When does the perceived wastefulness of different actions affect people's choices? In an influential set of studies examining different conceptions of wastefulness (overspending, underutilization, and sunk costs), Arkes (1996) found a systematic aversion to wastefulness in decision making, even when choosing to avoid wastefulness has no economic value or works against personal interest. While these findings have been influential in basic and applied research, there have been no attempts to directly replicate the results. Moreover, the original study had several methodological limitations, including the use of relatively small samples and critical gaps in statistical reporting and analyses.

 

In the current study, Zhu and Feldman (2024) conducted a high-powered replication of Arkes (1996) using an online sample of participants (N=659). The authors incorporated several extentions to improve the methodological rigor relative to the original article, including comprehension checks, manipulation checks, a within-subjects design, and a novel quantitative analysis of participants' self-reported motivations for their choices. The authors successfully replicated the effect of perceived wastefulness on two of the three scenarios used in the original article, but participants' self-reported reasons for their choices only provided partial support for the role of perceived wastefulness in decisions, with behavioral consistency and maximizing economic value also playing a role. The original effect was not observed in a third scenario, with a failed manipulation check that may indicate changes in the perceptions of wastefulness in the domain (tax preparation). Overall, the results provide some support for the role of wastefulness aversion in decision making, while also showing that perceived wastefulness might be outweighted by other considerations depending on how people interpret or reason about a situation.

 

The Stage 2 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review by the recommender and two expert reviewers. Following revision, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 2 criteria and awarded a positive recommendation.

 

URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/r7tsw
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that was used to answer the research question was generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 

 

 

1. Arkes, H. R. (1996). The psychology of waste. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 9,
213-224. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(199609)9:3%3C213::AID-BDM230%3E3.0.CO;2-1

 

2. Zhu, Z. and Feldman, G. (2024). Revisiting the Psychology of Waste: Replication and extensions Registered Report of Arkes (1996) [Stage 2]. Acceptance of Version 5 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/2jnc8

The psychology of meat-eating offers a fascinating window into moral reasoning, cognition and emotion, as well as applications in the shift toward more sustainable and ethical alternatives to meat consumption. One key observation in this field is the so-called “meat paradox” – the tendency for people to simultaneously eat meat while also caring about animals. One way to resolve this conflict and reduce cognitive dissonance is for people to separate the concept of meat from animals, mentally disengaging from the origins of meat in order to make the act of consumption more ethically acceptable. Another potential explanation is a motivated “denial of mind”, in which people believe that animals lack the mental capacity to experience suffering; therefore, eating an animal is not a harm that the animal will experience. In support of the latter hypothesis, Bastian et al (2012) found that animals judged to have greater mental capacities were also judged as less edible, and that simply reminding meat eaters that an animal was being raised for the purposes of meat consumption led to denial of its mental capacities.

 

Using a large-scale online design in 1000 participants, Jacobs et al. (2024) replicated two studies from Bastian et al. (2012): asking how the perceived mental capabilities of animals relates to both their perceived edibility and the degree of moral concern they elicit, and whether learning that an animal will be consumed influences perceptions of its mental capabilities. The original findings were successfully replicated. For study 1, attributions of mind were negatively related to animals’ edibility, positively related to negative affect towards eating animals, and positively related to moral concern for animals. For study 2, learning that an animal would be used for food led participants to attribute less mind to the animal. Overall, the results strengthen the conclusion that motivated denial of animal minds can be a mechanism for resolving the ‘meat paradox’.

 

The Stage 2 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 2 criteria and awarded a positive recommendation.
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/cru4z

 

Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that was used to answer the research question was generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:

 

 

1. Bastian, B., Loughnan, S., Haslam, N., & Radke, H. R. M. (2012). Don’t mind meat? The denial of mind to animals used for human consumption. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38, 247–256. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167211424291

 

2. Jacobs, T. P., Wang, M., Leach, S., Loong, S. H., Khanna, M., Chan, K. W., Chau, H. T., Tam, Y. Y. & Feldman, G. (2024). Revisiting the motivated denial of mind to animals used for food: Replication and extension of Bastian et al. (2012) [Stage 2]. Acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/mwyde

Numeracy – the ability to understand and work with numbers – is associated with a wide range of social and health-related outcomes, including socioeconomic status, employment, literacy, reasoning, and life satisfaction. A substantial body of evidence has also shown links between numeracy and decision-making, prompting the question of how it relates to finer-grained measures of reasoning, judgment and affect/emotion.

 

In the current study, Zhu and Feldman repeated four influential experiments from a study by Peters et al. (2006), which reported links between numeracy and performance on a variety of decision-making tasks, including attribute framing, frequency-percentage framing, susceptibility to affective influences, and various cognitive biases. The authors also explored several extended questions, including refinements of the original hypotheses and an examination of the relationship between numeracy and confidence in numeric judgments (subjective numeracy).

 

The results broadly constitute a successful replication, with higher numeracy associated with weaker attribute framing and susceptibility to bias. The relationship between numeracy and the frequency-percentage framing effect – that is, the change in decision-making when numbers are presented as frequencies (e.g. 5 out of 100) rather than percentages (e.g. 5%) – was inconclusive for the main analysis that treated numeracy as a categorical variable (low vs. high); however the link emerged reliably in exploratory analyses that considered numeracy as a continuous variable. The outcomes of the extended analyses were mixed, revealing evidence for a potentially weak relationship between numeracy and confidence.

 

The Stage 2 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewer's comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 2 criteria and awarded a positive recommendation.
 

URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/r73fb

 

Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that was used to answer the research question was generated until after IPA. 

 

 

 

 

1. Zhu, M. & Feldman, G. (2022). Revisiting the links between numeracy and decision making: Replication Registered Report of Peters et al. (2006) with an extension examining confidence. Acceptance of Version 5 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/62wqb

 

2. Peters, E., Västfjäll, D., Slovic, P., Mertz, C. K., Mazzocco, K., & Dickert, S. (2006). Numeracy and decision making. Psychological Science, 17, 407-413. https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9280.2006.01720.x

The concept of a “true self” – the deepest and most genuine part of a person’s personality – is fundamental to many aspects of psychology, with influences that extend deep into society and culture. For decades, research in psychology has consistently found that people see their true selves as positive and virtuous. But people also positively regard (and indeed overestimate) many other characteristics related to the self, such as their abilities and achievements, prompting the question of whether there is anything special about the “true self” as a psychological concept. In an influential study, Newman et al. (2014) found that people were more likely to attribute morally good than morally bad changes in the behaviour of other people to their true selves. Crucially, they also found that our tendency to view the true self positively is shaped by our own moral values – in essence, what we regard as morally or politically good, we see in the true selves of others. Newman et al’s findings suggest that the tendency for us to regard our true self in a positive light stems from the specific nature of true self as a concept. 

 

In the current study, Lee and Feldman (2022) propose to replicate two key studies from Newman et al. (2014) in a large online sample. In particular, they will ask whether true-self attributions are higher for changes in behaviour that are morally positive compared to morally negative or neutral, and, further, how true-self attributions are aligned with personal moral/political views. The authors also propose exploring the relationship between true-self attributions and perceived social norms.

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over one round of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).
 
URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/v2tpf

 

Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA. 
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:

 

 

1. Newman, G. E., Bloom, P., & Knobe, J. (2014). Value judgments and the true self. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40, 203–216. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167213508791

 

2. Lee, S. C. & Feldman, G. (2022). Revisiting the link between true-self and morality: Replication and extension of Newman, Bloom, and Knobe (2014) Studies 1 and 2, in principle acceptance of Version 2 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/v2tpf

Emotion is a well-established mediator of decision-making, including prospective economic decisions, but does it affect the way we respond economically to loss? According to classic economic theories, when an object is lost and cannot be recovered, our emotional attachment to that object should be irrelevant for decisions such as choosing whether to claim insurance or compensation. Intriguingly, however, this does not appear to be the case: in a series of experiments, Hsee and Kunreuther (2000) found that when people have higher affection towards an object, they are more sensitive to its loss and are more willing to claim compensation or purchase insurance for the object. They explained these findings according to an influential “consolation hypothesis” in which people see insurance compensation as means to mitigate against the emotional distress associated with property loss.

 

Using a large online sample (N=1000), Law and Feldman (2023) propose to replicate four of six studies from Hsee and Kunreuther (2000), each asking (primarily) whether people with higher affection towards an object are more willing to claim compensation or purchase insurance for that object. In each experiment, participants are randomly assigned to either a high affection group or a low affection group and then given a scenario in which the level of affection to an object is correspondingly manipulated while the monetary value is held constant. For example, for high affection: “You liked the now-damaged painting very much and you fell in love with it at first sight. Although you paid only $100, it was worth a lot more to you”, and for low affection: “You were not particularly crazy about the now-damaged painting. You paid $100 for it, and that’s about how much you think it was worth.” A range of dependent measures are then collected, including the maximum hours participants would be willing to spend driving to claim compensation, the maximum amount participants would be willing to pay for insurance, and how likely participants would be to claim compensation or purchase insurance. As part of the replication, the authors have also built in manipulation checks to confirm that the scenarios influenced participants' (imagined) level of affection for the object, and a range of exploratory analyses.

 

The Stage 1 manuscript was evaluated over two rounds of in-depth review. Based on detailed responses to the reviewers' comments, the recommender judged that the manuscript met the Stage 1 criteria and therefore awarded in-principle acceptance (IPA).

 

URL to the preregistered Stage 1 protocol: https://osf.io/b7y5z
 
Level of bias control achieved: Level 6. No part of the data or evidence that will be used to answer the research question yet exists and no part will be generated until after IPA.
 
List of eligible PCI RR-friendly journals:
 

 

References
 

1. Hsee, C. K., & Kunreuther, H. C. (2000). The affection effect in insurance decisions. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 20, 141-159. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007876907268

2. Law, Y. Y. & Feldman, G. (2023). Revisiting the impact of affection on insurance purchase and claim decision-making: Replication and extensions Registered Report of Hsee and Kunreuther (2000), in principle acceptance of Version 3 by Peer Community in Registered Reports. https://osf.io/b7y5z