The sunk cost fallacy is a cognitive bias in which people persist with a decision that is no longer optimal because of previous resources they have invested (now considered to be spent or “sunk”). Most of us will have heard sunk costs reflected in the saying “throwing good money after bad”, but sunk costs can, in theory, occur more broadly, whether for money, time or any other resource-limited investment. The sunk cost effect for money has been widely studied and appears robust; in contrast, the sunk cost effect for time is more uncertain, and is potentially moderated by the age of respondents (and likely resource availability), the fact that time is irreplaceable, and the tendency for people to account for time less easily than they do for money. In an impactful study, Soman (2001) found that the sunk cost effect for time was indeed weaker than for money, although this finding has not been widely replicated.

 

In the current study, Petrov et al. (2023) propose a replication of three studies from Soman (2001), asking whether sunk costs are weaker for time than for money, and then testing whether the relative absence of a sunk time cost arises from the inability of participants to account for time or due to more rational beliefs in the evaluation of past time investments.

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/65htv

 

Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:

 

 

1. Soman, D. (2001). The mental accounting of sunk time costs: Why time is not like money. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making,14, 169-185. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.370

 

2. Petrov, N. B., Chan, Y. K., Lau, C. N., Kwok, T. H., Chow, L. C., Lo, W. Y. V, Song W., & Feldman, G. (2023). Sunk cost effects for time versus money: Replication of Soman (2001) [Registered Report Stage 1], in principle acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/u34zb

The sunk cost fallacy is a cognitive bias in which people persist with a decision that is no longer optimal because of previous resources they have invested (now considered to be spent or “sunk”). Most of us will have heard sunk costs reflected in the saying “throwing good money after bad”, but sunk costs can, in theory, occur more broadly, whether for money, time or any other resource-limited investment. The sunk cost effect for money has been widely studied and appears robust; in contrast, the sunk cost effect for time is more uncertain, and is potentially moderated by the age of respondents (and likely resource availability), the fact that time is irreplaceable, and the tendency for people to account for time less easily than they do for money. In an impactful study, Soman (2001) found that the sunk cost effect for time was indeed weaker than for money, although this finding has not been widely replicated.

 

In the current study, Petrov et al. (2023) replicated three studies (1, 2 and 5) from Soman (2001), asking whether sunk costs are weaker for time than for money, and then testing whether the relative absence of a sunk time cost arises from the inability of participants to account for time or due to more rational beliefs in the evaluation of past time investments.

 

Results provided mixed support for the original findings. Consistent with Soman (2001), the sunk cost effect for money was reliably stronger than for time in Study 1; however, sunk costs for both money and time were comparable in Study 2 (and if anything, slightly stronger for time). The indirect replication of Study 5 from Soman (2001) found that the sunk cost effect for time was not significantly influenced by accounting for time, either using education or by highlighting opportunity costs. Robustness checks confirmed the main preregistered outcomes while also ruling out a range of potential alternative explanations. Overall, the results suggest that that sunk cost effects for time are more context-dependent and empirically volatile than sunk costs for money.
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/65htv

 

Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that was used to answer the research question was generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:

 

 

1. Soman, D. (2001). The mental accounting of sunk time costs: Why time is not like money. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making,14, 169-185. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.370

 

2. Petrov, N. B., Chan, Y. K., Lau, C. N., Kwok, T. H., Chow, L. C., Lo, W. Y. V, Song W., & Feldman, G. (2023). Sunk cost effects for time versus money: Replication and extensions Registered Report of Soman (2001), acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/q9s6p

According to the sensory recruitment framework, the visual cortex is at least in part responsible for maintaining information about elementary visual features in visual short term memory. Could an early visual area, constantly taking in new information, really be responsible for holding information for up to a second? But conversely, could higher order regions, such as frontal regions, really hold subtle sensory distinctions? It must be done somewhere. Yet the existing evidence is conflicting. Phylactou et al. seek to address this question by applying transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to disrupt early visual areas at intervals up to a second after stimulus presentation to determine the effect on visual short term memory performance. In this way they will causally influence the sensory cortex at relevant times while tightening up on possible confounds in earlier research.

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review by three expert reviewers. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).

 

 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. 

 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 

 

 

1. Phylactou, P., Shimi, A. & Konstantinou, N. (2022). Causal evidence for the role of the sensory visual cortex in visual short-term memory maintenance, in principle acceptance of Version 5 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/empdt

Are attention and consciousness inherently intertwined or distinct aspects of cognition? One report (Jiang et al. 2006) presented clear results in evidence of the latter. In this earlier study, the authors used a continuous flash suppression (CFS) paradigm which presents a colorful pattern to the dominant eye and stimuli of interest to the non-dominant eye; the colorful pattern masks the relevant stimulus from awareness. On each trial, the authors presented a sexually stimulating image and a scrambled image on different sides of a computer screen during CFS. They found that, even though participants were not consciously aware of the images, intact images that matched participants' sexual orientation could still capture attention.

 

Despite these seemingly clear results, the authors of the current Stage 1 manuscript pointed out that CFS studies are often not replicated, and the paper by Jiang et al. (2006) is no exception. Therefore, Chen et al. (2023) seek to replicate this study using a Bayesian (rather than NHST) analytic approach. This method will allow the authors to determine the strength of evidence for their hypotheses.

 

In this Stage 1 manuscript, Chen et al. present an introduction that motivates the replication, and a pilot study that replicated the procedure of Jiang et al. (2006) conducted with 21 participants. This led to a well-motivated statistical sampling plan and some small design changes for the main experiment, such as adding a staircasing procedure to remove potential performance ceiling effects, and using less extreme wording for stimulus attractiveness ratings. A clear study design template is presented, detailing the different hypotheses that will be tested, and what different outcomes would indicate.

 

The Stage 1 submission was evaluated by the recommender and two expert reviewers. Following revisions, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).

 

 

Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:

 

 

1. Jiang, Y., Costello, P., Fang, F., Huang, M., & He, S. (2006). A gender-and sexual orientation-dependent spatial attentional effect of invisible images. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 103, 17048-17052. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0605678103

 

2. Chen, Y.-J., Scott, R.B., & Dienes, Z. (2023). Is conscious perception necessary to direct attention? A replication of Jiang et al. (2006). In principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/b2ncp

Online sports betting is becoming increasingly popular worldwide, which has raised concerns about the negative consequences it has on both individual health and public health. To prevent and reduce these negative consequences, it is important to understand how gambling-related harms arise in the context of online sports betting. 

Impulsivity has long been recognized as a risk factor for disordered gambling, yet how impulsivity may lead to gambling-related harms is not entirely clear. In the current study, Jacob and colleagues (2024) aim to examine this question using a longitudinal cross-lagged panel design. Regular online sports bettors will be invited to fill out measures of impulsivity (including impulsive choice, impulsive action, and impulsivity personality) and gambling disorder symptoms three times at three-month intervals. Player tracking data on these players' online betting behavior in these three-month intervals will then be retrieved from the online gambling provider. Combining these data provides a unique opportunity to test the hypotheses that impulsivity may lead to riskier online gambling behavior, which in turn may lead to more gambling-related problems later on. The results of the current study will offer novel insights into the causal pathways from impulsivity to disordered gambling in online sports betting, and may also inform the development of early prevention strategies to reduce gambling-related harms.

The current Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated by two reviewers and the recommender. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).

 

URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/7wsfh
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 3. At least some data/evidence that will be used to the answer the research question has been previously accessed by the authors (e.g. downloaded or otherwise received), but the authors certify that they have not yet observed ANY part of the data/evidence.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 

References
 
1. Jacob, A., Joshanloo, M., Czernecka, R., & Kräplin, A. (2024). Impulsivity and online sports betting behavior: Untangling the causal relationship. In principle acceptance of Version 4 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/7wsfh