The reward value of a stimulus is based on an error in prediction: Things going better than predicted. Could this learning principle, often tested on short acting stimuli, also apply to a long lasting episode, like going for a run? Could how rewarding a run is be based on the run going better than predicted?

 

Understanding the conditions under which exercise is pleasurable could of course be relevant to tempting people to do more of it! Brevers et al. (2023) will ask people before a daily run to predict the amount of perceived exertion they will experience; then just after the run, to rate the retrospective amount of perceived exertion actually experienced. The difference between the two ratings is the prediction error.

 

Participants will also rate their remembered pleasure in running and the authors will investigate whether running pleasure depends on prediction error.
 
The study plan was refined across four rounds of review, with input from two external reviewers and the recommender, after which it was judged to satisfy the Stage 1 criteria for in-principle acceptance (IPA).

 

URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/xh724
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 

 

References
 
1. Brevers, D., Martinent, G., Oz, I. T., Desmedt, O. & de Geus, B. (2023). Do error predictions of perceived exertion inform the level of running pleasure? In principle acceptance of Version 5 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/xh724

How do perceptions of wastefulness affect how people make choices? In an influential set of studies examining different conceptions of wasteful behavior (overspending, underutilization, and sunk costs), Arkes (1996) found a systematic aversion to wastefulness in decision making, even when choosing to avoid wastefulness has no economic value or works against personal interest. While these findings have been influential in basic and applied research, there have been no attempts to directly replicate the results. Moreover, the original study has several methodological limitations, including the use of relatively small samples and gaps in statistical analysis and reporting.

 

In this Stage 1 manuscript, Zhu and Feldman (2024) propose to conduct a high-powered replication of Arkes (1996) using an online sample of participants. The authors will incorporate several extensions to improve methodological rigor relative to the original article, including added comprehension checks, checks of the wastefulness manipulations, a within-subjects design, and a quantitative analysis of participants’ self-reported motivations for their choices. The results of the study will provide insight into the robustness of the original findings, while also better distinguishing wastefulness aversion from other potential reasons behind participants' decisions.

 

The Stage 1 submission was evaluated by the recommender and two expert reviewers. After two rounds of revision, the recommender determined that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA). 

 

URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/r7tsw
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 

 

 

1. Arkes, H. R. (1996). The psychology of waste. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 9,
213-224. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(199609)9:3%3C213::AID-BDM230%3E3.0.CO;2-1

 

2. Zhu, Z. & Feldman, G. (2024). Revisiting the Psychology of Waste: Replication and extensions Registered Report of Arkes (1996). In principle acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/r7tsw

In interpersonal evaluation, the amount of information available about the other person has a significant impact. Norton et al. (2007) conducted systematic experiments suggesting a 'less is more' effect – that a lack of information leads to a more positive evaluation. However, subsequent studies have not always reached the same conclusion.

 

In the current study, Horsham et al. (2024) aim to address this issue by conducting direct and conceptual replications of the Norton et al. (2007) experiments, as well as additional extensive experiments focusing on the effects of curiosity. The authors seek to confirm in a reliable way the relationship between ambiguity and liking, and even to clarify the factors that mediate this relationship. The results should significantly advance our understanding of the importance of information management in interpersonal relationships.

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was peer-reviewed by two experts; after four rounds of review and based on their revisions and detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and awarded it in-principle acceptance (IPA).

 

URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/7mc4y
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 

 

 

1. Norton, M. I., Frost, J. H., & Ariely, D. (2007). Less is more: The lure of ambiguity, or why familiarity breeds contempt. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 97-105. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.92.1.97

 

2. Horsham, Z., Haydock-Symonds, A., Imada, H., Tai, H. C., Lau, W. L., Shum, T. L., Zeng, Y., Chow, H. T., & Feldman, G., (2024). Does learning more about others impact liking them? Replication and extension Registered Report of Norton et al. (2007)’s Lure of Ambiguity. In principle acceptance of Version 4 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/7mc4y

Revisiting a true classic, this registered replication report addresses Kahneman and Tversky’s (1973) introduction of the representativeness heuristic. The heuristic refers to deviations of judgments from normative evaluations of the evidence when the stimulus fits to a prototype. For instance, when an individual is described by features stereotypically associated with a certain target group (e.g., a person who attends dance training several times a week and has a passion for singing and performing), likelihood judgments that the individual belongs to a target group (K-Pop artists) compared to a non-target group (e.g., accountants) are inflated. 

The impact of the original research on the field is clearly immense and long-lasting. All the better that a systematic replication attempt is being undertaken in this registered report, which addresses studies 1 through 7 of Kahneman and Tversky’s classic 1973 paper. Chan and Feldman (2024) propose a well-powered online study, in which all studies from the original article are presented to participants within-subjects. The materials are carefully constructed and closely documented in the accompanying OSF project, where in-depth information on planned data analyses is supported with a simulated dataset.  

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over three rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).

 

 

Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. Data collection commenced during the later part of Stage 1 peer review; however, since no substantive changes to the design were made after this point, the risk of bias due to prior data observation remains zero and the manuscript therefore qualifies for Level 6.

 

 

 

1. Chan, H. C. & Feldman, G. (2024). Representativeness heuristic in intuitive predictions: Replication Registered Report of problems reviewed in Kahneman and Tversky (1973). In principle acceptance of Version 5 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/er2cq

 

2. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973). On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review, 80(4), 237–251. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0034747

 

Decision-making based on limited information is a common occurrence. Whether it is the possibility of a cheaper product elsewhere or the unknown qualifications of election candidates, people are regularly forced to make a decision under ignorance or uncertainty. In such situations, information about certain events is unavailable or too costly to acquire and people rely on subjective probability allocation to guide decision-making processes. This allocation seems to result in what is known as ignorance priors, i.e., decision-makers assigning equal probabilities to each possible outcome within a given set. How events are grouped or partitioned is often subjective and may influence probability judgments and subsequent decisions. In such cases, the way the choices within a choice set are presented may shape the perceived likelihood of different outcomes. Understanding the impact of partitioning on probability estimation is crucial for both psychological and economic theories of judgment and decision.

 

The question of evaluating probabilities under uncertainty has received much attention in the psychology and economics literature over the past decades given the wide range of possible applications. In the current work, Ding and Feldman (2024) seek to replicate one of the foundational works on the topic: Fox and Rottenstreich (2003). In the original work, the authors provided exploratory evidence indicating that the framing of a situation affects the way individuals perceive probabilities of possible outcomes. They showed that people assigned uniform probabilities to sets of events described in a problem, such that the way the events are described partly determines people’s partitioning of those events and evaluations of the probabilities of the possible outcomes. Additionally, this partitioned framing affected judgments both under conditions of ignorance (where individuals have no information and rely solely on uniform probability assignments) and uncertainty (where individuals have some information but still rely on heuristics influenced by partitioning). This suggests that priors resulting from the inference of available evidence are sometimes partly contaminated by partitioning bias, affecting both uninformed and partially informed decision-making processes. As a consequence, the partitioning of events into different subsets might lead to varying evaluations of a single situation, resulting in inconsistencies and poorly calibrated probability assessments.

 

Ding and Feldman (2024) aim to replicate Studies 1a, 1b, 3, and 4 from Fox and Rottenstreich (2003). Their close replication will rely on original data (US participants, Prolific, N=600, not collected yet) with a large statistical power (>95%). Their replication aims to examine whether the partitioned framing affects prior formation under ignorance (Studies 1a, 1b, and 4) and uncertainty (Study 3). In addition, the authors propose an extension examining estimations of alternative event(s) contrasting estimations of the probabilities of events happening versus of events not happening.

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated by two external reviewers and the recommender. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' and the recommender’s comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).

 

 

Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.

 

 

 

 

1. Ding, K. & Feldman, G. (2024). Revisiting Partition Priming in judgment under uncertainty:
Replication and extension Registered Report of Fox and Rottenstreich (2003). In principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/px6vb

 

2. Fox, C. R. & Rottenstreich, Y. (2003). Partition priming in judgment under uncertainty. Psychological Science, 14, 195-200. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.02431