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Id | Title * | Authors * | Abstract * ▼ | Picture | Thematic fields * | Recommender | Reviewers | Submission date | |
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09 Jun 2022
STAGE 1
![]() Revisiting diversification bias and partition dependence: Replication and extensions of Fox, Ratner, and Lieb (2005) Studies 1, 2, and 5Mei Yee (Alice) Li, Gilad Feldman https://osf.io/vkp3q/Testing the replicability of diversification bias and partition dependenceRecommended by Chris ChambersWhen offered a range of options and asked to make multiple selections, how do people choose? Over the last 30 years, a key finding to emerge from behavioural economics is that people distribute their choices more evenly than would be considered optimal – a phenomenon termed “diversification bias” or the “diversification heuristic” (Read & Loewenstein, 1995). For example, when filling a plate from a buffet, you might be inclined to choose a relatively even amount of everything on offer, even when you prefer some foods over others. Similarly, when allocating savings among different investment options, people are prone to spreading their money more evenly than would maximise utility.
In an influential study, Fox et al. (2005) found that diversification bias can be shaped by so-called “partition dependence” – the tendency to allocate resources differently across options depending on how they are subjectively grouped. Such groupings could be arbitrary; so, for example, to return to the buffet example, people might diversify across high-level categories such as cooked and uncooked, savoury and sweet, or surf and turf, and then diversify across the options within those categories. The nature of level of these subjective (and potentially arbitrary) categorisations can strongly influence the final allocation of resources. Diversification bias and partition dependence have important implications for basic theory in judgment and decision-making as well as applications in behavioral economics and finance.
In the current study, Li and Feldman (2022) propose to replicate Studies 1, 2 and 5 from Fox et al. (2002) in a large online sample. In particular, they plan to ask how partitioning influences the allocation of choices between options, and the extent to which partition dependence is reduced in people with greater relevant expertise. The authors also propose extending the original study to explore individual differences in the desire for choice diversity as predictors of partition dependence.
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/bx8vq Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals: References 1. Read, D., & Loewenstein, G. (1995). Diversification bias: Explaining the discrepancy in variety seeking between combined and separated choices. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 1, 34-49. https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-898X.1.1.34
2. Fox, C. R., Ratner, R. K., & Lieb, D. S. (2005). How subjective grouping of options influences choice and allocation: Diversification bias and the phenomenon of partition dependence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 134, 538-551. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.134.4.538
3. Li, M. Y. & Feldman, G. (2022). Revisiting diversification bias and partition dependence: Replication and extension of Fox, Ratner, and Lieb (2005) Studies 1, 2, and 5, in principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/bx8vq | Revisiting diversification bias and partition dependence: Replication and extensions of Fox, Ratner, and Lieb (2005) Studies 1, 2, and 5 | Mei Yee (Alice) Li, Gilad Feldman | <p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Revisiting diversification bias and partition dependence: Replication and extensions of Fox, Ratner, and Lieb (2005) Studies 1, 2, and 5 "</p> | Social sciences | Chris Chambers | Craig Fox, Leo Cohen | 2022-02-15 09:57:51 | View | |
30 Jun 2022
STAGE 1
![]() Revisiting and updating the risk-benefits link: Replication of Fischhoff et al. (1978) with extensions examining pandemic related factorsJason M. Frank, Gilad Feldman https://osf.io/zayn3Understanding the relationship between the perception of risks and benefitsRecommended by Chris ChambersEveryday decisions involve weighing up many kinds of risks and benefits, prompting the question of how our perception of those risks relates to our perception of the associated benefits. Intuitively, we might assume that behaviours or practices that are judged by society as riskier would also be seen as carrying greater potential benefits, in keeping with the expression “high risk, high reward”. The psychology of risk perception, however, appears to be more complex. In a seminal study, Fischhoff et al. (1978) in fact found the opposite pattern: that perceived risk and perceived benefit were negatively correlated – behaviours or practices that were perceived to be higher risk tended to be perceived as carrying lower benefits. This counterintuitive finding has had a significant impact on the field of judgment and decision making, despite being subjected only rarely to close replication.
Using a large-scale online design, Frank and Feldman (2022) propose a replication that incorporates key elements of Fischhoff et al. (1978) as well as a recent replication by Fox-Glassman et al. (2016). In particular, the authors will reassess the strength and directionality of the relationship between perceived risks and perceived benefits, and how these relate to both risk characteristics and acceptable levels of risk. As part of a series of exploratory extensions, they will also examine the risk/benefit relationship for policies and practices related to the Covid-19 pandemic, including vaccinations, lockdowns, and social distancing.
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/bx93v Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
References
1. Fischhoff, B., Slovic, P., Lichtenstein, S., Read, S., & Combs, B. (1978). How safe is safe enough? A psychometric study of attitudes towards technological risks and benefits. Policy Sciences, 9, 127-152. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00143739
2. Fox-Glassman, K. T. & Weber, E. U. (2016). What makes risk acceptable? Revisiting the 1978 psychological dimensions of perceptions of technological risks. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 75, 157-169. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2016.05.003
3. Frank, J. M. & Feldman, G. (2022). Revisiting and updating the risk-benefits link: Replication of Fischhoff et al. (1978) with extensions examining pandemic related factors, in principle acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/bx93v
| Revisiting and updating the risk-benefits link: Replication of Fischhoff et al. (1978) with extensions examining pandemic related factors | Jason M. Frank, Gilad Feldman | <p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Revisiting and updating the risk-benefits link: Replication of Fischhoff et al. (1978) with extensions examining pandemic related factors "</p> | Social sciences | Chris Chambers | 2022-02-15 09:21:15 | View | ||
16 Jun 2023
STAGE 1
![]() Licensing via credentials: Replication of Monin and Miller (2001) with extensions investigating the domain-specificity of moral credentials and the association between the credential effect and trait reputational concernQinyu Xiao, Lok Ching Li, Ying Lam Au, Wing Tung Chung, See Ngueh Tan, Gilad Feldman https://osf.io/vrsd3Revisiting moral licensingRecommended by Chris ChambersDoes being good free people up to be bad? A large literature in social psychology suggests that it might, with evidence that “moral licensing” gives people a perception that actions deemed morally questionable, or socially undesirable, will be tolerated more readily if they have demonstrated a past history of praiseworthy, moral behaviour. In a formative study, Monin and Miller (2001) reported that having a track record of moral credentials as being nonprejudiced (e.g. non-sexist or non-racist) increased the willingness of participants to later express a prejudiced attitude. For example, in their Study 2 they found that participants who built up their moral credit by selecting a Black woman in a hypothetical recruitment task were then more willing to then prefer a White man for a second job, compared to participants who did not have the opportunity to initially recommend a Black woman. These results have prompted a burgeoning literature on moral licensing, albeit one that is mixed and has been found to exhibit substantial publication bias.
In the current study, Xiao et al. (2023) propose a large online replication of Study 2 in Monin and Miller (2001), asking whether previous moral behaviours that furnish participants with moral credentials make them more likely to then engage in morally questionable behaviours. The authors will also extend earlier work by testing whether moral credentials license immoral behaviours more effectively in the same domain (e.g. within sex) than in a different domain (e.g. across sex and race), asking whether there is a negative relationship between expression of prejudice and trait reputational concern (fear of negative evaluation), and whether moral credentials attenuate any such observed relationship.
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over three rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/uxgrk
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
References
1. Monin, B., & Miller, D. T. (2001). Moral credentials and the expression of prejudice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 33-43. https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/0022-3514.81.1.33
2. Xiao, Q., Ching Li, L., Au, Y. L., Chung, W. T., Tan, S. N. & Feldman, G. (2023). Licensing via credentials: Replication of Monin and Miller (2001) with extensions investigating the domain-specificity of moral credentials and the association between the credential effect and trait reputational concern, in principle acceptance of Version 5 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/uxgrk | Licensing via credentials: Replication of Monin and Miller (2001) with extensions investigating the domain-specificity of moral credentials and the association between the credential effect and trait reputational concern | Qinyu Xiao, Lok Ching Li, Ying Lam Au, Wing Tung Chung, See Ngueh Tan, Gilad Feldman | <p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Licensing via credentials: Replications of Monin and Miller (2001) with extensions investigating the domain-specificity of moral credentials and associations with trait reputational c... | Social sciences | Chris Chambers | Marek Vranka, Štěpán Bahník, Ethan Meyers | 2022-02-20 04:49:16 | View | |
11 Jul 2023
STAGE 1
![]() Factors impacting effective altruism: Revisiting heuristics and biases in charity in a replication and extensions of Baron and Szymanska (2011)Mannix CHAN, Gilad FELDMAN https://osf.io/2w3zyUnderstanding biases and heuristics in charity donationsRecommended by Romain EspinosaDecisions to give to charities are affected by numerous external and internal factors. Understanding the elements that influence donation decisions is of first-order importance for science and society. On the scientific side, understanding the determinants of charity giving contributes to the knowledge of altruistic behaviors in the presence of collective problems such as poverty, climate change, or animal welfare. On the social side, pointing out which factors affect donations can help increase pro-social behaviors and might facilitate collective actions in the case of public goods.
Previous work identified multiple mechanisms affecting altruistic donations to charities (Bekkers and Weeping, 2011). Importantly, Baron and Szymanska (2011) collected empirical evidence suggesting that people prefer (i) their donations to be directly used for projects rather than organizational costs, (ii) when charities have low past costs, (iii) to diversity their donations into several NGOs, (iv) to favor charities that deal with close peers like nationals, and (v) to give voluntarily rather than through taxes.
In the current study, Chan and Feldman seek to replicate the results of Baron and Szymanska (2011). They propose a close replication of the original study using a large sample of online participants (1,400 participants). In addition to the five mechanisms identified by the original study, they will further explore whether public donation increases contributions and whether individuals are more likely to donate when the charities’ overhead costs are paid for by other donors.
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/gmswz
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
References
1. Baron, J. & Szymanska, E. (2011). Heuristics and Biases in Charity. In D. M. Oppenheimer & C. Y. Olivola (Eds.), The Science of Giving: Experimental Approaches to the Study of Charity (pp. 215–235). Psychology Press.
2. Bekkers, R. & Wiepking, P. (2011). A Literature Review of Empirical Studies of Philanthropy. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 40, 924–973.
3. Chan, M. & Feldman, G. (2023). Factors impacting effective altruism: Revisiting heuristics and biases in charity in a replication and extensions Registered Report of Baron and Szymanska (2011), in principle acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/gmswz
| Factors impacting effective altruism: Revisiting heuristics and biases in charity in a replication and extensions of Baron and Szymanska (2011) | Mannix CHAN, Gilad FELDMAN | <p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Factors impacting effective altruism: Revisiting heuristics and biases in charity in a replication and extensions of Baron and Szymanska (2011)"</p> | Social sciences | Romain Espinosa | 2023-02-28 13:19:52 | View | ||
25 Jun 2023
STAGE 1
![]() Reference points and decision-making: Impact of status quo and defaults in a conceptual replication and extensions Registered Report of Dinner et al. (2011)Monique Moon Ling YAM, Gilad Feldman https://osf.io/5ak6pUnderstanding the impact of status quo bias and the default effect on decision-makingRecommended by Chris ChambersEveryday decisions can often be biased by how different options are presented and which choices were made previously, over and above whichever option is rationally preferable. Two such major biases in judgment and decision-masking are status quo bias and the default effect. The status quo bias reflects a tendency for people to choose an option that has already been implemented or represents the current state of affairs (for instance, choosing to remain with a current energy supplier rather than switching to a different one, even when the current supplier provides less value for money), while the default effect is a bias toward taking a course of action that would occur automatically in the absence of an active choice (such as the pre-selected energy supplier in questionnaire). Status quo bias and default effects can overlap or diverge: the status quo option will often be the same as the default, while on other occasions the default option in a choice set will be determined by other factors and differ from the option that was already implemented.
In the current study, Yam and Feldman (2023) propose a replication and extension of an influential study by Dinner et al. (2011) that purported to examine default effects but, arguably, actually studied its nearby cousin, status quo bias. Using a large online sample, the authors will independently test for the existence of both status quo bias and the default effect, before then asking whether (and if so how) status quo bias and default effects interact and how they are related to several potential explanatory variables, including perceived effort (which may be lower for the status quo or default) and endorsements (whether through direct recommendations or indirectly through perceived norms). The authors also build in additional manipulation checks and comprehension checks, in addition to exploratory analyses examining (among other variables), the political orientation of participants.
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/ep3jh
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
References
1. Dinner, I., Johnson, E. J., Goldstein, D. G., & Liu, K. (2011). Partitioning default effects: Why people choose not to choose. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 17, 332– 341. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0024354
2. Yam, M. L. M. & Feldman, G. (2023). Reference points and decision-making: Impact of status quo and defaults in a conceptual replication and extensions Registered Report of Dinner et al. (2011), in principle acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/ep3jh | Reference points and decision-making: Impact of status quo and defaults in a conceptual replication and extensions Registered Report of Dinner et al. (2011) | Monique Moon Ling YAM, Gilad Feldman | <p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Default, status quo, and past behavior effects: Examining impact of reference points on decisions in a replication and extensions of Dinner et al. (2011)"</p> | Social sciences | Chris Chambers | 2023-02-02 06:02:29 | View | ||
23 Jan 2023
STAGE 1
![]() Comparing time versus money in sunk cost effects: Replication of Soman (2001)Nikolay Petrov, Wenkai Song, Yin Kan (Megan) CHAN, Cheuk Nam (Chris) LAU, Tin Ho (Donald) KWOK, Lok Ching (Estelle) CHOW, Wai Yan (Vivian) LO, Gilad Feldman (gfeldman@hku.hk) https://osf.io/twehuAre sunk cost effects weaker for time than money?Recommended by Chris ChambersThe sunk cost fallacy is a cognitive bias in which people persist with a decision that is no longer optimal because of previous resources they have invested (now considered to be spent or “sunk”). Most of us will have heard sunk costs reflected in the saying “throwing good money after bad”, but sunk costs can, in theory, occur more broadly, whether for money, time or any other resource-limited investment. The sunk cost effect for money has been widely studied and appears robust; in contrast, the sunk cost effect for time is more uncertain, and is potentially moderated by the age of respondents (and likely resource availability), the fact that time is irreplaceable, and the tendency for people to account for time less easily than they do for money. In an impactful study, Soman (2001) found that the sunk cost effect for time was indeed weaker than for money, although this finding has not been widely replicated.
In the current study, Petrov et al. (2023) propose a replication of three studies from Soman (2001), asking whether sunk costs are weaker for time than for money, and then testing whether the relative absence of a sunk time cost arises from the inability of participants to account for time or due to more rational beliefs in the evaluation of past time investments.
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/65htv Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
References
1. Soman, D. (2001). The mental accounting of sunk time costs: Why time is not like money. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making,14, 169-185. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.370
2. Petrov, N. B., Chan, Y. K., Lau, C. N., Kwok, T. H., Chow, L. C., Lo, W. Y. V, Song W., & Feldman, G. (2023). Sunk cost effects for time versus money: Replication of Soman (2001) [Registered Report Stage 1], in principle acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/u34zb
| Comparing time versus money in sunk cost effects: Replication of Soman (2001) | Nikolay Petrov, Wenkai Song, Yin Kan (Megan) CHAN, Cheuk Nam (Chris) LAU, Tin Ho (Donald) KWOK, Lok Ching (Estelle) CHOW, Wai Yan (Vivian) LO, Gilad Feldman (gfeldman@hku.hk) | <p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Comparing time versus money in sunk cost effects: Replication of Soman (2001) "</p> | Social sciences | Chris Chambers | 2022-02-23 10:39:42 | View | ||
13 Jun 2022
STAGE 1
![]() Associations of fear, anger, happiness, and hope with risk judgments: Revisiting appraisal-tendency framework with a replication and extensions of Lerner and Keltner (2001)Sirui Lu; Gilad Feldman https://osf.io/zbqyr/Replicating the relationship between emotions and judgments of riskRecommended by Chris ChambersHow do emotions interact with cognition? The last 40 years has witnessed the rise of cognitive-appraisal theories, which propose that emotions can be differentiated along an axis of cognitive dimensions such as certainty, pleasantness, attentional activity, control, anticipated effort, and responsibility (Smith and Ellsworth, 1985). Early tests of such theories focused especially on the impact of the valence – pleasantness/unpleasantness – of emotions on judgment and decision-making, finding, for instance, that negative mood induction can heighten pessimistic estimates of risk (Johnson & Tversky, 1983).
The Appraisal-Tendency Framework proposed by Lerner and Keltner (2000) refined cognitive-appraisal theory by proposing that specific emotions trigger a predisposition to appraise future (or hypothetical) events in line with the central appraisal dimensions that triggered the emotion, even when the emotion and the judgment are unrelated. For example, an individual who is triggered to become fearful of a heightened risk, such as nuclear war, may then exhibit heightened pessimism about risks unrelated to war. The Appraisal-Tendency Framework also predicts relationships between traits, such as between fear, anger and risk-taking/risk-seeking tendencies. In an influential paper, Lerner and Keltner (2001) reported direct empirical support for the Appraisal-Tendency Framework, which aside from its influence in cognitive/affective psychology has had considerable impact in behavioural economics, moral psychology, and studies of consumer behaviour.
In the current study, Lu and Feldman (2022) propose to replicate three key studies from Lerner and Keltner (2001) in a large online sample. Through a combination of replication and extension, the authors will probe the relationship between various trait emotions (including fear, anger, happiness, and hope) and trait characteristics of risk seeking and optimistic risk assessment. The authors also propose examining how the ambiguity of triggering events moderates the relationship between specific emotions and risk judgments.
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/8yu2x Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
References
1. Smith, C. A., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1985). Patterns of cognitive appraisal in emotion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 813-838. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.48.4.813
2. Johnson, E. J., & Tversky, A. (1983). Affect, generalization, and the perception of risk. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45(1), 20–31. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.45.1.20
3. Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2000). Beyond valence: Toward a model of emotion-specific influences on judgment and choice. Cognition & Emotion, 14, 473-493. https://doi.org/10.1080/026999300402763
4. Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2001). Fear, anger, and risk. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 146–159. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.81.1.146
5. Lu, S. & Feldman, G. (2022). Associations of fear, anger, happiness, and hope with risk judgments: Revisiting appraisal-tendency framework with a replication and extensions of Lerner and Keltner (2001), in principle acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/8yu2x | Associations of fear, anger, happiness, and hope with risk judgments: Revisiting appraisal-tendency framework with a replication and extensions of Lerner and Keltner (2001) | Sirui Lu; Gilad Feldman | <p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Associations of fear, anger, happiness, and hope with risk judgments: Revisiting appraisal-tendency framework with a replication and extensions of Lerner and Keltner (2001)"</p> | Social sciences | Chris Chambers | 2022-01-31 09:36:29 | View | ||
08 Nov 2024
STAGE 1
![]() Relationship between perceived risk and compliance to infection control measures during the first year of a pandemicSebastian Bjørkheim, Sigurd Hystad, Bjørn Sætrevik https://osf.io/z6rmhThe relationship between risk and compliance during the first year of the Covid-19 pandemic in NorwayRecommended by Adrien FillonWhat relationship can be expected between the perception of risk and compliance with protective measures? The authors of the current study measured the perceived risk of COVID-19 and compliance with infection control in Norway during the first year of the pandemic. While the authors state that the perceived risk has a positive association with compliance, they also hypothesize that both measures at Tn will predict the other at Tn+1, indicating a dynamic and bi-directional relationship. Finding support (or not) for this hypothesis can be crucial for developing interventions that will encourage compliance with infection control measures. The analysis will be quantitative.
The authors already collected the data, and the risk of bias due to the accessibility of data was discussed extensively during the peer-reviewing process. In summary, the authors will set up an alpha at 0.01, perform a multiverse analysis and present all the results associated. They will analyse the model with various ways of handling outliers, and the analysis will be made by a colleague who did not have access to the data. The authors already provided a script to produce the multiverse analysis. The recommender and reviewers agreed that these procedures are sufficient to control for the level of bias due to the accessibility of data.
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over three rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to reviewers’ and the recommender’s comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance. URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/epdn8
Level of bias control achieved: Level 1. At least some of the data/evidence that will be used to the answer the research question has been accessed and observed by the authors, the data analyst excepted, including key variables, but the authors certify that they have not yet performed ANY of their preregistered analyses, and in addition they have taken stringent steps to reduce the risk of bias.
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals: References Bjørkheim, S., Hystad, S., & Sætrevik, B. (2024). Relationship between perceived risk and compliance to infection control measures during the first year of a pandemic. In principle acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/epdn8
| Relationship between perceived risk and compliance to infection control measures during the first year of a pandemic | Sebastian Bjørkheim, Sigurd Hystad, Bjørn Sætrevik | <p>The way people perceive health risks is often assumed to influence how they adopt precautionary measures. However, people’s assessment of a given phenomenon’s risk may vary over time, and the relationship between perceived risk and compliance w... | Social sciences | Adrien Fillon | Lewend Mayiwar | 2023-10-25 10:16:57 | View | |
Sunk cost effects for time versus money: Replication and extensions Registered Report of Soman (2001)Nikolay PETROV, Yin Kan (Megan) CHAN, Cheuk Nam (Chris) LAU, Tin Ho (Donald) KWOK, Lok Ching (Estelle) CHOW, Wai Yan (Vivian) LO, Wenkai SONG, Gilad FELDMAN https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/PM264Mixed evidence for the hypothesis that sunk cost effects are weaker for time than moneyRecommended by Chris ChambersThe sunk cost fallacy is a cognitive bias in which people persist with a decision that is no longer optimal because of previous resources they have invested (now considered to be spent or “sunk”). Most of us will have heard sunk costs reflected in the saying “throwing good money after bad”, but sunk costs can, in theory, occur more broadly, whether for money, time or any other resource-limited investment. The sunk cost effect for money has been widely studied and appears robust; in contrast, the sunk cost effect for time is more uncertain, and is potentially moderated by the age of respondents (and likely resource availability), the fact that time is irreplaceable, and the tendency for people to account for time less easily than they do for money. In an impactful study, Soman (2001) found that the sunk cost effect for time was indeed weaker than for money, although this finding has not been widely replicated.
In the current study, Petrov et al. (2023) replicated three studies (1, 2 and 5) from Soman (2001), asking whether sunk costs are weaker for time than for money, and then testing whether the relative absence of a sunk time cost arises from the inability of participants to account for time or due to more rational beliefs in the evaluation of past time investments.
Results provided mixed support for the original findings. Consistent with Soman (2001), the sunk cost effect for money was reliably stronger than for time in Study 1; however, sunk costs for both money and time were comparable in Study 2 (and if anything, slightly stronger for time). The indirect replication of Study 5 from Soman (2001) found that the sunk cost effect for time was not significantly influenced by accounting for time, either using education or by highlighting opportunity costs. Robustness checks confirmed the main preregistered outcomes while also ruling out a range of potential alternative explanations. Overall, the results suggest that that sunk cost effects for time are more context-dependent and empirically volatile than sunk costs for money.
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/65htv Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that was used to answer the research question was generated until after IPA.
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
References
1. Soman, D. (2001). The mental accounting of sunk time costs: Why time is not like money. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making,14, 169-185. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.370
2. Petrov, N. B., Chan, Y. K., Lau, C. N., Kwok, T. H., Chow, L. C., Lo, W. Y. V, Song W., & Feldman, G. (2023). Sunk cost effects for time versus money: Replication and extensions Registered Report of Soman (2001), acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/q9s6p
| Sunk cost effects for time versus money: Replication and extensions Registered Report of Soman (2001) | Nikolay PETROV, Yin Kan (Megan) CHAN, Cheuk Nam (Chris) LAU, Tin Ho (Donald) KWOK, Lok Ching (Estelle) CHOW, Wai Yan (Vivian) LO, Wenkai SONG, Gilad FELDMAN | <p>The sunk cost effect is the tendency for an individual's decision-making to be impacted by unrecoverable previous investments of resources. Soman (2001) found that sunk cost effect is weaker for time than for money (Studies 1 and 2) and that th... | Social sciences | Chris Chambers | 2023-04-18 20:57:24 | View | ||
21 Apr 2024
STAGE 1
![]() Mechanisms of secularization: Testing between three causal pathwaysMartin Lang, Radim Chvaja https://osf.io/scnuh?view_only=2afb8c616e6245debd279ee3f0b19675Understanding links between secularization, rationalisation and insecurityRecommended by Adrien FillonWhat relationship can be expected between secularization, rationalisation and insecurity? While some authors argue that rationalisation reduces the willingness to belong to religious groups, others have suggested that insecurity increases this need to belong to religious groups.
In the current study, Lang and Chvaja (2024) will adjudicate between these two possibilities using an economics game in participants from two countries: US and Poland. The central question posed by the authors is whether cooperative insecurity increases the probability of joining a religious normative group. They will test the relationship between an environment (secure and insecure) and institution (which related to the norm context: religious and secular) on the probability of choosing the normative group in an experimental setting. Therefore, the study will be a quantitative analysis.
The authors included an adequate power analysis, alternatives for non-supported hypotheses, and filtering to ensure a high quality of data collection. They also undertook a pilot study to ensure the quality of the procedure and sensitivity of the analyses.
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to reviewers’ and the recommender’s comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance.
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/yzgek
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
References 1.Lang, M. & Chvaja, R. (2024). Mechanisms of secularization: Testing between the rationalization and existential insecurity theories. In principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/yzgek
| Mechanisms of secularization: Testing between three causal pathways | Martin Lang, Radim Chvaja | <p>The study tests two competing explanations of the secularization process related to rationalizing worldviews and decreasing existential insecurity. While the former explanation argues that people are unwilling to join religious groups because o... | Social sciences | Adrien Fillon | 2023-11-22 11:17:30 | View |
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