When offered a range of options and asked to make multiple selections, how do people choose? Over the last 30 years, a key finding to emerge from behavioural economics is that people distribute their choices more evenly than would be considered optimal – a phenomenon termed “diversification bias” or the “diversification heuristic” (Read & Loewenstein, 1995). For example, when filling a plate from a buffet, you might be inclined to choose a relatively even amount of everything on offer, even when you prefer some foods over others. Similarly, when allocating savings among different investment options, people are prone to spreading their money more evenly than would maximise utility.

 

In an influential study, Fox et al. (2005) found that diversification bias can be shaped by so-called “partition dependence” – the tendency to allocate resources differently across options depending on how they are subjectively grouped. Such groupings could be arbitrary; so, for example, to return to the buffet example, people might diversify across high-level categories such as cooked and uncooked, savoury and sweet, or surf and turf, and then diversify across the options within those categories. The nature of level of these subjective (and potentially arbitrary) categorisations can strongly influence the final allocation of resources. Diversification bias and partition dependence have important implications for basic theory in judgment and decision-making as well as applications in behavioral economics and finance.

 

In the current study, Li and Feldman (2022) propose to replicate Studies 1, 2 and 5 from Fox et al. (2002) in a large online sample. In particular, they plan to ask how partitioning influences the allocation of choices between options, and the extent to which partition dependence is reduced in people with greater relevant expertise. The authors also propose extending the original study to explore individual differences in the desire for choice diversity as predictors of partition dependence.

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/bx8vq

 

Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 

• Advances in Cognitive Psychology
• Experimental Psychology
• F1000Research
• Journal of Cognition
• Meta-Psychology
• Peer Community Journal
• PeerJ
• Royal Society Open Science
• Swiss Psychology Open

 
References

 

1. Read, D., & Loewenstein, G. (1995). Diversification bias: Explaining the discrepancy in variety seeking between combined and separated choices. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 1, 34-49. https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-898X.1.1.34

 

2. Fox, C. R., Ratner, R. K., & Lieb, D. S. (2005). How subjective grouping of options influences choice and allocation: Diversification bias and the phenomenon of partition dependence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 134, 538-551. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.134.4.538

  
3. Li, M. Y. & Feldman, G. (2022). Revisiting diversification bias and partition dependence: 
Replication and extension of Fox, Ratner, and Lieb (2005) Studies 1, 2, and 5, in principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/bx8vq

Does being good free people up to be bad? A large literature in social psychology suggests that it might, with evidence that “moral licensing” gives people a perception that actions deemed morally questionable, or socially undesirable, will be tolerated more readily if they have demonstrated a past history of praiseworthy, moral behaviour. In a formative study, Monin and Miller (2001) reported that having a track record of moral credentials as being nonprejudiced (e.g. non-sexist or non-racist) increased the willingness of participants to later express a prejudiced attitude. For example, in their Study 2 they found that participants who built up their moral credit by selecting a Black woman in a hypothetical recruitment task were then more willing to then prefer a White man for a second job, compared to participants who did not have the opportunity to initially recommend a Black woman. These results have prompted a burgeoning literature on moral licensing, albeit one that is mixed and has been found to exhibit substantial publication bias.

 

In the current study, Xiao et al. (2023) propose a large online replication of Study 2 in Monin and Miller (2001), asking whether previous moral behaviours that furnish participants with moral credentials make them more likely to then engage in morally questionable behaviours. The authors will also extend earlier work by testing whether moral credentials license immoral behaviours more effectively in the same domain (e.g. within sex) than in a different domain (e.g. across sex and race), asking whether there is a negative relationship between expression of prejudice and trait reputational concern (fear of negative evaluation), and whether moral credentials attenuate any such observed relationship.

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over three rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).

 

URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/uxgrk
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 

 

References
 

1. Monin, B., & Miller, D. T. (2001). Moral credentials and the expression of prejudice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 33-43. https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/0022-3514.81.1.33

2. Xiao, Q., Ching Li, L., Au, Y. L., Chung, W. T., Tan, S. N. & Feldman, G. (2023). Licensing via credentials: Replication of Monin and Miller (2001) with extensions investigating the domain-specificity of moral credentials and the association between the credential effect and trait reputational concern, in principle acceptance of Version 5 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/uxgrk

Everyday decisions can often be biased by how different options are presented and which choices were made previously, over and above whichever option is rationally preferable. Two such major biases in judgment and decision-masking are status quo bias and the default effect. The status quo bias reflects a tendency for people to choose an option that has already been implemented or represents the current state of affairs (for instance, choosing to remain with a current energy supplier rather than switching to a different one, even when the current supplier provides less value for money), while the default effect is a bias toward taking a course of action that would occur automatically in the absence of an active choice (such as the pre-selected energy supplier in questionnaire). Status quo bias and default effects can overlap or diverge: the status quo option will often be the same as the default, while on other occasions the default option in a choice set will be determined by other factors and differ from the option that was already implemented.

 

In the current study, Yam and Feldman (2023) propose a replication and extension of an influential study by Dinner et al. (2011) that purported to examine default effects but, arguably, actually studied its nearby cousin, status quo bias. Using a large online sample, the authors will independently test for the existence of both status quo bias and the default effect, before then asking whether (and if so how) status quo bias and default effects interact and how they are related to several potential explanatory variables, including perceived effort (which may be lower for the status quo or default) and endorsements (whether through direct recommendations or indirectly through perceived norms). The authors also build in additional manipulation checks and comprehension checks, in addition to exploratory analyses examining (among other variables), the political orientation of participants.

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).

 

URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/ep3jh
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 

References
 

1. Dinner, I., Johnson, E. J., Goldstein, D. G., & Liu, K. (2011). Partitioning default effects: Why people choose not to choose. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 17, 332– 341. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0024354

2. Yam, M. L. M.  & Feldman, G. (2023). Reference points and decision-making: Impact of status quo and defaults in a conceptual replication and extensions Registered Report of Dinner et al. (2011), in principle acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/ep3jh

How do emotions interact with cognition? The last 40 years has witnessed the rise of cognitive-appraisal theories, which propose that emotions can be differentiated along an axis of cognitive dimensions such as certainty, pleasantness, attentional activity, control, anticipated effort, and responsibility (Smith and Ellsworth, 1985). Early tests of such theories focused especially on the impact of the valence – pleasantness/unpleasantness – of emotions on judgment and decision-making, finding, for instance, that negative mood induction can heighten pessimistic estimates of risk (Johnson & Tversky, 1983).

 

The Appraisal-Tendency Framework proposed by Lerner and Keltner (2000) refined cognitive-appraisal theory by proposing that specific emotions trigger a predisposition to appraise future (or hypothetical) events in line with the central appraisal dimensions that triggered the emotion, even when the emotion and the judgment are unrelated. For example, an individual who is triggered to become fearful of a heightened risk, such as nuclear war, may then exhibit heightened pessimism about risks unrelated to war. The Appraisal-Tendency Framework also predicts relationships between traits, such as between fear, anger and risk-taking/risk-seeking tendencies. In an influential paper, Lerner and Keltner (2001) reported direct empirical support for the Appraisal-Tendency Framework, which aside from its influence in cognitive/affective psychology has had considerable impact in behavioural economics, moral psychology, and studies of consumer behaviour.

 

In the current study, Lu and Feldman (2022) propose to replicate three key studies from Lerner and Keltner (2001) in a large online sample. Through a combination of replication and extension, the authors will probe the relationship between various trait emotions (including fear, anger, happiness, and hope) and trait characteristics of risk seeking and optimistic risk assessment. The authors also propose examining how the ambiguity of triggering events moderates the relationship between specific emotions and risk judgments. 

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/8yu2x

 

Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 

 

1. Smith, C. A., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1985). Patterns of cognitive appraisal in emotion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 813-838. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.48.4.813

 

2. Johnson, E. J., & Tversky, A. (1983). Affect, generalization, and the perception of risk. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45(1), 20–31. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.45.1.20

 

3. Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2000). Beyond valence: Toward a model of emotion-specific influences on judgment and choice. Cognition & Emotion, 14, 473-493. https://doi.org/10.1080/026999300402763 

 

4. Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2001). Fear, anger, and risk. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 146–159. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.81.1.146

  
5. Lu, S. & Feldman, G. (2022). Associations of fear, anger, happiness, and hope with risk judgments: Revisiting appraisal-tendency framework with a replication and extensions of Lerner and Keltner (2001), in principle acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/8yu2x

What relationship can be expected between secularization, rationalisation and insecurity? While some authors argue that rationalisation reduces the willingness to belong to religious groups, others have suggested that insecurity increases this need to belong to religious groups.

 

In the current study, Lang and Chvaja (2024) will adjudicate between these two possibilities using an economics game in participants from two countries: US and Poland. The central question posed by the authors is whether cooperative insecurity increases the probability of joining a religious normative group. They will test the relationship between an environment (secure and insecure) and institution (which related to the norm context: religious and secular) on the probability of choosing the normative group in an experimental setting. Therefore, the study will be a quantitative analysis.

 

The authors included an adequate power analysis, alternatives for non-supported hypotheses, and filtering to ensure a high quality of data collection. They also undertook a pilot study to ensure the quality of the procedure and sensitivity of the analyses.

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review. Based on ​detailed responses to reviewers’ and the recommender’s comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance.​​​

 

 

Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:

 

 
References
 
1.Lang, M. & Chvaja, R. (2024). Mechanisms of secularization: Testing between the rationalization and existential insecurity theories. In principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/yzgek

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