the impact of affection on insurance purchase and claim decision-making: Replication and extensions Registered Report of Hsee and Kunreuther (2000), in principle acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/b7y5z

Stigmas are prejudices or discrimination against people based on qualities that vary from the norm, such as a physical or mental illness, disability, sexuality, race, or one of many other personal characteristics. The harm caused by stigmatisation has made understanding the causes and potential solutions a vital area of study in psychology and public health. One of the major focuses of ongoing research is understanding the factors that determine whether a particular characteristic becomes stigmatised, and if so how the stigma might be eliminated. Previous research has found that for disease-based stigmas, the contagiousness, course, and disruptiveness of a disease can be influential. Another key determinant is the perceived cause of the stigmatised condition or characteristic. In a landmark study, Weiner et al. (1988) reported that attributes based on physical health were more likely to be perceived as being uncontrollable, stable and irreversible, prompting feelings of sympathy without anger or judgment. On the other hand, attributes related to mental health and behaviour were more likely to be regarded as controllable and reversible, prompting lack of sympathy coupled with feelings of anger and negative judgement. In a second experiment, they also found that manipulating the perception of controllability can modify emotional responses and judgments – for some stigmas (but not others), providing participants with information that a particular characteristic was controllable vs. uncontrollable was found to increase or decrease negative attributions, respectively.

 

In the current study, Yeung and Feldman (2022) propose to replicate Experiment 2 from Weiner et al. (1988) in a large online sample. In particular, they plan to ask how the source of a stigma is related to perceived controllability and stability, emotional reactions, and willingness to help. They also propose a range of extensions, including the inclusion of additional stigmas that have become relevant since the original study was published over 30 years ago.

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/k957f

 

Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:

 

 

1. Weiner, B., Perry, R. P., & Magnusson, J. (1988). An attributional analysis of reactions to stigmas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 738–748. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.55.5.738

 

2. Yeung, K. Y. & Feldman, G. (2022). Revisiting stigma attributions and reactions to stigma: Replication and extensions of Weiner et al. (1988), in principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/k957f

When offered a range of options and asked to make multiple selections, how do people choose? Over the last 30 years, a key finding to emerge from behavioural economics is that people distribute their choices more evenly than would be considered optimal – a phenomenon termed “diversification bias” or the “diversification heuristic” (Read & Loewenstein, 1995). For example, when filling a plate from a buffet, you might be inclined to choose a relatively even amount of everything on offer, even when you prefer some foods over others. Similarly, when allocating savings among different investment options, people are prone to spreading their money more evenly than would maximise utility.

 

In an influential study, Fox et al. (2005) found that diversification bias can be shaped by so-called “partition dependence” – the tendency to allocate resources differently across options depending on how they are subjectively grouped. Such groupings could be arbitrary; so, for example, to return to the buffet example, people might diversify across high-level categories such as cooked and uncooked, savoury and sweet, or surf and turf, and then diversify across the options within those categories. The nature of level of these subjective (and potentially arbitrary) categorisations can strongly influence the final allocation of resources. Diversification bias and partition dependence have important implications for basic theory in judgment and decision-making as well as applications in behavioral economics and finance.

 

In the current study, Li and Feldman (2022) propose to replicate Studies 1, 2 and 5 from Fox et al. (2002) in a large online sample. In particular, they plan to ask how partitioning influences the allocation of choices between options, and the extent to which partition dependence is reduced in people with greater relevant expertise. The authors also propose extending the original study to explore individual differences in the desire for choice diversity as predictors of partition dependence.

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/bx8vq

 

Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 

• Advances in Cognitive Psychology
• Experimental Psychology
• F1000Research
• Journal of Cognition
• Meta-Psychology
• Peer Community Journal
• PeerJ
• Royal Society Open Science
• Swiss Psychology Open

 
References

 

1. Read, D., & Loewenstein, G. (1995). Diversification bias: Explaining the discrepancy in variety seeking between combined and separated choices. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 1, 34-49. https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-898X.1.1.34

 

2. Fox, C. R., Ratner, R. K., & Lieb, D. S. (2005). How subjective grouping of options influences choice and allocation: Diversification bias and the phenomenon of partition dependence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 134, 538-551. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.134.4.538

  
3. Li, M. Y. & Feldman, G. (2022). Revisiting diversification bias and partition dependence: 
Replication and extension of Fox, Ratner, and Lieb (2005) Studies 1, 2, and 5, in principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/bx8vq

Does being good free people up to be bad? A large literature in social psychology suggests that it might, with evidence that “moral licensing” gives people a perception that actions deemed morally questionable, or socially undesirable, will be tolerated more readily if they have demonstrated a past history of praiseworthy, moral behaviour. In a formative study, Monin and Miller (2001) reported that having a track record of moral credentials as being nonprejudiced (e.g. non-sexist or non-racist) increased the willingness of participants to later express a prejudiced attitude. For example, in their Study 2 they found that participants who built up their moral credit by selecting a Black woman in a hypothetical recruitment task were then more willing to then prefer a White man for a second job, compared to participants who did not have the opportunity to initially recommend a Black woman. These results have prompted a burgeoning literature on moral licensing, albeit one that is mixed and has been found to exhibit substantial publication bias.

 

In the current study, Xiao et al. (2023) propose a large online replication of Study 2 in Monin and Miller (2001), asking whether previous moral behaviours that furnish participants with moral credentials make them more likely to then engage in morally questionable behaviours. The authors will also extend earlier work by testing whether moral credentials license immoral behaviours more effectively in the same domain (e.g. within sex) than in a different domain (e.g. across sex and race), asking whether there is a negative relationship between expression of prejudice and trait reputational concern (fear of negative evaluation), and whether moral credentials attenuate any such observed relationship.

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over three rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).

 

URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/uxgrk
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 

 

References
 

1. Monin, B., & Miller, D. T. (2001). Moral credentials and the expression of prejudice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 33-43. https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/0022-3514.81.1.33

2. Xiao, Q., Ching Li, L., Au, Y. L., Chung, W. T., Tan, S. N. & Feldman, G. (2023). Licensing via credentials: Replication of Monin and Miller (2001) with extensions investigating the domain-specificity of moral credentials and the association between the credential effect and trait reputational concern, in principle acceptance of Version 5 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/uxgrk