
Stage 2 Review of Lee & Feldman (Replication & Extension of Newman et al.)

Overall, I believe this study satisfies the Stage 2 criteria. I noted some minor issues in relation to criteria 2C and 2E, but these are quite minor. See below for my specific comments!

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Signature:

* **Criterion 2A: Ability of Data to Test Hypotheses**

Results of all prespecified manipulation checks indicated the manipulations were successful, and otherwise I do not perceive any indication of data-quality issues that interfere with the ability to effectively test the prespecified hypotheses.

* **Criterion 2B: Equivalence of Introduction, Rationale, and Hypotheses to Stage 1 Submission**The introduction, rationale, and hypotheses in the Stage 2 manuscript are identical to those in the approved Stage 1 submission.
* **Criterion 2C: Adherence to Registered Procedures**

One set of results included on pg. 38 of the Stage 1 manuscript, namely *Study 1: Neutral items and preferences (replication)* does not seem to be reported in the Stage 2 manuscript (unless I have just overlooked it somehow). These results are not relevant to any of the central hypotheses, but to the extent that they were included in the Stage 1 manuscript it would seem desirable to include them in Stage 2.

* **Criterion 2D: Justification and Soundness of Exploratory Analyses**

The two sets of exploratory analyses reported in the Stage 2 manuscript (on pgs. 44-49) were not unregistered, since they were included in the Stage 1 manuscript. These analyses are sound and their results are informative.

* **Criterion 2E: Justification of Authors’ Conclusions**

On pg. 41, there is a small error; it is stated that neutral change was rated *lower* on surface-self compared to good and bad changes – I believe that should say *higher*, not *lower* (consistent with the reported means and other descriptive statements about this finding).

Not related to the conclusions drawn from the current data – but I don’t think it’s appropriate to cite my 2019 paper (Christy et al., 2019) in support of the claim that essentialist cognition contributes to the belief in *good* true selves specifically. The studies reported in that article did not examine beliefs about the morality of true selves, but simply the belief that true selves *exist*; the implication is just that belief in personal true selves may be symptomatic of broader essentialist cognitive tendencies. Some of my other work has found evidence consistent with a baseline assumption of goodness about one’s own (Christy et al., 2016) and others’ true selves (Christy et al., 2017). Other authors (e.g., De Freitas, Cikara et al., 2017) have suggested that essentialist cognition may somehow result in this belief in good true selves, on the basis of these latter findings and others (such as those replicated here as well as Nina Strohminger’s work), as well as evidence that people seem to perceive the essences of *all kinds* of entities, not just of persons, as being good (De Freitas, Tobia, et al., 2017). So I think that section of the Discussion could be revised to use citations more appropriately in support of the authors’ claims.