Inequalities in income, wealth, and opportunities are rampant both between and within nations around the world. Making strides to rectify inequalities requires examining how people come to understand them as well as the psychological processes that translate those understandings into reparative actions. There is some evidence for a “comparative framing effect,” in which the group that is initially referenced impacts judgements by communicating salient information and the appropriate reference point. Research on this comparative framing effect suggests that focusing on disadvantage, relative to advantage, leads to a more negative assessment and intentions to engage in action to reduce the inequality. 

 

In two pilot studies (reported in the current proposal) focused on global inequalities (low-income vs high-income countries), Schnepf et al. (2023) did not find evidence for a main effect of framing on perceived legitimacy of the inequality or intentions to engage in action. They did, however, find some evidence for an interaction with the perceived size of the inequality. When the low-income country was the subject of the comparison, larger perceptions of the size of the inequality were associated with greater intentions to engage in action (both studies) and greater perceptions of the differences as illegitimate (Study 1 only). Moreover, they found some evidence in both studies that negative social emotions such as guilt and shame were the mechanism that explained why perceiving greater inequality in the low-income framing condition was associated with the outcomes. 

 

In the current study, Schnepf et al. (2023) build upon these two pilot studies to conduct a high-quality replication and a stronger test of their hypotheses. Most notably, the proposed Registered Report uses a much larger sample, providing adequate statistical power to detect relatively small interaction effects. Additionally, the proposed project manipulates the size of the inequality that is being evaluated, rather than relying on participants’ perceptions. Finally, the study includes “justice sensitivity,” or the degree to which individuals assess inequality as unfair as an additional hypothesized moderator, and “social dominance orientation” as an exploratory moderator. Along with the pilot studies, the proposed project will represent a strong test of several hypotheses relevant to many different areas of social and personality psychology. 

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth peer review, both of which consisted of substantial comments from two scholars with relevant expertise. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and was therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).

 

URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/pgyvw
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:

 

 

 

1. Schnepf, J., Reese, G., Bruckmüller, S., Braun, M., Rotzinger, J., & Martiny, S. E. (2023). Justice in the eye of the beholder: How comparison framing affects the perception of global inequality through social emotions and justice sensitivity. In principle acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/pgyvw

Decision-making based on limited information is a common occurrence. Whether it is the possibility of a cheaper product elsewhere or the unknown qualifications of election candidates, people are regularly forced to make a decision under ignorance or uncertainty. In such situations, information about certain events is unavailable or too costly to acquire and people rely on subjective probability allocation to guide decision-making processes. This allocation seems to result in what is known as ignorance priors, i.e., decision-makers assigning equal probabilities to each possible outcome within a given set. How events are grouped or partitioned is often subjective and may influence probability judgments and subsequent decisions. In such cases, the way the choices within a choice set are presented may shape the perceived likelihood of different outcomes. Understanding the impact of partitioning on probability estimation is crucial for both psychological and economic theories of judgment and decision.

 

The question of evaluating probabilities under uncertainty has received much attention in the psychology and economics literature over the past decades given the wide range of possible applications. In the current work, Ding and Feldman (2024) seek to replicate one of the foundational works on the topic: Fox and Rottenstreich (2003). In the original work, the authors provided exploratory evidence indicating that the framing of a situation affects the way individuals perceive probabilities of possible outcomes. They showed that people assigned uniform probabilities to sets of events described in a problem, such that the way the events are described partly determines people’s partitioning of those events and evaluations of the probabilities of the possible outcomes. Additionally, this partitioned framing affected judgments both under conditions of ignorance (where individuals have no information and rely solely on uniform probability assignments) and uncertainty (where individuals have some information but still rely on heuristics influenced by partitioning). This suggests that priors resulting from the inference of available evidence are sometimes partly contaminated by partitioning bias, affecting both uninformed and partially informed decision-making processes. As a consequence, the partitioning of events into different subsets might lead to varying evaluations of a single situation, resulting in inconsistencies and poorly calibrated probability assessments.

 

Ding and Feldman (2024) aim to replicate Studies 1a, 1b, 3, and 4 from Fox and Rottenstreich (2003). Their close replication will rely on original data (US participants, Prolific, N=600, not collected yet) with a large statistical power (>95%). Their replication aims to examine whether the partitioned framing affects prior formation under ignorance (Studies 1a, 1b, and 4) and uncertainty (Study 3). In addition, the authors propose an extension examining estimations of alternative event(s) contrasting estimations of the probabilities of events happening versus of events not happening.

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated by two external reviewers and the recommender. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' and the recommender’s comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).

 

 

Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.

 

 

 

 

1. Ding, K. & Feldman, G. (2024). Revisiting Partition Priming in judgment under uncertainty:
Replication and extension Registered Report of Fox and Rottenstreich (2003). In principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/px6vb

 

2. Fox, C. R. & Rottenstreich, Y. (2003). Partition priming in judgment under uncertainty. Psychological Science, 14, 195-200. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.02431

When we familiarise with new faces over repeated exposures, it is generally in situations that have meaning for us. Seeing a face more often tends to go along with learning more about the person, and their likely contexts and actions. In this Registered Report, Noad and Andrews (2024) tested whether meaningful context during exposure improves the consolidation of faces into long-term memory. Participants were shown video clips from the TV series Life on Mars, either in their original chronological sequence, which provides meaningful context, or in a scrambled sequence. It was expected that the original sequence would provide a better conceptual understanding, and this was confirmed by free recall and structured question tests. Face recognition memory was tested with images of the actor from the original clips (‘in show’) and the same actor from another show (‘out-of-show’), to test whether memory was modulated by the similarity of appearance to that at encoding. Face recognition was tested immediately after exposure and after four weeks, to allow time for consolidation. As expected, recognition memory was better for participants in the meaningful context condition, and for in-show faces. However, meaningful context did not lead to less forgetting of the faces at the follow up test, even for in-show faces, which did not support the original predictions. An exploratory analysis found that a metric of overlap between pairs of participants’ conceptual understanding was related to overlap in the set of faces they recognised. This relationship was stronger after four weeks, which suggests increased interaction of conceptual knowledge and face recognition after consolidation.

 

The Stage 2 manuscript was assessed over two rounds of review, and the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 2 criteria for recommendation.

 

URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/8wp6f
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that was used to answer the research question was generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:

 

 

References
 
1. Noad, K. & Andrews, T. J. (2024). The importance of conceptual knowledge when becoming familiar
with faces during naturalistic viewing [Stage 2]. Acceptance of Version 4 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/thgrz

Chronic pain is a major cause of disability that can often poorly managed with pharmacological treatments. This has prompted the exploration of other interventions like resizing illusions of body parts in augmented reality. These illusions have shown promise in conditions like osteoarthritis and complex regional pain syndrome, but it remains unclear how they alter the neural representation of body parts in the brain. The study by Hansford and colleagues aims to investigate these mechanisms in healthy participants, using somatosensory steady state evoked potentials (SSEP) and self-report questionnaires.

 

The study will involve finger stretching in an augmented reality setup that allows the researchers to independently manipulate visual and tactical stimulation. Assuming that multisensory stimulation indeed produces a robust illusion, the researchers will quantify the somatosensory evoked potentials in multisensory, unisensory, and two non-illusion control conditions. The study will provide inights into the neural mechanisms of these illusions and lay the ground for future investigations of these processes as a potential treatment for chronic pain.

 

The manuscript was evaluated over seven rounds of in-depth review by the recommender and three expert reviewers. After substantial revisions, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).

 

URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/u6gsb
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 

References
 
1. Hansford, K. J., Baker, D. H., McKenzie, K. J., & Preston, C. E. J. (2023). Somatosensory Response Changes During Illusory Finger Stretching. In principle acceptance of Version 7 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/u6gsb

There are two fundamental processes that the brain engages in: statistical learning and selection. Indeed, past work has shown these processes often come together: People can use a task-irrelevant stimulus to predict a target stimulus even in different modalities (crossmodal statistical learning), thereby enhancing the processing of the target stimulus (selection). Further, people can learn where a distractor will be in order to efficiently suppress it (selecting out), using task irrelevant stimuli in the same modality (within-modality statistical learning).
 
In two experiments Jagini and Sunny found that people did not learn to use a task-irrelevant stimulus from a different modality (cross modal statistical learning) to suppress a distractor (selecting out). They also found that people had little awareness of the relation between the predictor task-irrelevant stimulus and the location of the distractor. The results may reflect limits on what can be achieved unconsciously.

 

Following peer review, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 2 criteria and awarded a positive recommendation.

 

URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/qjbmg
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that was used to answer the research question existed prior to Stage 1 in-principle acceptance.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 

 

 

1. Jagini, K. K. & Sunny, M. M. (2023). No reliable effect of task-irrelevant cross-modal statistical regularities on distractor suppression. Stage 2 Registered Report, acceptance of Version 4 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/d8wes