Stigmas are prejudices or discrimination against people based on qualities that vary from the norm, such as a physical or mental illness, disability, sexuality, race, or one of many other personal characteristics. The harm caused by stigmatisation has made understanding the causes and potential solutions a vital area of study in psychology and public health. One of the major focuses of ongoing research is understanding the factors that determine whether a particular characteristic becomes stigmatised, and if so how the stigma might be eliminated. Previous research has found that for disease-based stigmas, the contagiousness, course, and disruptiveness of a disease can be influential. Another key determinant is the perceived cause of the stigmatised condition or characteristic. In a landmark study, Weiner et al. (1988) reported that attributes based on physical health were more likely to be perceived as being uncontrollable, stable and irreversible, prompting feelings of sympathy without anger or judgment. On the other hand, attributes related to mental health and behaviour were more likely to be regarded as controllable and reversible, prompting lack of sympathy coupled with feelings of anger and negative judgement. In a second experiment, they also found that manipulating the perception of controllability can modify emotional responses and judgments – for some stigmas (but not others), providing participants with information that a particular characteristic was controllable vs. uncontrollable was found to increase or decrease negative attributions, respectively.

 

In the current study, Yeung and Feldman (2022) propose to replicate Experiment 2 from Weiner et al. (1988) in a large online sample. In particular, they plan to ask how the source of a stigma is related to perceived controllability and stability, emotional reactions, and willingness to help. They also propose a range of extensions, including the inclusion of additional stigmas that have become relevant since the original study was published over 30 years ago.

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/k957f

 

Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:

 

 

1. Weiner, B., Perry, R. P., & Magnusson, J. (1988). An attributional analysis of reactions to stigmas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 738–748. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.55.5.738

 

2. Yeung, K. Y. & Feldman, G. (2022). Revisiting stigma attributions and reactions to stigma: Replication and extensions of Weiner et al. (1988), in principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/k957f

Anthropomorphism is a widespread phenomenon in which people instil non-human entities or objects with human-like characteristics, such as motivations, intentions, and goals. Although common, the tendency to anthropomorphise varies between people, and a growing body of psychological research has examined the importance of various individual differences. One major theoretical account of anthropomorphism (Epley et al. 2007) suggests that sociality motivation – the drive to establish social relationships – is a key moderator of the phenomenon. In support of this account, some evidence suggests that people who experience greater loneliness (a proposed marker of sociality motivation) are more likely to anthropomorphise. In an influential series of studies, Epley et al. (2008) found that anthropomorphism and loneliness were positively correlated and that inducing participants experimentally to feel more lonely led to greater anthropomorphism. Later studies, however, produced more mixed results, particularly concerning the effectiveness of the experimental interventions.

 

In the current study, Elsherif et al. (2022) propose a partial replication of Epley et al. (2008), focusing on the correlational relationship between anthropomorphism and loneliness, with extensions to examine free will beliefs, anthropomorphism for supernatural beings (in addition to objects/gadgets), and the extent to which participants judged objects/gadgets to be controllable.

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/by89c

 

Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:

 

 

1. Epley, N., Waytz, A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2007). On seeing human: A three-factor theory of anthropomorphism. Psychological Review, 114, 864–886. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.114.4.864 

 

2. Epley, N., Akalis, S., Waytz, A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2008). Creating social connection through inferential reproduction: Loneliness and perceived agency in gadgets, Gods, and greyhounds. Psychological Science, 19, 114–120. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02056.x 

 

3. Elsherif, M., Pomareda, C., Xiao, Q., Chu, H. Y., Tang, M. C., Wong, T. H., Wu, Y. &  Feldman, G. (2022). Revisiting the positive association between loneliness and anthropomorphism with an extension to belief in free will: Replication and extensions of Epley et al. (2008), in principle acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/by89c

Does being good free people up to be bad? A large literature in social psychology suggests that it might, with evidence that “moral licensing” gives people a perception that actions deemed morally questionable, or socially undesirable, will be tolerated more readily if they have demonstrated a past history of praiseworthy, moral behaviour. In a formative study, Monin and Miller (2001) reported that having a track record of moral credentials as being nonprejudiced (e.g. non-sexist or non-racist) increased the willingness of participants to later express a prejudiced attitude. For example, in their Study 2 they found that participants who built up their moral credit by selecting a Black woman in a hypothetical recruitment task were then more willing to then prefer a White man for a second job, compared to participants who did not have the opportunity to initially recommend a Black woman. These results have prompted a burgeoning literature on moral licensing, albeit one that is mixed and has been found to exhibit substantial publication bias.

 

In the current study, Xiao et al. (2023) propose a large online replication of Study 2 in Monin and Miller (2001), asking whether previous moral behaviours that furnish participants with moral credentials make them more likely to then engage in morally questionable behaviours. The authors will also extend earlier work by testing whether moral credentials license immoral behaviours more effectively in the same domain (e.g. within sex) than in a different domain (e.g. across sex and race), asking whether there is a negative relationship between expression of prejudice and trait reputational concern (fear of negative evaluation), and whether moral credentials attenuate any such observed relationship.

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over three rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).

 

URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/uxgrk
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 

 

References
 

1. Monin, B., & Miller, D. T. (2001). Moral credentials and the expression of prejudice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 33-43. https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/0022-3514.81.1.33

2. Xiao, Q., Ching Li, L., Au, Y. L., Chung, W. T., Tan, S. N. & Feldman, G. (2023). Licensing via credentials: Replication of Monin and Miller (2001) with extensions investigating the domain-specificity of moral credentials and the association between the credential effect and trait reputational concern, in principle acceptance of Version 5 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/uxgrk

The sunk cost fallacy is a cognitive bias in which people persist with a decision that is no longer optimal because of previous resources they have invested (now considered to be spent or “sunk”). Most of us will have heard sunk costs reflected in the saying “throwing good money after bad”, but sunk costs can, in theory, occur more broadly, whether for money, time or any other resource-limited investment. The sunk cost effect for money has been widely studied and appears robust; in contrast, the sunk cost effect for time is more uncertain, and is potentially moderated by the age of respondents (and likely resource availability), the fact that time is irreplaceable, and the tendency for people to account for time less easily than they do for money. In an impactful study, Soman (2001) found that the sunk cost effect for time was indeed weaker than for money, although this finding has not been widely replicated.

 

In the current study, Petrov et al. (2023) propose a replication of three studies from Soman (2001), asking whether sunk costs are weaker for time than for money, and then testing whether the relative absence of a sunk time cost arises from the inability of participants to account for time or due to more rational beliefs in the evaluation of past time investments.

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/65htv

 

Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:

 

 

1. Soman, D. (2001). The mental accounting of sunk time costs: Why time is not like money. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making,14, 169-185. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.370

 

2. Petrov, N. B., Chan, Y. K., Lau, C. N., Kwok, T. H., Chow, L. C., Lo, W. Y. V, Song W., & Feldman, G. (2023). Sunk cost effects for time versus money: Replication of Soman (2001) [Registered Report Stage 1], in principle acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/u34zb

The psychology of meat-eating offers a fascinating window into moral reasoning, cognition and emotion, as well as applications in the shift toward more sustainable and ethical alternatives to meat consumption. One key observation in this field is the so-called “meat paradox” – the tendency for people to simultaneously eat meat while also caring about animals. One way to resolve this conflict and reduce cognitive dissonance is for people to separate the concept of meat from animals, mentally disengaging from the origins of meat in order to make the act of consumption more ethically acceptable. Another potential explanation is a motivated “denial of mind”, in which people believe that animals lack the mental capacity to experience suffering; therefore, eating an animal is not a harm that the animal will experience. In support of the latter hypothesis, Bastian et al (2012) found that animals judged to have greater mental capacities were also judged to less edible, and that simply reminding meat eaters that an animal was being raised for the purposes of meat consumption led to denial of its mental capacities.

 

Using a large-scale online design in 1000 participants, Jacobs et al. (2022) propose a replication of two studies from Bastian et al. (2012): asking how the perceived mental capabilities of animals relates to both their perceived edibility and the degree of moral concern they elicit, and whether learning that an animal will be consumed influences perceptions of its mental capabilities. Among various exploratory analyses, the authors will also examine whether the perception of animal minds (in animals consumed for meat) varies systematically according to species.

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/cru4z

 

Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:

 

 

1. Bastian, B., Loughnan, S., Haslam, N., & Radke, H. R. M. (2012). Don’t mind meat? The denial of mind to animals used for human consumption. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38, 247–256. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167211424291

 

2. Jacobs, T. P., Wang, M., Leach, S., Loong, S. H., Khanna, M., Chan, K. W., Chau, H. T., Tam, Y. Y. & Feldman, G. (2022). Revisiting the motivated denial of mind to animals used for food: Replication and extension of Bastian et al. (2012), in principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/cru4z