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06 Jun 2022
STAGE 1
toto

Revisiting the psychological sources of ambiguity avoidance: Replication and extensions of Curley, Yates, and Abrams (1986)

Reducing ambiguity in the psychological understanding of ambiguity avoidance

Recommended by ORCID_LOGO based on reviews by Leyla Loued-Khenissi and Hayley Jach
A considerable body of research in behavioural economics has established the existence of ambiguity avoidance: the tendency for people, when given a choice between two options, to choose the option for which there is greater certainty about the probabilities of certain outcomes occurring. In a seminal study, Curley, Yates, and Abrams (1986) explored potential psychological explanations of ambiguity avoidance, contrasting five hypotheses: hostile nature (the anticipation that more ambiguous options are biased against oneself), other-evaluation (the anticipation that one’s decision will be evaluated by others), self-evaluation (the anticipation that one's decision will be self-evaluated in the future), forced-choice (in which the less ambiguous option is selected only when all other considerations are equal), and a more general uncertainty avoidance associated with risk aversion. The results favoured other-evaluation as the most promising explanation, with implications in the following decades for research in social psychology, judgment and decision making, behavioural economics, consumer behaviour, and cognitive psychology.
 
In the current study, Yiu and Feldman (2022) plan to revisit the psychological basis of ambiguity avoidance in a large online sample through a replication of key studies from Curley et al. (1986), including extensions to increase methodological rigour and to explore the relationship between ambiguity avoidance and hostility bias, anticipated future regret, and post-choice social judgment from others, as well as trait measures of risk tolerance and ambiguity tolerance.
 
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/wb3hc
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 
References
 
1. Curley, S. P., Yates, J. F. & Abrams, R. A. (1986). Psychological sources of ambiguity avoidance. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 38, 230-256. https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(86)90018-X
  
2. Yiu, S. Y. & Feldman, G. (2022). Revisiting the psychological sources of ambiguity avoidance: 
Replication and extensions of Curley, Yates, and Abrams (1986), in principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/wb3hc
Revisiting the psychological sources of ambiguity avoidance: Replication and extensions of Curley, Yates, and Abrams (1986)Sze Ying (Dawn) Yiu, Gilad Feldman<p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Revisiting the psychological sources of ambiguity avoidance: Replication and extensions of Curley, Yates, and Abrams (1986) ​"</p>Social sciencesChris Chambers2022-02-15 09:03:37 View
21 Nov 2022
STAGE 1
toto

Revisiting the motivated denial of mind to animals used for food: Replication and extension of Bastian et al. (2012)

Does denial of animal minds explain the "meat paradox"?

Recommended by ORCID_LOGO based on reviews by Brock Bastian, Ben De Groeve, Florian Lange and Sebastian Berger
The psychology of meat-eating offers a fascinating window into moral reasoning, cognition and emotion, as well as applications in the shift toward more sustainable and ethical alternatives to meat consumption. One key observation in this field is the so-called “meat paradox” – the tendency for people to simultaneously eat meat while also caring about animals. One way to resolve this conflict and reduce cognitive dissonance is for people to separate the concept of meat from animals, mentally disengaging from the origins of meat in order to make the act of consumption more ethically acceptable. Another potential explanation is a motivated “denial of mind”, in which people believe that animals lack the mental capacity to experience suffering; therefore, eating an animal is not a harm that the animal will experience. In support of the latter hypothesis, Bastian et al (2012) found that animals judged to have greater mental capacities were also judged to less edible, and that simply reminding meat eaters that an animal was being raised for the purposes of meat consumption led to denial of its mental capacities.
 
Using a large-scale online design in 1000 participants, Jacobs et al. (2022) propose a replication of two studies from Bastian et al. (2012): asking how the perceived mental capabilities of animals relates to both their perceived edibility and the degree of moral concern they elicit, and whether learning that an animal will be consumed influences perceptions of its mental capabilities. Among various exploratory analyses, the authors will also examine whether the perception of animal minds (in animals consumed for meat) varies systematically according to species.
 
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/cru4z
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 
References
 
1. Bastian, B., Loughnan, S., Haslam, N., & Radke, H. R. M. (2012). Don’t mind meat? The denial of mind to animals used for human consumption. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38, 247–256. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167211424291
 
2. Jacobs, T. P., Wang, M., Leach, S., Loong, S. H., Khanna, M., Chan, K. W., Chau, H. T., Tam, Y. Y. & Feldman, G. (2022). Revisiting the motivated denial of mind to animals used for food: Replication and extension of Bastian et al. (2012), in principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/cru4z
Revisiting the motivated denial of mind to animals used for food: Replication and extension of Bastian et al. (2012) Tyler P. Jacobs, Meiying Wang, Stefan Leach, Siu Ho Loong, Mahika Khanna, Ka Wan Chan, Ho Ting Chau, Yuen Yan Tam, Gilad Feldman<p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Revisiting the motivated denial of mind to animals used for food: Replication and extension of Bastian et al. (2012) ​"</p>Social sciencesChris Chambers Ben De Groeve, Florian Lange, Brock Bastian, Sebastian Berger2022-03-04 04:21:18 View
03 May 2022
STAGE 1
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Revisiting the links between numeracy and decision making: Replication of Peters et al. (2006) with an extension examining confidence

Assessing the replicability of specific links between numeracy and decision-making

Recommended by ORCID_LOGO based on reviews by Daniel Ansari and Elena Rusconi
Numeracy – the ability to understand and work with numbers – is associated with a wide range of social and health-related outcomes, including socioeconomic status, employment, literacy, reasoning, and life satisfaction. A substantial body of evidence has also shown links between numeracy and decision-making, prompting the question of how it relates to finer-grained measures of reasoning, judgment and affect/emotion.
 
In the current study, Zhu and Feldman propose to replicate four influential experiments from a study by Peters et al. (2006), which demonstrated links between numeracy and performance on a variety of decision-making tasks, including attribute framing, frequency-percentage framing, susceptibility to affective influences, and various cognitive biases. The authors also propose several extended questions, including refinements of the original hypotheses and an examination of the relationship between numeracy and confidence in numeric judgments (subjective numeracy).
 
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/r73fb
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 
 
References
 
1. Zhu, M. & Feldman, G. (2022). Revisiting the links between numeracy and decision making: Replication of Peters et al. (2006) with an extension examining confidence, in principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/r73fb
 
2. Peters, E., Västfjäll, D., Slovic, P., Mertz, C. K., Mazzocco, K., & Dickert, S. (2006). Numeracy and decision making. Psychological Science, 17, 407-413. https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9280.2006.01720.x
Revisiting the links between numeracy and decision making: Replication of Peters et al. (2006) with an extension examining confidenceMinrui Zhu, Gilad Feldman<p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Revisiting the links between numeracy and decision making: Replication of Peters et al. (2006) with an extension examining confidence"</p>Social sciencesChris Chambers2022-01-31 10:27:58 View
13 Jun 2022
STAGE 1
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Revisiting the link between true-self and morality: Replication and extensions of Newman, Bloom and Knobe (2014) Studies 1 and 2

Replicating positive evaluations of our "true selves"

Recommended by ORCID_LOGO based on reviews by Andrew Christy, Cillian McHugh, Caleb Reynolds and Sergio Barbosa
The concept of a “true self” – the deepest and most genuine part of a person’s personality – is fundamental to many aspects of psychology, with influences that extend deep into society and culture. For decades, research in psychology has consistently found that people see their true selves as positive and virtuous. But people also positively regard (and indeed overestimate) many other characteristics related to the self, such as their abilities and achievements, prompting the question of whether there is anything special about the “true self” as a psychological concept. In an influential study, Newman et al. (2014) found that people were more likely to attribute morally good than morally bad changes in the behaviour of other people to their true selves. Crucially, they also found that our tendency to view the true self positively is shaped by our own moral values – in essence, what we regard as morally or politically good, we see in the true selves of others. Newman et al’s findings suggest that the tendency for us to regard our true self in a positive light stems from the specific nature of true self as a concept. 
 
In the current study, Lee and Feldman (2022) propose to replicate two key studies from Newman et al. (2014) in a large online sample. In particular, they will ask whether true-self attributions are higher for changes in behaviour that are morally positive compared to morally negative or neutral, and, further, how true-self attributions are aligned with personal moral/political views. The authors also propose exploring the relationship between true-self attributions and perceived social norms.
 
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/v2tpf
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 
References
 
1. Newman, G. E., Bloom, P., & Knobe, J. (2014). Value judgments and the true self. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40, 203–216. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167213508791
 
2. Lee, S. C. & Feldman, G. (2022). Revisiting the link between true-self and morality: Replication and extension of Newman, Bloom, and Knobe (2014) Studies 1 and 2, in principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/v2tpf
Revisiting the link between true-self and morality: Replication and extensions of Newman, Bloom and Knobe (2014) Studies 1 and 2Shuk Ching (Janet) Lee, Gilad Feldman<p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Revisiting the link between true-self and morality: Replication and extensions of Newman, Bloom and Knobe (2014) Studies 1 and 2"</p>Social sciencesChris Chambers2022-02-15 08:43:21 View
02 Dec 2022
STAGE 1
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Revisiting the link between anthropomorphism and loneliness with an extension to free will belief: Replication and extensions of Epley et al. (2008)

Are loneliness and free will beliefs associated with anthropomorphism?

Recommended by ORCID_LOGO based on reviews by John Protzko and Marieke Wieringa
Anthropomorphism is a widespread phenomenon in which people instil non-human entities or objects with human-like characteristics, such as motivations, intentions, and goals. Although common, the tendency to anthropomorphise varies between people, and a growing body of psychological research has examined the importance of various individual differences. One major theoretical account of anthropomorphism (Epley et al. 2007) suggests that sociality motivation – the drive to establish social relationships – is a key moderator of the phenomenon. In support of this account, some evidence suggests that people who experience greater loneliness (a proposed marker of sociality motivation) are more likely to anthropomorphise. In an influential series of studies, Epley et al. (2008) found that anthropomorphism and loneliness were positively correlated and that inducing participants experimentally to feel more lonely led to greater anthropomorphism. Later studies, however, produced more mixed results, particularly concerning the effectiveness of the experimental interventions.
 
In the current study, Elsherif et al. (2022) propose a partial replication of Epley et al. (2008), focusing on the correlational relationship between anthropomorphism and loneliness, with extensions to examine free will beliefs, anthropomorphism for supernatural beings (in addition to objects/gadgets), and the extent to which participants judged objects/gadgets to be controllable.
 
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/by89c
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 
References
 
1. Epley, N., Waytz, A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2007). On seeing human: A three-factor theory of anthropomorphism. Psychological Review, 114, 864–886. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.114.4.864 
 
2. Epley, N., Akalis, S., Waytz, A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2008). Creating social connection through inferential reproduction: Loneliness and perceived agency in gadgets, Gods, and greyhounds. Psychological Science, 19, 114–120. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02056.x 
 
3. Elsherif, M., Pomareda, C., Xiao, Q., Chu, H. Y., Tang, M. C., Wong, T. H., Wu, Y. &  Feldman, G. (2022). Revisiting the positive association between loneliness and anthropomorphism with an extension to belief in free will: Replication and extensions of Epley et al. (2008), in principle acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/by89c
Revisiting the link between anthropomorphism and loneliness with an extension to free will belief: Replication and extensions of Epley et al. (2008)Mahmoud Elsherif, Christina Pomareda, Qinyu Xiao, Hoi Yan Chu, Ming Chun Tang, Ting Hin (Angus) Wong, Yiming Wu, Gilad Feldman<p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Revisiting the link between anthropomorphism and loneliness with an extension to free will belief: Replication and extensions of Epley et al. (2008)​"</p>Social sciencesChris Chambers2022-02-16 07:03:50 View
06 Jun 2022
STAGE 1
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Revisiting the role of public exposure and moral beliefs on feelings of shame and guilt: Replication of Smith et al. (2002)’s Study 1

How do public exposure and moral beliefs impact feelings of shame and guilt?

Recommended by ORCID_LOGO based on reviews by Roger Giner-Sorolla and Uriel Haran
Shame and guilt are powerful negative emotions that are notable for their external vs. internal focus: while shame is generally experienced in response to public scrutiny, guilt arises from a self-directed, private evaluation. In a formative study, Smith et al. (2002) asked whether the level of public exposure influenced levels of shame and guilt arising from one's transgressions, and found that, compared to private situations, public exposure was more strongly associated with shame than with guilt. Since then, these findings have had significant implications for theories and applications of moral psychology.
 
In the current study, Zhang et al.  propose to directly replicate Smith et al. (2002) in a large online sample. In particular, they will revisit the critical questions from Study 1, asking (a) whether public exposure affects the magnitude of shame and guilt over one’s misconduct, and (b) whether stronger moral belief increases guilt and shame over one’s misconduct.
 
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/j7kt2
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 
References
 
1. Smith, R. H., Webster, J. M., Parrott, W. G., & Eyre, H. L. (2002). The role of public exposure in moral and nonmoral shame and guilt. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 138-159. https://doi.apa.org/doi/10.1037/0022-3514.83.1.138
 
2. Zhang, Y., Cheung, F. C., Wong, H.T., Yuen, L. Y., Sin, H. C., Chow, H. T. & Feldman, G. (2022). Revisiting the role of public exposure and moral beliefs on feelings of shame and guilt: Replication of Smith et al. (2002)’s Study 1. https://osf.io/j7kt2
Revisiting the role of public exposure and moral beliefs on feelings of shame and guilt: Replication of Smith et al. (2002)’s Study 1Yikang Zhang, Fung Chit (Jack) Cheung, Hei Tung (Patrina) Wong, Lok Yee (Noel) Yuen, Hui Ching (Rachel) Sin, Hiu Tang (Kristy) Chow, Gilad Feldman<p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Revisiting the impact of public exposure on shame and guilt: Replications of Smith et al. (2002) Study 1 with extensions examining regret, responsibility, and robustness to a within-s...Social sciencesChris Chambers2022-02-16 05:05:36 View
15 Jun 2023
STAGE 1
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Revisiting the impact of affection on insurance purchase and claim decision-making: Replication and extensions Registered Report of Hsee and Kunreuther (2000)

Understanding how object-oriented emotional attachment influences economic response to loss

Recommended by ORCID_LOGO based on reviews by Bence Palfi, Rima-Maria Rahal and Fausto Gonzalez
Emotion is a well-established mediator of decision-making, including prospective economic decisions, but does it affect the way we respond economically to loss? According to classic economic theories, when an object is lost and cannot be recovered, our emotional attachment to that object should be irrelevant for decisions such as choosing whether to claim insurance or compensation. Intriguingly, however, this does not appear to be the case: in a series of experiments, Hsee and Kunreuther (2000) found that when people have higher affection towards an object, they are more sensitive to its loss and are more willing to claim compensation or purchase insurance for the object. They explained these findings according to an influential “consolation hypothesis” in which people see insurance compensation as means to mitigate against the emotional distress associated with property loss.
 
Using a large online sample (N=1000), Law and Feldman (2023) propose to replicate four of six studies from Hsee and Kunreuther (2000), each asking (primarily) whether people with higher affection towards an object are more willing to claim compensation or purchase insurance for that object. In each experiment, participants are randomly assigned to either a high affection group or a low affection group and then given a scenario in which the level of affection to an object is correspondingly manipulated while the monetary value is held constant. For example, for high affection: “You liked the now-damaged painting very much and you fell in love with it at first sight. Although you paid only $100, it was worth a lot more to you”, and for low affection: “You were not particularly crazy about the now-damaged painting. You paid $100 for it, and that’s about how much you think it was worth.” A range of dependent measures are then collected, including the maximum hours participants would be willing to spend driving to claim compensation, the maximum amount participants would be willing to pay for insurance, and how likely participants would be to claim compensation or purchase insurance. As part of the replication, the authors have also built in manipulation checks to confirm that the scenarios influenced participants' (imagined) level of affection for the object, and a range of exploratory analyses.
 
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/b7y5z
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 
 
References
 
1. Hsee, C. K., & Kunreuther, H. C. (2000). The affection effect in insurance decisions. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 20, 141-159. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007876907268

2. Law, Y. Y. & Feldman, G. (2023). Revisiting the impact of affection on insurance purchase and claim decision-making: Replication and extensions Registered Report of Hsee and Kunreuther (2000), in principle acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/b7y5z
Revisiting the impact of affection on insurance purchase and claim decision-making: Replication and extensions Registered Report of Hsee and Kunreuther (2000)Yan Yi (Veronica) Law, Gilad Feldman<p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Revisiting the impact of affection on insurance purchase and claim decision-making: Replication and extensions of Hsee and Kunreuther (2000)"</p>Social sciencesChris Chambers2023-02-02 11:02:51 View
19 Jun 2023
STAGE 1
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Revisiting the “Belief in the law of small numbers”: Conceptual replication and extensions Registered Report of problems reviewed in Tversky and Kahneman (1971) [Stage 1]

Should we believe in the “belief in the law of small numbers?”

Recommended by ORCID_LOGO based on reviews by Romain Espinosa and Kariyushi Rao
Probability and randomness are foundational statistical concepts used not only throughout the sciences, but also in our daily lives to guide our behavior and make sense of the world. Their importance and widespread use may suggest that they are easy concepts to understand, yet that seems not to be the case. A classic article by Tversky and Kahneman (1971) on the “belief in the law of small numbers” revealed that professional psychologists tended to incorrectly perceive a small sample that is randomly drawn from a population as representative of that population. This finding has been hugely influential, inspiring myriad subsequent studies into error and bias when reasoning about probability. 
 
In the current study, Hong and Feldman (2023) propose a conceptual replication and extension of Tversky and Kahneman (1971). The original article was shockingly sparse on details regarding the method, sample, and findings, and, to our knowledge, has never been replicated. These facts are especially concerning given the foundational status that the article holds in the field. Hong and Feldman (2023) have developed a conceptual replication project, using the same approach and targeting the same claims from Tversky and Kahneman (1971), but modifying the wording of the stimuli for clarity and appropriateness for lay respondents. Although Tversky and Kahneman (1971) relied on professional psychologists as participants, many of their claims were not restricted to that population, but rather were generalized to all people—which is also how the findings have been subsequently applied. Thus, the change from professional to lay responders is entirely appropriate and the study will be diagnostic of the original claims.
 
Finally, Hong and Feldman (2023) extend the target study by manipulating the sample size indicated in the stimuli. Tversky and Kahneman (1971) relied on a single sample size in each scenario, leaving open the question as to how sample size might impact respondents’ reasoning. Accordingly, Hong and Feldman (2023) vary the sample size across the scenarios to determine whether participants answer differently as the sample size increases. 
 
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review, the first round consisting of detailed comments from two reviewers and the second round consisting of a close read by the recommender. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and was therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/fzbq7
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 
 
References
 
1. Hong, C. K., & Feldman, G. (2023). Revisiting the “Belief in the law of small numbers”: Conceptual replication and extensions Registered Report of problems reviewed in Tversky and Kahneman (1971). In principle acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/fzbq7
 
2. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1971). Belief in the law of small numbers. Psychological Bulletin, 76(2), 105–110. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0031322   
Revisiting the “Belief in the law of small numbers”: Conceptual replication and extensions Registered Report of problems reviewed in Tversky and Kahneman (1971) [Stage 1]Cheuk Kiu (Jeffery) HONG, Gilad FELDMAN<p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Revisiting the “Belief in the law of small numbers”: Replication and extensions of problems reviewed in Tversky and Kahneman (1971)​"</p>Social sciencesMoin Syed2023-02-23 08:23:23 View
20 Jun 2022
STAGE 1
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Revisiting stigma attributions and reactions to stigma: Replication and extensions of Weiner et al. (1988)

Understanding the psychology of stigmas

Recommended by ORCID_LOGO based on reviews by Charlotte Pennington and Joanne Rathbone
Stigmas are prejudices or discrimination against people based on qualities that vary from the norm, such as a physical or mental illness, disability, sexuality, race, or one of many other personal characteristics. The harm caused by stigmatisation has made understanding the causes and potential solutions a vital area of study in psychology and public health. One of the major focuses of ongoing research is understanding the factors that determine whether a particular characteristic becomes stigmatised, and if so how the stigma might be eliminated. Previous research has found that for disease-based stigmas, the contagiousness, course, and disruptiveness of a disease can be influential. Another key determinant is the perceived cause of the stigmatised condition or characteristic. In a landmark study, Weiner et al. (1988) reported that attributes based on physical health were more likely to be perceived as being uncontrollable, stable and irreversible, prompting feelings of sympathy without anger or judgment. On the other hand, attributes related to mental health and behaviour were more likely to be regarded as controllable and reversible, prompting lack of sympathy coupled with feelings of anger and negative judgement. In a second experiment, they also found that manipulating the perception of controllability can modify emotional responses and judgments – for some stigmas (but not others), providing participants with information that a particular characteristic was controllable vs. uncontrollable was found to increase or decrease negative attributions, respectively.
 
In the current study, Yeung and Feldman (2022) propose to replicate Experiment 2 from Weiner et al. (1988) in a large online sample. In particular, they plan to ask how the source of a stigma is related to perceived controllability and stability, emotional reactions, and willingness to help. They also propose a range of extensions, including the inclusion of additional stigmas that have become relevant since the original study was published over 30 years ago.
 
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/k957f
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 
References
 
1. Weiner, B., Perry, R. P., & Magnusson, J. (1988). An attributional analysis of reactions to stigmas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 738–748. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.55.5.738
 
2. Yeung, K. Y. & Feldman, G. (2022). Revisiting stigma attributions and reactions to stigma: Replication and extensions of Weiner et al. (1988), in principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/k957f
Revisiting stigma attributions and reactions to stigma: Replication and extensions of Weiner et al. (1988)Kwan Yin (Gladys) Yeung, Gilad Feldman <p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Revisiting stigma attributions and reactions to stigma: Replication and extensions of Weiner et al. (1988) ​"</p>Social sciencesChris Chambers Joanne Rathbone2022-02-15 10:55:13 View
17 May 2022
STAGE 1
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Revisiting mental accounting classic paradigms: Replication of Thaler (1999) and an extension examining impulsivity

Mental accounting under the microscope

Recommended by ORCID_LOGO based on reviews by Barnabas Szaszi and Féidhlim McGowan
In recent years, the study of mental accounting – the thought processes by which people informally record, categorise, and evaluate the costs and benefits of their financial transactions – has been an active research area, drawing attention to a range of biases and distortions that deviate from optimal economic decision-making (Zhang & Sussman, 2018). Although the term “mental accounting” is a relatively recent construction (Thaler, 1999), it stems from a longer history of behavioural economic research on value functions, decision frames, risk-taking, and related concepts.
 
In the current study, Li and Feldman propose to replicate 17 influential mental accounting problems (or tasks) reviewed by Thaler (1999) in a large online sample. The authors also propose several extensions examining the effects of sunk costs and expenses framing. 
 
The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/d6cjk
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 
References
 
1. Zhang, C. Y., & Sussman, A. B. (2018). Perspectives on mental accounting: An exploration of budgeting and investing. Financial Planning Review, 1, e1011. https://doi.org/10.1002/cfp2.1011
 
2. Thaler, R. H. (1999). Mental accounting matters. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 12, 183-206. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(199909)12:3%3C183::AID-BDM318%3E3.0.CO;2-F
 
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Revisiting mental accounting classic paradigms: Replication of Thaler (1999) and an extension examining impulsivityMengfei Li; Gilad Feldman <p>This is a scheduled PCI-RR snap shot for a planned project: "Revisiting mental accounting classic paradigms: Replication of Thaler (1999) and an extension examining impulsivity​"</p>Social sciencesChris Chambers2022-01-31 10:18:38 View