Pro-social actions are often driven by emotional factors. For instance, emotions have been shown to play a decisive role in the way we judge the fairness of a situation (affect-as-information theory: e.g., Clore et al., 2001; Storbeck and Clore, 2008), and, thus, how we make decisions. Specific emotions like anger have also been shown to stimulate the motivation to fight injustice (Lerner et al., 2015). At the individual level, people might undertake altruistic actions as a way to relieve themselves from these negative emotions (what Cialdini (1991) calls ‘reflexive distress’) but also because these actions are expected by the social norms (‘normative distress’). Indeed, pro-social actions are usually taken in social contexts, and the perception of one’s behavior by third parties might hinder or facilitate the adoption of pro-social behaviors. Understanding the determinants of the perception of altruistic behaviors is thus a key research question to support pro-social actions in collective settings.

 

In the current study, Woo and Feldman (2024) aim to replicate the seminal work of Barasch et al. (2014), who showed that third parties hold more favorable views of agents undertaking pro-social actions when the latter are motivated by emotions. More precisely, the authors aim to replicate two studies of the original work by conducting a well-powered online experiment (US participants, Prolific, N=1,164). First, they will investigate whether donors who exhibit higher distress regarding the suffering of others are perceived as more moral and authentically concerned for others. Second, they will analyze whether individuals who expect material or reputational benefits from their altruistic deeds are perceived by third parties as less moral than those who act for emotional reasons. In addition to these two replication objectives, the authors propose extensions with pre-registered hypotheses that are inspired by Study 2 from the original work. They seek to investigate whether people are seen as more other-focused when they undertake a prosocial action (donation) and under different expected rewards (material, reputational, emotional benefits).

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated by two external reviewers and the recommender. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' and the recommender’s comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).

 

Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.

 

List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 

1. Barasch, A., Levine, E. E., Berman, J. Z., & Small, D. A. (2014). Selfish or selfless? On the signal value of emotion in altruistic behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 107, 393-413. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0037207

 

2. Cialdini, R. B. (1991). Altruism or egoism? That is (still) the question. Psychological Inquiry, 2, 124-126. https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1207/s15327965pli0202_3

 

3. Clore, G. L., Gasper, K., Garvin, E., & Forgas, J. P. (2001). Handbook of Affect and Social Cognition.

 

4. Lerner, J. S., Li, Y., Valdesolo, P., & Kassam, K. S. (2015). Emotion and decision making. Annual Review of Psychology, 66, 799-823. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115043

 

5. Storbeck, J., & Clore, G. L. (2008). Affective arousal as information: How affective arousal influences judgments, learning, and memory. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2, 1824-1843. https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1751-9004.2008.00138.x

 

6. Woo, T. L. & Feldman, G. (2024). Revisiting the signal value of emotion in altruistic behavior: Replication and extensions Registered Report of Barasch et al. (2014) Studies 3 and 6. In principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/d5bmp

How does emotion influence item memory (what?) temporal memory (when?) and associative memory (in which context?), and does this differ for younger and older adults? Previous research has found inconsistent results, possibly due to small sample sizes. In this study, Laulan and Rimmele (2024) and will build on the paradigm in Palombo et al. (2021) in which participants see images embedded in videos and are asked to remember the images (what?), their temporal position within the videos (where?), and the association between the images and the videos (in which context?). Image valence (positive vs negative vs neutral) and participant age-group (18-30 vs 60-80 yr olds) are manipulated. Pre-registered analyses will first look at the two age groups separately to test for an effect of valence for each of the memory components, and second test for modulating effects of age-group. To be cost-effective, a sequential analysis approach with statistical analyses conducted at three time points and a maximum sample size of 150 younger and 150 older adults is planned.

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).

 

URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/z4e8j
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:

 

References
 

1. Laulan, P. & Rimmele, U. (2024). The role of positive and negative emotions on multiple components of episodic memory (“what”, “when”, “in which context”) in older compared to young adults: a pre-registered study. In principle acceptance of Version 4 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/z4e8j

 

2. Palombo, D. J., Te, A. A., Checknita, K. J. & Madan, C. R. (2021). Exploring the Facets of Emotional Episodic Memory: Remembering “What,” “When,” and “Which”. Psychological Science, 32, 1104–1114. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797621991548

Single gene alterations have been estimated to account for nearly half of neurodevelopmental conditions (NDCs), providing a crucial opportunity for animal models to understand the underlying mechanisms, causes and potential treatments. The use of systematic reviews (SRs) can, in principle, provide a powerful means to synthesise this evidence-base; however, the reporting quality of previous SRs in preclinical animal research has been found lacking (Hunniford et al., 2021). In the current study, Wilson et al. (2023) will undertook a review of systematic reviews to assess the characteristics and reporting quality of SRs that, in turn, synthesise research in genetically-modified animals to model NDCs. In particular, the authors extracted key features of reviews (including, among others, the aim and primary research questions, relevant animal model, and number of studies in the SR), in addition to quality indicators such as risk of bias and completeness of reporting. In doing so, the authors aimed to enhance guidance on the conduct and reporting of systematic reviews in this area.

 

Of twelve publications that met the preregistered search criteria, the completeness and quality of reporting was variable. Among the better reported characteristics were search strategies (9 of 12 articles), reporting of funding sources (10 of 12 articles) and use of animal data (11 of 12 articles). In contrast, only two articles reported whether the study protocol was preregistered, only three articles reported methods for assessing risk of bias, and just one included methods to analyse publication bias. In addition, the authors identified 19 review registrations via PROSPERO, most of which remained unpublished after their anticipated end dates. Overall, the results highlight the importance of adherence to reporting guidelines for increasing the transparency and reproducibility of SRs in this field.

 

The Stage 2 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses by the authors, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 2 criteria and awarded a positive recommendation.
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/952qk

 

Level of bias control achieved: Level 4. At least some of the data/evidence that was used to answer the research question already existed prior to IPA and was accessible in principle to the authors, but the authors certify that they did not access any part of that data/evidence prior to IPA.

 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:

 

• Brain and Neuroscience Advances
• F1000Research
• Human Population Genetics and Genomics
• In&Vertebrates
• Journal for Reproducibility in Neuroscience
• Peer Community Journal
• PeerJ
• Royal Society Open Science
   

 

1. Hunniford V. T., Montroy J., Fergusson D. A., Avey M. T., Wever K. E., McCann S. K., Foster M., Fox G., Lafreniere M., Ghaly M., Mannell S., Godwinska K., Gentles A., Selim S., MacNeil J., Sikora L., Sena E. S., Page M. J., Macleod M., Moher D., & Lalu M. M. (2021). Epidemiology and reporting characteristics of preclinical systematic reviews. PLOS Biology, 19:e3001177. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.3001177

 

2. Wilson, E., Currie, G., Macleod, M., Kind, P. & Sena, E. S. (2023). Genetically-modified animals as models of neurodevelopmental conditions: a review of systematic review reporting quality [Stage 2]. Acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/s5xd4

The psychology of meat-eating offers a fascinating window into moral reasoning, cognition and emotion, as well as applications in the shift toward more sustainable and ethical alternatives to meat consumption. One key observation in this field is the so-called “meat paradox” – the tendency for people to simultaneously eat meat while also caring about animals. One way to resolve this conflict and reduce cognitive dissonance is for people to separate the concept of meat from animals, mentally disengaging from the origins of meat in order to make the act of consumption more ethically acceptable. Another potential explanation is a motivated “denial of mind”, in which people believe that animals lack the mental capacity to experience suffering; therefore, eating an animal is not a harm that the animal will experience. In support of the latter hypothesis, Bastian et al (2012) found that animals judged to have greater mental capacities were also judged as less edible, and that simply reminding meat eaters that an animal was being raised for the purposes of meat consumption led to denial of its mental capacities.

 

Using a large-scale online design in 1000 participants, Jacobs et al. (2024) replicated two studies from Bastian et al. (2012): asking how the perceived mental capabilities of animals relates to both their perceived edibility and the degree of moral concern they elicit, and whether learning that an animal will be consumed influences perceptions of its mental capabilities. The original findings were successfully replicated. For study 1, attributions of mind were negatively related to animals’ edibility, positively related to negative affect towards eating animals, and positively related to moral concern for animals. For study 2, learning that an animal would be used for food led participants to attribute less mind to the animal. Overall, the results strengthen the conclusion that motivated denial of animal minds can be a mechanism for resolving the ‘meat paradox’.

 

The Stage 2 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 2 criteria and awarded a positive recommendation.
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/cru4z

 

Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that was used to answer the research question was generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:

 

 

1. Bastian, B., Loughnan, S., Haslam, N., & Radke, H. R. M. (2012). Don’t mind meat? The denial of mind to animals used for human consumption. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38, 247–256. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167211424291

 

2. Jacobs, T. P., Wang, M., Leach, S., Loong, S. H., Khanna, M., Chan, K. W., Chau, H. T., Tam, Y. Y. & Feldman, G. (2024). Revisiting the motivated denial of mind to animals used for food: Replication and extension of Bastian et al. (2012) [Stage 2]. Acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/mwyde

The "lure of choice" refers to the idea that we prefer to preserve the option to choose even when the choice is not helpful. In a classic study cited hundred of times, Bown et al. (2003) reported evidence for the lure of choice from a series of studies involving choices between competing options of night clubs, bank savings accounts, casino spinners, and the Monty Hall door choice paradigm. In all cases, participants tended to prefer to choose an option when paired with a "lure", even when that lure was objectively inferior (e.g., same probability of winning but lower payoff).

 

The lure of choice phenomenon applies to a variety of real-life situations many of us often face in our daily lives, and Bown et al.’s findings have influenced the way organizations present choices to prospective users. Despite their theoretical and practical impact, Bown et al.'s findings have not previously been directly replicated, even as the importance of replication studies has become increasingly acknowledged (Nosek et al., 2022).

 

Here, Chan & Feldman (2024) outline a close replication of Bown et al. (2003) that will replicate and extend their original design. By unifying Bown et al.'s multiple studies into a single paradigm with which they will collect data from approximately 1,000 online participants via Prolific, they will have substantially greater statistical power than the original study to detect the predicted effects. They will follow LeBel et al.’s (2019) criteria for evaluating replicability, such that it will be considered a successful replication depending on how many of the 4 scenarios show a signal in the same direction as Bown et al.’s original results (at least 3 out of 4 scenarios = successful replication; no scenarios = failed replication; 1 or 2 scenarios = mixed results replication). They have also added additional controls including a neutral baseline choice without a lure, further ensuring the the validity and interpretability of their eventual findings.

 

One of the goals in creating Peer Community In Registered Reports (PCI RR) was to increase the availability of publishing venues for replication studies, and so PCI RR is well-suited to the proposed replication. Feldman’s lab has also pioneered the use of PCI RR for direct replications of previous studies (e.g., Zhu & Feldman, 2023), and the current submission uses an open-access template he developed (Feldman, 2023). This experience combined with PCI RR’s efficient scheduled review model meant that the current full Stage 1 protocol was able to go from initial submission, receive detailed peer review by two experts, and receive in-principle acceptance (IPA) for the revised submission, all in less than one month.

 

URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/8ug9m
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 

• Advances in Cognitive Psychology
• Collabra: Psychology
• F1000Research
• Journal of Cognition
• Meta-Psychology
• Peer Community Journal
• PeerJ
• Royal Society Open Science
• Studia Psychologica
• Swiss Psychology Open

 

 

Bown, N. J., Read, D. & Summers, B. (2003). The lure of choice. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 16(4), 297–308. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.447

 

Chan, A. N. Y. & Feldman, G. (2024). The lure of choice revisited: Replication and extensions Registered Report of Bown et al. (2003) [Stage 1]. In principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community In Registered Reports. https://osf.io/8ug9m

 

Feldman, G. (2023). Registered Report Stage 1 manuscript template. https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/YQXTP

 

LeBel, E. P., Vanpaemel, W., Cheung, I. & Campbell, L. (2019). A brief guide to evaluate replications. Meta-Psychology, 3. https://doi.org/10.15626/MP.2018.843

 

Nosek, B. A., Hardwicke, T. E., Moshontz, H., Allard, A., Corker, K. S., Dreber, A., ... & Vazire, S. (2022). Replicability, robustness, and reproducibility in psychological science. Annual Review of Psychology, 73(1), 719-748. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-020821-114157

 

Zhu, M. & Feldman, G. (2023). Revisiting the links between numeracy and decision making: Replication Registered Report of Peters et al. (2006) with an extension examining confidence. Collabra: Psychology, 9(1). https://doi.org/10.1525/collabra.77608